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All he tasted; glory growing 
Greater after great embroil; 
Flight; and victory bestowing 
Palace; and the sad exile; 
Twice in the dust a victim razed, 
Twice on the altar victim blazed. 
 
Alessandro Manzoni, The Fifth of May, 1821 
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Foreword 
 
Biographies are not as common in Italian historiography as in the Anglo-
Saxon. The historian Pietro Pastorelli writes that this kind of research can 
be “useful because they give a soul and a face to the central figures of 
politics and contribute to clarify their activity, relating it to their time.”1 So, 
the aim of this work is to understand the actions of Carlo Sforza as a 
diplomat and Foreign Affairs Minister going beyond any preconceived 
opinion, and to relate his decisions and official documents to his “time.” 
Sforza lived through a period in which the world experienced many 
shocking events. His story encompasses the passage from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution, the crisis of the Chinese 
Empire, the First World War and the Second, the end of the European 
hegemony and the rise of the United States as a world power, and the 
beginning of the Cold War. The study of his action as an Italian diplomat, 
Minister, and exile enable the historian to understand the red thread of 
continuity – or discontinuity, in the Italian foreign policy during these 
crucial years for the world.  
As regards Sforza’s life and political thought, important volumes have 
been written. Nevertheless, an all-embracing study of his diplomatic action, 
inclusive of the exile years, misses. Livio Zeno Zencovich and Giancarlo 
Giordano wrote important volumes about Sforza.2 They represent essential 
sources for the reconstruction of the diplomat’s life. Zeno was Sforza’s 
assistant, and his work, rich with episodes and biographical details, can be 
                                                
1 P. Pastorelli, “Sonnino e l’Europa,” in Sonnino e il suo tempo, 1914-1922, edited by Pier 
Luigi Ballini (Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli: 2011). 
2  L. Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza: col carteggio Croce-Sforza e altri documenti inediti (Le 
Monnier, Firenze: 1975); G. Giordano, Carlo Sforza, 2 voll. (Franco Angeli, Milano: 1987). 
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subsumed under the category of memoir. Giordano, as a historian, makes a 
different reconstruction based mainly on Italian diplomatic documents. His 
work is divided into two parts: the first covers the years of Sforza’s 
diplomatic career from 1896 to 1922; the second is about the exile and 
Sforza’s actions after the Second World War. Finally, Rinaldo Merlone's 
book deserves to be mentioned.3 It deals with Carlo Sforza’s “European 
thought.” Merlone focuses on the second post-war period mainly 
scrutinizing Italian documents. The author, in fact, had access to new 
documentation provided by Sforza’s family. 
Sforza himself wrote many books and articles which help in better 
understanding his ideas. But this research has a different aim. As Sforza 
writes, “Historians cannot but describe what statesmen accomplished: at 
most, what they left undone; after having attempted. Historians can rarely 
describe the secret hopes, the doubts, the inner struggles of their heroes.”4  
For this reason, without forgetting his memoirs, the objective of this work 
is to understand Sforza’s actions and foreign policy decisions drawing 
heavily on – published and unpublished – diplomatic documents and 
correspondence. The collection of Documenti Diplomatici Italiani is one of the 
most important sources with Carlo Sforza’s personal file and Sforza’s 
Papers, stored at Archivio Storico Diplomatico of the Italian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and Archivio Centrale di Stato of Rome. Also, the French and 
British collections have been taken into account: Documents Diplomatiques 
Français and Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series. The 
study also considers Sforza’s exchanges of letters with other important 
                                                
3  R. Merlone, L’unificazione europea nel pensiero e nell’azione di Carlo Sforza (Il mulino, 
Bologna: 2009). 
4  C. Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe: Portraits and Personal Impressions and Recollection 
(London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot, 1930), 6. 
	 	 	
5 
personalities: i.e., Giovanni Giolitti, Luigi Alberitni, Gaetano Salvemini, 
Luigi Sturzo, Nicholas Murray Butler, Guglielmo Ferrerro, and Max Ascoli. 
Considering the amount of material related to Carlo Sforza, the study has 
been divided. The dissertation represents the first part of a more ambitious 
project which aims to reconstruct the entire life of Carlo Sforza and his 
international action. This work analyzes the first years of Sforza’s career, 
from 1896 to 1922. In 1896 Sforza became a diplomat; meanwhile, the defeat 
of Adua shocked the Italian political system. In 1922 Sforza decided to 
resign because he strongly disagreed with the foreign policy that the new 
Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini adopted. This choice stressed the 
personal and professional change in Sforza’s life. In fact, he had a career as 
a diplomat and a public servant which ended for good when he left Paris. 
Starting from that moment, Sforza acted as a politician and his actions 
would be related to his political career.  
Entering the diplomatic career in 1986 meant not to be an ordinary 
observer of the political change ongoing in Rome. The defeat of Adua 
provoked the end of Francesco Crispi’s era. It coincided with the return of 
the Consulta to the moderate Emilio Visconti Venosta, who imprinted the 
so-called “colpo di timone” in Italian foreign policy. This change culminated 
in the signing of the Prinietti-Barrère agreements in 1902. This is a 
fundamental step in Carlo Sforza’s trajectory. He grew up among the 
Tuscan moderates and in the “myth” of Alessandro Manzoni, whose family 
was related to him. As a young diplomat, he worked under Salvago Raggi, 
Giuseppe Tornielli, Visconti Venosta and Guglielmo Imperiali. He was 
raised according to the tradition of liberal and Cavourian diplomacy. 
Sforza’s reports and foreign policy choices are the best evidence of this 
attitude, as Sforza himself implies in some passages of his volumes. In 
particular, Visconti Venosta represented a guide for the young Sforza, who 
	 	 	
6 
was the old statesman’s secretary at the Algeciras Conference in 1906. 
Sforza learned from his chief to frame every national problem in the context 
of a “European landscape.” 5 When the diplomat became the Foreign Affairs 
Minister in the last Giolitti Cabinet in 1920-21, he abandoned the policy of 
“principles” to adopt a more conciliatory attitude with the aim to avoid 
isolation in a modified international system.6 He was more interested in the 
opening of commercial paths than territorial acquisitions. He believed that 
Italy’s true security resided in peaceful relations with its new neighbors, 
those countries born from the new territorial arrangements agreed upon by 
the Allies at Versailles. 
In 1922 Benito Mussolini seized the power. Though, the well-known 
“march on Rome,” on October 28th, was a pivotal moment chiefly for 
domestic politics, Sforza, observing the changes from his Parisian Embassy, 
decided to resign with a telegram transmitted en clair to the Consulta. The 
case hit the headlines and the foreign chancelleries. The diplomat declared 
that he did not share the new foreign policy’s guidelines, which Mussolini 
had announced in Naples on October 24th. In the first years, however, the 
fascist leader acted in continuity with previous governments. Meantime, 
Sforza maintained his seat as an Italian Senator and preserved his 
international contacts. The ex-Foreign Minister left Italy only in 1926 and 
travelled across Europe, Asia, North and South America, becoming an 
“envoy” of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
The documents do not always allow for full understanding of what 
transpire, so Sforza’s memoirs are crucial, above all to understand the 
experiences that were most important to him. For instance, the study does 
not give much space to the periods Sforza worked in Rome as Chief of the 
                                                
5 C. Sforza, L’Italia dal 1914 al 1944: Quale io la vidi (Verona: Mondadori ,1946 – 3rd edition), 
23.  
6 Ibid., 61. 
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Cabinet or Undersecretary. He did not like to work at the Consulta; he felt 
away from international affairs and without opportunities to leave his 
mark. He knew the way to have his position changed, so those periods 
never lasted for a long time. As many said, Sforza had a strong sense of his 
own self-worth; he was ambitious, yet, this does not mean he was “blinded” 
by it. In contrast, based on the circumstances, he was ready to shift his 
positions and ideas. He labored constantly for Italian security and the 
maintenance of peace.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE INCEPTION OF A DIPLOMATIC CAREER 
 
 
Carlo Sforza used to say that there was only a real kind of nobility, and it 
was the nobility that came from “landed property.”7 His family owned 
several lands in Montignoso and Antognano, the two “castles” of Lunigiana 
– an Italian historical region located between Liguria and Tuscany, close to 
the basin of the river Magra.8 The Sforza family had settled in this area for 
generations. Sforza’s ancestors had relocated to Lunigiana from Borgonovo 
Val Tidone and Castel San Giovanni: two hamlets in the province of 
Piacenza. These hamlets were, in ancient times, fiefs of Sforza Secondo 
Sforza, by-blow of Francesco Sforza, who was the first Duke of Milan in the 
fifteenth century. 9  However, Carlo’s grandfather, Pietro Sforza, was 
compelled to leave his possessions and to move to Tuscany in 1849, because 
he took part in the unsuccessful 1848 uprisings against the Duke of Modena, 
Francis V of Austria-Este, who had extended his power in this region since 
                                                
7 L. Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza: col carteggio Croce-Sforza e altri documenti inediti (Firenze: 
Le Monnier, 1975), 38. 
8 L. Bazzi-Scotti, ‘L’Uomo’, Montignoso Town Hall (ed.), Giovanni Sforza: la bibliografia dei 
suoi scritti e quattro discorsi commemorativi (Pontremoli: Cavanna, 1923), 5. 
9 Enciclopedia Treccani, Sforza, Sforza Secondo, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/sforza-
secondo-sforza/ (accessed 09/17/2016). 
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1847, and imposed a less “liberal” regime.10 His son Giovanni grew up in an 
atmosphere made of political inspirations and became an archivist and a 
well-known historian. When he was eighteen, he had already published his 
first manuscript about the history of Montignoso, and, as soon as he could 
go back to Lunigiana, he issued several studies about his homeland. 11 
Moreover, his cousin, Giambattista Giorgini, married Vittoria Manzoni, 
daughter of the renowned writer Alessandro Manzoni, who gave him the 
chance to work on important primary sources. In 1882 Giovanni Sforza 
edited the first collection of Manzoni’s letters; this was just the beginning of 
a long series of studies about the author who became rather an obsession in 
the Sforza family.12 Manzoni was such an obsession that Carlo Sforza even 
considered a manuscript of the Fifth of May as sacred, bringing the text with 
him on all of his travels up until his death. According to Carlo Sforza’s 
personal assistant, Livio Zeno Zencovich, it was a “memento” of his 
childhood spent in Montignoso.13 
 
 
 
1.I. A YOUNG AMIDST “MODERATES” 
 
Montignoso was for the young Carlo Sforza a melting pot of culture and 
politics. His family owned properties bordering those of Giorgini, and there 
                                                
10 R. Mori, C. Morangio Bonaiuti (ed.), Scritti minori sulla Toscana (Roma: Jouvence, 1998), 
179-180. 
11 G. Sforza, Memorie storiche di Montignoso di Lunigiana (Lucca: Canovetti, 1867). 
12 G. Sforza, Epistolario di Alessandro Manzoni raccolto e annotato (Milano: Paolo Carrara, 
1881-1882). See L. Bazzi-Scotti, ‘L’Uomo’, 6. 
13 Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, 36. 
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was a special relationship between the two families. 14  Giambattista 
Giorgini, was Carlo’s favorite uncle, and Carlo loved Giorgini’s tales about 
the Italian Risorgimento.15  Giorgini had been a peer of Bettino Ricasoli, the 
leader of the Tuscan moderates who had supported Cavour’s policies since 
1859, and who had been an active player in the making of the Italian 
Kingdom. Ricasoli belonged to that exclusive regional elite, named 
Consorteria, composed of property owners that joined the so-called Destra 
Storica, the Right, once the Italian State had been established. 16  Despite 
previous skepticism about a possible union with the other Italian States 
under the Piedmontese Monarchy, the regional state was doomed to 
disappear; in fact, they had reasons for this belief based upon their own 
personal interests.17  
During the Sixties most of them would change their businesses from 
sharecropping to international finance, and the Parliament’s aisles would 
become places for commercial negotiations. 18  They did not have a real 
liberal State in mind, rather an “omnipresent” State to be an engine of the 
national economy. For this reason, when Ricasoli assumed the office of 
Prime Minister, on June 1861, he was particularly focused on the economic 
issues.19 Giorgini, who had worked with Ricasoli in order to made Tuscany 
part of Italy, was not a minister of this executive, but he supported it as a 
member of the first Italian Parliament.  
Giorgini’s house had been the center where the Tuscan high society met 
the Piedmontese liberal school. This was in part due to his link with 
                                                
14 Mori, Morangio Bonaiuti, Scritti minori sulla Toscana, 178. 
15 G. Giordano, Carlo Sforza: La Diplomazia, 1896-1922 (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1987), 12-14. 
16 M. Battini, ‘Per una storia della Toscana Rossa’, E. Fasano Guarini, G. Petralia, P. Pezzino, 
Storia della Toscana: Dal Settecento a oggi (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2014), 119. 
17 Mori, Morangio Bonaiuti, Scritti minori sulla Toscana, 278-279. 
18 G. Mori (ed.), ‘La Toscana’, Storia d'Italia: Le regioni dall'Unità a oggi (Torino: Einaudi, 
1986), 114. 
19 Ibid., 99-100. 
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Massimo D’Azeglio, Manzoni’s son-in-law, as the Giorgini family had 
hosted him in Pisa during the 1848 uprisings, before D’Azeglio became one 
of the most influential political men in Turin. Moreover, Giorgini and 
D’Azeglio both had been persecuted during Francesco Domenico 
Guerrazzi’s rule in March 1849.  
Guerrazzi tried to establish a republic in Tuscany, where Republicans 
could be “counted on the fingers of one hand.”20 According to Giorgini’s 
memories, Guerrazzi profited from the absence of Grand Duke Leopoldo II, 
but he did not manage dissension, so he used violence. As a result, Tuscany 
was “neither a monarchy nor a republic, but the denial of all principles, the 
loss of all consciences, the freedom of all appetites, the anarchy born from 
the ruin of all political institutions.”21 When the Grand Duke returned to 
Florence thanks to Austrian help, the restoration was severe, and the 
moderates became more interested in the Piedmontese Monarchy, which 
led the war against Vienna for Italian independence. Nevertheless, the 
moderates did not choose the revolution. They preferred to wait rather than 
pursue actions similar to those in 1848-49. Indeed, they did not have a real 
plan to achieve their political goals until 1859, when Cavour’s policies 
offered them the opportunity to realize the kind of State they wanted.22 
Carlo Sforza did not live through that political period, since he was only 
born on September 23, 1872. He was born in Lucca, the hometown of his 
mother Elisa Pietrantoni. 23  He was the third of five siblings: his eldest 
brother, Pier Alessandro was born in 1866, and took up a military career;  
Cesare was born in 1870 and became a doctor; Ascanio Michele was born in 
                                                
20 C. Sforza, ‘La Toscana sotto Guerrazzi in una descrizione del tempo’, La Critica: Rivista di 
Letteratura, Storia e Filosofia, n. 24, 1926, 254. 
21 Ibid., 255. 
22 Mori, Morangio Bonaiuti, Scritti minori sulla Toscana, 284-286. 
23 Sforza, ‘Mia madre’, L. Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, 399-400. 
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1877 and graduated in physics at the University of Genova and in civil 
engineering at Turin; his only sister, Luisa, was born in 1878 but she died 
few month after.24   
During his adolescence Carlo saw his uncle daily, and Giorgini told him 
everything about the making of Italy. “He was then very old,” Sforza 
remembers in his memoirs, “but endowed with a miraculous memory.”25  
The young man was “steeped” in that kind of “liberalism” that was clearly 
different from other European ideals.26 As the future Foreign Minister later 
taught to his American students, “Italian liberalism was above all the 
watchword common to all the elite of Italy, from Turin to Palermo, which 
would bring to fruition the cause of Italian liberty and independence.”27 It 
was also an “optimistic” approach to life, asserted Sforza, which was a 
typical stance of people born after 1870 – after Rome had become part of the 
Kingdom, and the Pope had been deprived of the temporal power.28  
The suppression of the Catholic political authority had been “one of the 
supreme aspirations of Dante [Alighieri]” and part of Manzoni’s political 
thought; even if Manzoni was an “ardent Catholic”, he voted for the 
annexation of Rome as Senator of the Italian Parliament. “His politics,” 
Sforza said, “were simple: he wanted the independence and unity of Italy; 
he believed ardently in the necessity of a moral law in politics.”29  Manzoni, 
“acclaimed as the greatest Catholic poet of the nineteenth century,” was a 
real enigma for young Sforza, who asked his uncle about the writer’s 
conversion a “hundred times.” Giorgini was one of the Manzoni’s “dearest 
                                                
24 Giordano, La Diplomazia, 12; R. Merlone, L’unificazione europea nel pensiero e nell’azione di 
Carlo Sforza (Bologna: Il mulino, 2009), 31-32. 
25 C. Sforza, Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins (New York: Dutton & Co., 
1944), 48. 
26 Sforza, L’Italia dal 1914 al 1944, 13. 
27 Sforza, Contemporary Italy, 87. 
28 Sforza, L’Italia dal 1914 al 1944, 13. 
29 Sforza, Contemporary Italy, 50. 
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and most intimate friends,” and he used to reply only with one word: 
“Grace.”30  
This answer recalled the “Romantic Catholicism” that was, as the 
historian Fedrico Chabod explained, a set of “ideas and feelings flourished 
in Europe in the early nineteenth century, in a climate pregnant with the 
sense of religion, with messianic expectations of a new triumph of the 
faith.”31 Manzoni was one of those intellectuals, along with the philosopher 
Rosmini, who “propounded an accord between science and faith, between 
the church and liberty, between the church and modern thought.” 
Somehow, a close point of view to the Cavourean principle, “free Church 
in a free State,” which inspired the Bon Compagni Bill in 1861 and the choice 
of the diplomatic method – rather than war – in order to find a 
compromise.32  
Chabod claimed that the “latter disciple” of this tradition was Ricasoli; 
he “believed that it – the tradition of Rosmini and Manzoni – had to become 
a working faith even for the laity, and not remain the purely contemplative 
faith predicated by the Government.”33 However, in the Seventies it was 
very hard to understand these theories, and the Left voices prevailed. “For 
them Italy would have no good reason to exist if it failed to meet the 
responsibility assigned to it by destiny”: i.e. free the papacy from the 
temporal power and make Rome the capital of the Italian Kingdom.34 The 
“Roman Question” was the major issue between the two parties. 
“Moderates… felt that religious sentiment had, and could not lose, a 
                                                
30 Ibid., 48-49. 
31  F. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 186. 
32 For an analysis about the diplomatic consequences of the Roman Question, see R. Mori, 
La Questione Romana (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1963) and id., II tramonto del potere temporale 
(Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1967). 
33 Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 186. 
34 Ibid., 186-187. 
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fundamental importance in the social life of mankind.” On the Left side, 
“the Italian state would be truly and strongly established only when 
reverential subjection to the church had dissipated for good.”35 
Some scholars, and Sforza too, tended to say that there were no real 
differences between the old Right and Left policies, with the exception that 
the Right had represented the majority until 1876 and the Left was the 
opposition.36 It is interesting to note that the Roman Question had not been 
dismissed with the conquest of Rome in 1870; it continued to influence the 
Italian domestic and foreign policy, for instance the signing of the Triple 
Alliance Treaty in 1882 and the Pact of London in 1915. Even when Sforza 
became the Foreign Minister in Giolitti’s government in 1920, he had to face 
the thorny problem of the relationship with the Pope.37  
In 1875 the Foreign Affairs Minister Emilio Visconti Venosta, a moderate, 
told a French envoy that “he believed in the influence and development of 
Catholicism in the future.”38  Indeed, at university Carlo Sforza was bound 
to meet another Italian Catholic “intellectual soul” and outrider of the 
Christian Democracy Party, Giuseppe Toniolo. The latter taught Political 
                                                
35 Ibid., 196. 
36 C. Seton Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870-1925 (London: Methuen, 1967), 42; 
C. Sforza, Contemporary Italy, 87. For a different perspective, see L. Slavatorelli, A Concise 
History of Italy: From Prehistorc Times to Our Own Days (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1940), 588-589. 
37  C. Sforza, L’Italia dal 1914 al 1944, 167-169; G.B. Varnier, Gli ultimi governi liberali e la 
Questione romana, 1918-1922 (Milano: Giuffré, 1976), 147-148. About the origins of the Triple 
Alliance, see G. Volpe (ed.), L’Italia nella Triplice alleanza, 1882-1915 (Milano: Ispi, 1939); L. 
Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza. Storia diplomatica 1877-1912 (Milano-Varese: Ispi, 1939); G. 
Salvemini, La politica estera dell’Italia, 1871-1915 (Firenze: Barbera, 1950); W. L. Langer, 
European alliances and alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Knopf, 1950); B. Croce, Storia 
d’Italia dal 1871 al 1915 (Milano: Adelphi, 1991 – originally published: 1928); C. Morandi, 
La politica estera dell’Italia da Porta Pia all’età giolittiana, (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1968); A. Torre, 
La politica estera dell’Italia dal 1870 al 1896 (Bologna: Patron, 1969); R. Petrignani, Neutralità 
e alleanza: Le scelte di politica estera dell’Italia dopo l’Unità (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987). 
38 Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 196. 
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Economy and Statistics in Pisa, where Sforza was studying Law.39 It has to 
be pointed out that young Sforza was not a brilliant student, at least in 
Toniolo’s subject areas. He obtained twenty-three out of thirty in Statistics, 
and nineteen in Political Economy.40 The poor performance might be due to 
his penchant for Humanities. Sforza attended the State high school Niccolò 
Machiavelli in Lucca;41 and, according to the Casati Law which governed 
the education system at that time, this was the only way to access the 
universities.  
Toniolo had theorized about the intersection of public economy and 
morality since the Seventies, becoming a “guide for the Catholic social 
movement”.42  Nevertheless, in Sforza’s memoirs the professor played a 
lesser role than Luigi Sturzo, who was the founder of the Partito Popolare 
Italiano in 1919. Toniolo represented the “champion of the ancien régime, 
detached and systematic, he used to tell his learners that the ideal of 
democracy was not ahead but behind, in the Middle Ages, when the society 
was organized in guilds.” Sturzo, argued Sforza in 1944, was of a higher  
intelligence and had more heart; he was a “passionate, artist, philosopher, 
deeply loyal to the cause of those suffering, a free spirit, despite the catholic 
orthodoxy.” 43  In other words, Sturzo reminded Sforza of Manzoni’s 
“grace,” and it was not by chance that in 1947 Sforza became the Foreign 
Affairs Minister in the Government guided by Alcide De Gasperi, the heir 
of Sturzo. Sforza decided to support the action of the Christian Democracy’s 
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41 Merlone, L’unificazione europea nel…, 32. 
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leader for, according to Zeno, a simple reason: Sturzo and Manzoni both 
had embodied “an Italian policy free from clerical hierarchy’s pressure.”44 
 
 
 
1.II. NEW DIPLOMATS AT THE TRAILHEAD 
 
Despite receiving a low final grade, an 84 out of 110, Carlo Sforza graduated 
on December 4, 1895 at the age of twenty-three. Following graduation, he 
immediately participated in the open competitive exam in order to access a 
diplomatic career as a diplomatic and consular attaché.45 It was just a lucky 
coincidence that he was even able to apply; originally, the exam had been 
scheduled for December 4th and there were only ten job openings instead 
of 12, but a few days before the original start date for the test, a ministerial 
decree delayed it to a future date.46  
The Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry was understaffed and several new 
exams were expected. As a royal decree of December 8th stated in the new 
guidelines for the admission in the “first category” career, the careers were 
divided into diplomatic-consular service and internal officials.47 According 
to the new rules, the applicants had to be Italian and not less than twenty 
years old, fulfill their military service requirements, be in good health and 
had irreproachable behavior, and hold a university degree or diploma from 
                                                
44 L. Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, 263. 
45 Certificato generale di studi Università di Pisa, Dec. 16, 1895, in ASD, Coll. Personale, 
Concorsi – 1895, t. 22, fol. 4. See also P. Pastorelli’s speech, In ricordo di Carlo Sforza, 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Istituto Diplomatico Mario Toscano (ed.) (Roma: Servizio 
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46 Ministerial Decree, Dec. 1, 1895, in ASD, Coll. Personale, Concorsi – 1894-1896, t. 21, fol. 3. 
47 Royal Decree ‘Per l’ammissione alla carriera di prima categoria,’ Dec. 8, 1895, Art. 1, ASD, 
Coll. Personale, Concorsi – 1894-1896, t. 21, fol. 3. 
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the other State-recognized institutes. They also had to know two foreign 
languages, such as French, English, German or Arabic, Turk, Persian, 
Amharic, Japanese, and Chinese. Finally they had to demonstrate the 
financial ability to afford two years training using their own resources.48 
The examination would test the ability: to write essays about  history, 
geography, law, economics or other international issues related to the 
Italian interests, also in a foreign language; and to speak in a foreign 
language. In the second part, essentially, the candidate had to be able to 
confirm his skills in front of a Commission.49 
The Government attached great importance to this reform since the 
diplomatic service had some troubles in the previous years.50 So, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Baron Alberto De Blanc wrote to the Commission’s 
President, the Marquis Francesco Nobili Vitelleschi that the aim of the new 
recruitment system was to increase the quality of the service. The old exam, 
in fact, did not consider some important subjects, such as history and 
geography, nor did it require proficiency in other languages, even those 
considered “essential,” like French, English, and German.51 But the main 
change, in the Minister’s opinion, was the training: the eligible candidates 
had to take on more than two years of service abroad without being paid 
and with no guarantee of being hired. This measure had a double meaning: 
it would have discouraged those interested in money, but attracted the real 
patriots, and it was thought to fill an experience gap that theoretical studies 
could not satisfy.  
                                                
48 Ibid., Art. 2. 
49 Ibid., Art. 4. 
50  Università degli Studi di Lecce, Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche e Sociali (ed.), La 
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e Zecca dello Stato, 1986), 105. 
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To sum up, the real goal of the exam was to understand the candidates’ 
flair for entering this period of practicing. For this reason, De Blanc asked 
Vitelleschi to develop broad topics for the essay prompts with the purpose 
of allowing everyone to display their culture and allow inadequacy as well 
true talent to reveal itself.52 
 
It has to be learnt by practical experience that commercial, industrial, 
agricultural, financial interests are representing more and more the basis of 
political interests, they are increasingly garnering international relevance, 
and, if they do not lead directly to war or peace, they cause good or bad 
relations between countries, gather or alienate the spirits of people; as 
customs and rail fees, post, telegraphic and monetary unions, colonial and 
health affairs or the ones concerning emigration and foreign religious group, 
the different defense systems, or the implementation of the international civil 
law – all those issues – influence at the same time the wealth of the citizens 
and the power of States, which has its foundation on the same wealth.53 
 
The truth is that most of the Italian diplomats came from the old regional 
states and were used to different systems, so their methods and analysis 
were obsolete. Moreover, Rome was experiencing a difficult phase in the 
international community. Crispi had been appointed once again President 
of the Italian government in 1893 with the purpose of reestablishing the 
order in the country, devastated by socialist protests, and a foreign policy. 
According to Crispi the two situations were strictly related; the Prime 
Minister was persuaded that France was financing the Socialist and 
Republican parties and working on destabilizing the country and 
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undermining the Triple Alliance. 54  Instead, Crispi’s main goal were to 
bolster the Entente with the central Monarchies and achieve the alliance 
with Great Britain. With this purpose, he decided to call De Blanc as Foreign 
Minister.  
Baron De Blanc had been a diplomat for a long time and came from the 
Right, but he was a committed “triplicist” and an advocate of the Anglo-
Italian partnership.55 In his mind, these were the two necessary tools to 
protect Italy, so it was heresy to let Great Britain join the Franco-Russian 
entente. He tried to revitalize the 1887 Mediterranean Agreement signed 
with London and Vienna, profiting from the change in London’s 
Government in 1895, when the conservative party returned to office with 
the Marquees of Salisbury.56 The strategy presupposed that England and 
Austria had to take some joint action against the Ottoman Empire. Rome 
would have backed up this intervention, ensuring its influence over an 
African territory. But, the time had changed, and Germany was not 
interested in such a system; consequently, Austria had no reason for getting 
involved, and England would have never acted alone. Blanc’s policy was 
outdated, and he was not able to find any aid for his dreams of victory in 
Africa.57 Hence, Rome had to face alone the strong resistance that its army 
was encountering in the Horn of Africa to defend the colony of Eritrea. 
Problems had arisen with Menelik, the Ethiopian Negus, from the 
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demarcation of boundaries. Finally, Menelik, assisted by France and Russia, 
was able to defeat the Italian Army in the Adowa battle on March 1, 1896.58 
The African setback represented a real landmark for the Italian foreign 
policy, somehow it also had consequences for other countries engaged in 
the administration of the East African territories. In fact, according to the 
historian Albrecht-Carrié, the withdrawal of Italian ranks provoked the 
English decision to reconquer Sudan in order to prevent a possible French 
advance to the Nile.59 Rome was, obviously, the most effected, to such an 
extent that Crispi was compelled to resign as Prime Minister while people 
besieged the institutional buildings.60  
In this context Carlo Sforza entered his diplomatic career. He had sat the 
first paper on February 24th and the others in the two following days; 
besides that, he chose topics about colonialism for both the essays. To be 
more precise, the tasks’ titles assigned by the Commission were: concerning 
international law, “How to acquire or, particularly, to occupy territories 
according to the international law;” as regards history, politics, geography 
and economics, “The main colonial systems adopted by Spain, the 
Netherlands, England and the United States.” 61  It would have been 
interesting to read them, but it was not possible to find the documents in 
the Archive. They were, clearly, the outcome of a different era because, after 
March, Italy entered a “serious crisis,” which led the country into a real 
review of the foreign policy.62  
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The new cabinet, guided by the Marquis di Rudinì, was constituted on 
March 10th and immediately sat down with Menelik to found a compromise 
and the peace agreement which was signed in October. So, it is not by 
chance, that Sforza, who passed the first session of the exam, had to wait 
until the end of April for the interview and the final result was 
communicated to the Ministry only on May 10th. On May 20th Sforza was in 
the twelve who entered the diplomatic career, – he was the fifth in the slate 
– and his first mission was in Egypt. 
 
 
 
1.III. VOLUNTEER IN CAIRO: WATCHING THE MODERATES’ COMEBACK 
 
On May 29, 1896 the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Onorato 
Caetani, notified Sforza the result of his exam, and on June 1st the Assistant 
Secretary Lelio Bonin Longare wrote him about his first destination.63 The 
young man was assigned as Consular Secretary at the Italian Agency in 
Cairo, directed by the Marquis Salvago Raggi.64 The diplomat was one of 
those hostile to Crispi: “At this time there is no longer disgrace to our 
country that – quite late if you wish – has cleaned itself up,” wrote Salvago 
Raggi to Caetani in March 1896, when he took office as minister.65 After all, 
Cairo was an important city for the European balance of power: a struggle 
for the Nile and the influence on Sudan was underway between France and 
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England, and the Italian withdrawal from the Horn of Africa worried 
London. However, the British were not inclined to support the Italians; they 
were more concerned about the Dervish conquest of the Nile valley. For this 
reason, on March 12th Salisbury launched a military mission against 
Dongola that was far away from Italian territories. 
Italy was still isolated, and Rudinì, known for being Francophile and 
hostile to the Abyssinian adventure, had to ask the Chamber for a budget 
increase on March 17th in order to maintain the Eritrean garrison. 66 
However, a few days before the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Tornielli 
remarked on the necessity to maintain the African colonies, since even Paris 
was interested in the Italian presence and entente with Great Britain, as 
antidote to any possible future entanglement in the European framework.67 
Doubts gathered around Italy when in April – a few months before Sforza’s 
arrival, a press agency broke the story of the Italian evacuation from 
Kassala, a Sudanese territory close to Eritrea, where Rome had extended its 
rule, as they were threatened by the Dervish army. Kitchener, Chief of the 
Egyptian army, was seriously upset by the news that he “could not believe 
true”, reported Salvago Raggi.68 On April 10th, the English Ambassador in 
Rome told Caetani that such an event would have fostered the Dervish 
push, and if it was “necessary,” the Italian cabinet had to inform the 
Queen’s Government previously. But, by April Rudinì put an end to the 
discussion, at least until the Fall, confirming the seizure of Kassala, with the 
exception of severe military danger.69 
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Rudinì thought that the adoption of a genial attitude with the British was 
the best choice in order to defend the national interests. Rome and London, 
as he declared to the Chamber on May 25, 1896, were pursuing the same 
objectives in the Mediterranean area. Therefore, a cordial entente with Great 
Britain “fulfilled” the Italian “alliances system.” 70  He had in mind an 
“exchange of alliances:” it meant that the Triple Alliance was still essential 
for the Italian strategy, which mainly pursued peace in Europe.71 Rome 
should have been very careful in his friendship with Berlin and Vienna, 
Rudinì urged, because it was the only way to maintain the statu quo, that 
meant national security.72 The Kingdom of Sardinia had been involved in 
the Eastern question since the Crimean War of 1856. The Italian Kingdom 
inherited this position in 1861 and its policy had always been inspired by 
the two conflicting principles of maintaining the status quo and defending 
nationalities. According to the principle of “inorientamento” fixed in the 
Triple Alliance’s Treaty since 1887, Italy would obtain compensations if 
territorial changes occurred in the Balkans or on the coasts and islands of 
the Adriatic and Aegean seas. Indeed, the Italian Governments thought 
they could complete the unitary process – that meant to obtain the terre 
irredente which belonged to the Austrian Empire, by using diplomacy. 
Indeed, Rudinì let the agreement automatically renew until 1902. On the 
other side, it has to be underlined, that he had to face with a Parliament 
from the 1895 elections, where the majority was still pro-Crispi. He could 
not carry out a radical change, but some adjustments were in progress. He 
said that a peaceful policy should have been made up of true and deep 
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feelings of friendship towards everyone, “signally towards France and 
Russia.”73 
 
I mean to maintain resolutely the Triple Alliance, to maintain resolutely the 
policy it asked for, agreed in the treaties and still effective. But, I mean to 
apply it in that way, and I mean to lead the Government’s policy with those 
principles, that would not be modified by good relations with Russia or 
France, relations that I want to make more friendly; more cordially, truly 
and, I wish to say, quite affectionately friendly.74 
 
In those days Rome was trying to find a way to negotiate with Paris in 
order to normalize the commercial relations between the two countries, 
which went through a trade war almost ten years before.75 The agreement 
was imperative to the Italian economy and essential to establish a political 
entente, but the French government did not seem interested. According to 
the Foreign Affairs Minister, Paris only wanted to arrange the deal 
concerning the Tunis dispute.76  
The two parties were exactly on the opposite sides, and at the end of June, 
when Sforza arrived in Cairo, a solution had not been found yet. Rudinì 
overcame the stalemate with a cabinet reshuffle at the beginning of July, 
and he called Emilio Visconti Venosta as a guide for the Italian diplomacy.77 
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He was a man of the Right, Cavour’s disciple, and the only one who had 
been Foreign Minister for almost ten consecutive years, from 1866 to 1876, 
with a break between 1867 and 1869. His most famous phrase was 
“indipendenti sempre, isolati mai,” – i.e., “always free, but never isolated” – 
instead, when he entered the Consulta the risk was even worse. Vienna, 
without respecting the consulting clause, signed an agreement on July 20th 
with which recognized the French protectorate over Tunisia. Paris was also 
driving a bargain with London concerning Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, 
and for this reason the new minister sent Caetani, his predecessor, to Great 
Britain.78  
In Visconti Venosta’s view the national problems had to be faced from a 
“European” perspective because every single action had effects on the 
entire international system. Moreover, as Chabod highlighted, “every one 
of the powers had, at a certain point, to be limited by a sense of the general 
expediency.” It meant that every country should act according to notions of 
“European equilibrium” and the “concert of the great powers,” that were 
“the essential precondition for the liberty and security of Europe and the 
safeguarding of peace.” Particularly, Italy was a country which “cannot 
make a place” for itself or advance “except in Europe where there exists a 
certain equilibrium of forces.”79  
Visconti Venosta accepted the French conditions and recognized the 
French protectorate. Maybe, Italy had to pay a high price, but, at least, it 
was no longer isolated and normal relations with France could be restored: 
it was a real revolution for the Italian foreign policy, a “colpo di timone” – i.e. 
“changing the helm” – as it has been defined.80 By the end of September, 
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Visconti Venosta could sign the agreement that acknowledged the same 
privileges for the Italian community as for the French and the indigenous. 
Moreover, Paris accepted giving autonomy to Italian institutes and 
associations. Finally, they agreed on the most favored nation’s clause 
concerning merchant navigation. 
Carlo Sforza was just a volunteer, so he had little to do with the policy 
making, but clearly, he could watch the events from a special position. It is 
not possible to say which procedures the young secretary was following, 
since there is nothing in his private papers of this time, and he did not sign 
the reports sent to Rome. Nevertheless, he was not scared of displaying his 
ideas.  
During a lunch an Austrian attaché teased him, talking persistently about 
Adua and the Italian Army retreat, when Sforza replied that the Italian 
“soldiers withdraw because of the weapons pressure, whereas yours fell 
back only once the Italians kicked them in their ass.” It was a strong 
statement, maybe too much since later Salvago Raggi had to beg him not to 
provoke diplomatic incidents.81 As a young man, sometimes he impulsively 
reacted. He did not tolerate the sarcastic remarks of his colleagues and he 
shared an anti-Austrian sentiment with most Italians. However, in those 
days his task was to write half-year reports. Some of them where published 
on reviews, as the historian Pietro Pastorelli noticed during his speech in 
Carlo Sforza’s memory.82  
The result of the Egyptian experience was an essay about the reform of 
the national prison system. The Italian Consulate was concerned because of 
the rise in the amount of criminals – above all among teenagers – which was 
partly caused by “incomplete mix of the European civilization with the 
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Arabs.”83 Consular Tribunals convicts’ treatment, particularly the treatment 
of minors who often did not serve the term of imprisonment. The problem 
was related to the fact that in Egypt there was not a detention camp for 
them, and it was impossible to transport them in Italy cause of the 
administrative procedures. “For the ethics of the country and the decency 
of that great Italian colony” which was protected according the regime of 
capitulations, Sforza wrote,  “it is desirable that our Consulates could take 
advantage of the new camp and obtain the admission of those young 
undisciplined minors, who are sentenced by our Consular Tribunal to enter 
a reformatory.”84 The essay was issued in 1898, at that moment Sforza was 
already in Paris where he had been appointed as Embassy attaché on May 
1897. 
 
 
 
1. IV. TORNIELLI AND THE PARISIAN PRACTICE 
 
It may be a coincidence that Tornielli, the Italian Ambassador in Paris, had 
been a member and the secretary of the Commission created by the Italian 
Ministry of Justice for the review of the Egyptian proposal for judiciary 
reform in 1871.85 At the end of the nineteenth century Egypt was without 
doubts one of the major disputes between the European powers, namely 
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France and England – the previous Tornielli’s office. Sforza arrived in Paris 
on June 9, 1897, when the Franco-English relations were becoming 
increasingly strained because of the clashes about the African territories.86 
In fact, the French destination had been Sforza’s first choice, but there were 
no available positions when he began his career in 1896.87  
Tornielli had already written to Rome asking for more staff; his Embassy 
was pivotal in the reorientation of the Italian foreign policy. After the 
signing of the Tunisian agreement, the Franco-Italian secret contacts carried 
on with the aim of reaching a commercial entente.  So, when in May the 
Embassy’s secretary left because of serious health issues the Ambassador 
urged  prompt action from the Consulta. 88  For this reason, Sforza was 
ordered to leave Cairo and reach his new office as soon as possible. He 
would have been in the French capital city for the next four years which 
means he completed his period of practice there, with one of the most 
experienced Italian ambassadors.  
Giuseppe Brusati Tornielli had served the Foreign Affairs Ministry since 
1862, but he had already worked for the Sardinian State Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs since the Fifties. According to the English historian Duggan, 
Tornielli was a close friend of Rudinì.89 But, it was not enough for the new 
French Ambassador in Rome, Camille Barrère, who arrived in Palazzo 
Farnese – where the French embassy is located – at the beginning of 1898. 
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The two diplomats had opposite natures; the Italian was careful and 
detached, while the French was passionate and ambitious, as Sforza 
remembered. Consequently, Tornielli wanted to reach the political entente 
with the Latin sister adopting a moderate strategy, and, for this reason, 
Barrère tried to keep his Italian colleague out of every secret negotiation.90 
Tornielli’s action, instead, was relevant, even if his devotion to the 
Monarchy caused him a recurring crisis of conscience. “Would the 
rapprochement to France carry the disparagement of the royal institutions 
and of the ‘moderates’ ideals?” 91  This was the major fear for the old 
diplomat who asked to be replaced in the summer of 1897, argued Serra. 
Visconti Venosta did not have doubts about his reliability and refused to 
lose such an important partner in a thorny situation. The problem was not 
Tornielli, but the incompatible interests of the two countries. Paris still 
wanted Italy’s exit from the Triple Alliance; on the other side Rome needed 
good relations with Germany because of the irredentism. Barrère’s 
diplomatic skill lay in persuading his government that it was not possible 
to accomplish this project at that moment. It had to remain as the final goal 
of French foreign policy; in the meantime, his action would have been 
focused on a program to tie Rome to Paris in some specific fields.92 
The new course of the Franco-Italian relations was also fostered by a 
political overhaul in France, where a new Government established on June 
1898. The radical Brisson led the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs Minister 
was Delcassé, – previously, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Colonies – 
who had supported, as a journalist, the governments that started the trade 
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war against Italy during the ‘80s. For this reason, Tornielli was worried but 
there were other ministers favorable to a Franco-Italian entente.93  
Paris was trying to overcome all the difficulties with its potential friends, 
having in mind a bigger design that was the isolation of Germany. 
Moreover, on May 1897 Russia, the only French ally, had signed an 
agreement with Austria concerning the Balkan situation and the 
maintenance of the statu quo.94 Considering this framework, it is possible to 
understand the two main decisions of that year. At the beginning of 
November, Delcassé decided to yield to the English pressures in the 
Fashoda dispute that became the symbol of the rivalry between the two 
countries for the control of the upper Nile basin.95 On November 21st the 
commercial treaty with Italy was signed.  
The new Italian cabinet guided by Pelloux with Canevaro as Foreign 
Minister, took advantage from the French claims in Sudan choosing the 
neutrality between the two Mediterranean countries and pushing the 
bilateral negotiations on.96  Finally, Italy recognized France as the “most 
favored nation,” and France granted the minimum tariff to Italy. It was a 
commercial treaty, but it had a political value as the following events would 
reveal.97 
Since that moment the contacts between Rome and Paris continued, with 
some difficult phases. For instance, on March 21, 1899 when the Anglo-
French convention was signed, the two countries agreed on the 
establishment of limits for the relative African areas of influence and 
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expansion. France was excluded from the Nile basin, but Britain left to its 
rival the opportunity to extend its possessions into Western Africa and 
towards the internal zones in the direction of Sahara.98 The Entente, was a 
“source of concern and annoyance to Italy, who feared that it might be 
interpreted as a British recognition of French claims to Tripoli.”99  
Canevaro reacted immediately and tried to obtain some rewards from 
the two foreign governments. He asked for support in the occupation of the 
Chinese territory of Sun and Moon Bay on the Hainan Island, and Tripoli, 
but he failed. Consequently, he made a second proposal which envisioned 
an absolute commercial influence over the caravan routes coming from 
Chad and directed towards Tripoli.100 Salisbury was also resolutely adverse 
this time. The French reaction was different, particularly Barrèrre thought 
to take some advantages from this situation. Indeed, Delcassé implied that 
he was not hostile to an Italian action, but he was concerned about the 
possible Turkish reactions since it seemed an invitation to occupy Ottoman 
territories. For this reason a secret arrangement was the best solution in the 
French Minister’s view.101 
In May, Visconti Venosta was again appointed Foreign Affairs Minister, 
and one of his first acts was the confirmation of the Francophile policy.102 
Delcassé agreed with him, and, finally, the two men found a compromise. 
Obviously, the negotiations were also secret from the Italian Ambassador 
in Paris, who was painstakingly kept in the dark by his French colleague.103 
Barrère believed that Tornielli was a Francophobe. The Italian diplomat 
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understood the game of his colleague and let him think that he was 
completely unaware of the contacts.  
Tornielli wrote to Visconti Venosta on April 24, 1900 asserting the 
advantage of removing any reason of “mutual and constant suspects” on 
the African issue. In his opinion, the Italian government should benefit from 
the current French cabinet, which seemed to have markedly “peaceful 
purposes”, unlike its predecessors.104 His doubts were more related to the 
method followed by the Italian governments. On December 7th, he reported 
a conversation with Delcassé, afterwards the latter had met the ex-minister 
Canevaro. The old Admiral had talked about the Italian skepticism on the 
French cordial policy, adding suspects to his interlocutor.105 
 
Unfortunately, there are not few people, who use every opportunity to imply 
that the insurmountable obstacle, in order to achieve the perfect Franco-
Italian entente, lay in the different political constitution of the two countries. 
Here it is well known: if the situation required an instant revolutionary 
action against our constitutional institutions, the authors of the inauspicious 
act would be also Italian. How our differences reinvigorate the antinational 
action of those people everyone can easily understand, and it is natural, in 
my opinion, to presume that also the ones, who are resolute in the correct 
and friendly course towards us, cannot avoid hearing the voices which dare 
to convince them to change their route. 
 
Tornielli was worried about a possible change in French policy and in 
those “peaceful purposes” which had characterized the Delcassé’s strategy 
until that moment. Following his analysis, the situation was “one of the 
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most” delicate, and the problem was that different feelings prevailed in the 
two ruling classes; the French “cordiality” posed against the Italian 
“skepticism.” For this reason, any wrong assertion could cause the failure 
of the reconciliation policy and the victory of those “voices.” They 
represented a developing threat for the stability of the Italian regime, which 
could provoke a change in the policy of friendship that France was 
pursuing.  
He had been very careful in observing every little “clue” of such a trend 
since the moment of his arrival. 106  There was, according to Sforza, a 
phenomenon that was attracting many people from the Peninsula, and it 
could represent a future threat for the royal institutions. Italians were going 
to Paris to observe how the “People’s Universities” worked. Those cultural 
institutions were relatively new in France, but there was already a thirty-
year experience in England under the name of “Movement of the University 
Extension.” In contrast, to the English tradition, in France these centers 
became soon political tools of the Socialist party; they were born for 
opposing the Parisian Boulevards” conservative society. 107  Those 
Universities had gotten a political feature since the beginning, and in a short 
time, they became real electoral machines. The fact that so many Italians 
were going to Paris for the purposes of observing and replicating the same 
system represented a seditious potential.  
Rome was “far away” from that kind of public safety measures needed 
for applying foreign experiences, Sforza argued. “Maybe, every system, 
after having the best results beyond the Channel, can fail miserably in 
Italy,” he suggested. The young official had also another doubt related to 
the nationality; it may be that higher instruction over poor people had 
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different effects on the basis of their origins. It could be a “sedative” for an 
Anglo-Saxon, rather an “explosive” for a Latin. 108  Coming back to his 
origins, in conclusion, he envisaged a positive function of these centers as 
an attempt to “raise” the ethics of people, whereas leaving them in the 
hands of those people that wanted to engineer extremist struggle.109 
Tornielli seemed to claim an assertive stance of the Italian cabinet in 
order to prevent the French turnaround. Indeed, the agreement – consisting 
in an exchange of letters between the Italian Minister and the French 
Ambassador – was signed on January 4, 1901, even if the documents dated 
back to December 14th and 16th, 1900. In the first note Barrère, referring to 
the 1899 Anglo-French convention, wrote that the boundaries of Tripoli 
vilajet would have marked the limits of the French influence in that area. In 
his reply, Visconti Venosta stated the Italian disinterest with regard to 
Morocco. But, if a change had occurred in the political system or in the 
country planning, on the base of the reciprocity principle, Italy would have 
been allowed to take action in Tripolitania.110 However, it is impossible to 
argue that the Paris’ Embassy was a privileged place for observing the 
making of the Italian foreign policy because the agreement was negotiated 
in Rome.111  
In those days, Sforza could not know what was happening in the Eternal 
city, but he could observe that his superior clearly believed in a strategy of 
convergence and was careful in every aspect of French political life, as his 
very detailed reports show. Between the two there should have been a good 
harmony, considering that in 1899 Tornielli and the Embassy’s Secretary 
Polacco wrote to Rome praising the qualities of Sforza and they 
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recommended him for a promotion. The old Ambassador defined the 
young attaché one of the “best apprentices” for the diplomatic career. The 
daily affairs of that Embassy kept the staff busy for many hours, and “Mr. 
Sforza,” Tornielli wrote, “proved to be not only skilled, but also to have a 
consistent willingness that it is not possible in those who do not have that 
kind of awareness of their office duties.”112 In June 1901, the diplomat heard 
sounds about possible promotions and wrote again to sponsor his “pupil” 
that had “special values.” In Tornielli’s opinion, he had a “broad 
knowledge, a brilliant intelligence, and, in the meantime, a tireless 
perseverance in daily tasks.” Moreover, it had to be added in the 
recommendation that Sforza had a “high sensitivity” and “excellent 
nature.”113 This time, Sforza obtained his promotion and was appointed as 
Secretary of Legation in Constantinople. 
 
 
 
1.V. FROM PARIS TO ALGECIRAS: “CLASSES” OF METHOD  
 
Despite Tornielli’s words, it is hard to believe in the idea of the “excellent 
nature” of Sforza. The future Minister had his “secret” tricks to avoid the 
destinations that he did not like. So, after Paris and Tornielli, it was really 
difficult to find an office of the same class. He was headed for: 
Costantinople, where he arrived on October 1901; as a Counsel, Pechino in 
July 1903, and as chargé d’affaires, Bucarest in April 1905. Particularly, the 
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last one was for him a sort of demotion so he found a way to leave that city. 
One night in a club, Zeno shares, he pulled an armchair and a chair together 
to rest his “long legs,” and a royal law officer complained about that. The 
Italian diplomat’s answer was not very polite, rather ironic: “’Vous avez 
raison’, he said ‘mes pieds n’auraient pas dûs être au bout de cette chaise mais au 
bas de votre veston’.” 114  Finally, Sforza was removed and went into 
retirement. By contrast, according to Giordano, behind Sforza’s forced 
retirement there was a story of women. The no longer very young man – he 
was already thirty-three by that time, had to leave the Romanian city 
because anonymous letters, threats and insults began to arrive at the 
Embassy.115 
In any case this negative experience opened the way for a new one bound 
to be crucial in Sforza’s career. On December 14, 1905 he was appointed 
Secretary of the Italian Delegate, for the Ambassador in Spain, Silvestrelli, 
who was coincidentally the cousin of the Foreign Affairs Minister Tittoni. 
Sforza was to assist Silvestrelli at the Algeciras Conference, convened to 
dispose of the Moroccan querelle between France and Germany. 116  The 
dispute had opened on March 31, 1905 when German Emperor Guglielmo 
II landed in Tangeri in order to defend the economic interests in the North 
African country challenged by the French penetration. 117  Indeed, Paris’ 
diplomats had worked for years on this project – maybe not enough, 
considering the resignation of Delcassé, and French action was under the 
guarantee of different treaties. Particularly, in 1902 Barrère signed a new 
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secret agreement with the Italian Foreign Minister Prinetti which brought 
into focus the 1901 Entente. 
Prinetti and Barrère agreed on the freedom to develop their influence, 
respectively, on Tripolitania and Morocco without the necessity of the 
previous action of the other. In the second place, they committed to 
remaining neutral in case one of the two got involved in a conflict caused 
by a third power. Finally, Italy gave every assurance that she had not signed 
and would not sign a military agreement against France.118 In April 1904, 
Paris also signed the Entente cordiale with London, which recognized 
Morocco as an exclusive French area of interest, and Egypt as an English 
one. In October, Madrid also gave its consent to Paris’ action. Berlin was 
excluded and concerned about this new situation and resolute to reaffirm 
her power if that meant to have the guarantee of the open-door principle 
for Morocco. The position of Morocco was, in fact, ruled by international 
agreements, the last signed in Madrid in 1880. For this reason, the European 
powers agreed on the International Conference called for in January 1906.119 
The new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonino di San Giuliano, 
appointed on December 24, 1905, decided to substitute Silvestrelli with 
Visconti Venosta as delegate for the International Conference for “reasons 
of generic policy” officially.120 Silvestrelli was known for being a “protegé” 
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of Crispi and a Triplicist.121 There were pressures on the Italian government 
to have another delegate for the summit, mostly from Barrère and the 
English and the American Ambassadors, Egerton and White.122 The latter 
was representative of the United States in the Spanish meeting as well. 
White had a “liking” for Sforza, “as old men frequently have for 
beginners in their own fields,” remembers the diplomat. The American 
Ambassador was also Sforza’s golf teacher in Rome. 123  He was an 
“accomplished man of the world, and a conciliator by definition;” 
moreover, he “paid great deference” to Visconti Venosta. Even if White’s 
secretary Louis Einstein had the main role in Spain, as Sforza notes. 
Einstein, who became a lifelong friend of the Italian, “made up for the 
ignorance of his Chief in the matter of Mediterranean problems.” 124 
Nevertheless, one of the “suggestions” given to Visconsti Venosta – who 
accepted the charge on condition that he would have been free of directions, 
was to cooperate with White, in view of the coincident interests: 
preservation of peace and mediation between the two quarrelers.125 
 
At Algeciras we lodged with almost all the other representatives at the Hotel 
Reina Cristina, which became for three months the harbor of European 
diplomacy. With its pointed bow-windows, central turret, its massive and 
squat belvederes, the hotel recalled an illustration from the works of Sir 
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Walter Scott. The building is low extended, like the houses of that land. 
Galleries face the bay; little columns ornament them as well as the octagonal 
bow-windows. In the center a patio adds an Andalusian note. The entire 
ground fool opens on the patio-billiards and ping-pong rooms, reading 
rooms, smoking rooms furnished English style. The garden has the luxuriant 
vegetation of the south; gardenias, magnolias, eucalyptus, myrtles, palms, 
lemon and orange trees blended their violet shadows and heavy perfumes. 
The very long dining room had at one of his extremities, two round 
belvederes which gave a semi-privacy. One of them had been reserved by 
the Spanish diplomats who had come on the staff of the Duke of Almodovar. 
But the other belvedere was, for them, a cruel problem: Should they favor 
Germany or the friends of France? It had been decided to close it when the 
news arrived that Visconti Venosta had been chosen in place of Silvestrelli. 
The Spanish master of ceremonies felt relieved and reserved the belvedere 
for him.126 
 
Given this picture, on January 16th the Conference began, and Sforza was 
there as personal assistant of the eighty-year-old ex-minister and was also 
appointed as secretary of the conference, so he had to attend all the works.127 
This was an important experience to Sforza who had the opportunity to 
work with the toast of the Italian foreign policy. At the opening meeting it 
was decided that the conference had to concern itself with problem of a 
Moroccan State Bank and the organization of police. Above all the latter was 
a delicate issue, and the two main Powers gave opposite directions to their 
delegates. France would have shared the control of the Moroccan police 
only with Spain, whereas Germany wanted a solution distributing the 
mandate between several Powers or entrusting it to a minor Power or to 
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neutral Powers’ officers. According to the German point of view, this one 
would have been the only way to grant  economic equality.128  
Visconti Venosta’s goal was to maintain the Italian international setting 
without displeasing the Allies, but avoiding the allegation of lack of respect 
for the commitments which would have caused the loss of their 
“compensation,” that was Tripolitania.129 Finally, he did not support the 
German claims provoking the disappointment of Berlin that immediately 
complained to Rome, where a new cabinet had established in February, 
with Sidney Sonnino as Prime Minister and Francesco Guicciardini – who 
was considered a Germanophile – as Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, 
neither of the two tried to interfere with the Italian representative’s action, 
rather they reconfirmed the esteem for his “experienced and 
knowledgeable work” carried out with “not minor difficulties nor easily 
negotiable.”130 
Visconti Venosta was aware of the charged atmosphere and believed the 
hurdles could be overcome with “perfect loyalty and a proper behavior.”131 
For instance, Sforza remembered that one day Tattenbanch, one of the 
German delegates,  “more a German than diplomat” went to complain 
directly to Visconti Venosta “about the cold attitude” the Italian delegation 
adopted.132 The Italian diplomat told him, frankly, that Italy was behaving 
in accordance with the clauses of the Triple Alliance Treaty and the Italo-
French accords on Morocco, “well known in Berlin.” Tattenbach reminded 
Visconti Venosta the “true interests” of Italy, and the ex-foreign Minister 
listened to him “with long and patient courtesy,” Sforza noted. But, finally, 
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the experienced man asked him if he had been instructed by his government 
to give those statements. Having a negative answer, he replied, “The idea 
you have of diplomatic negotiations is that one ought to jump at the throat 
of one’s adversary, throw him to the ground, kick him and say: “Let’s have 
an accord.” That method, if it gets to be general among you, will bring you 
misfortune.”133 Visconti Venosta had another idea of diplomacy, and maybe 
this is the reason why he had “a phobia of voting.”134 So, when his colleague 
left, and he found his assistant smiling, he just said, “You are right. Let’s go 
for a walk. If we sent [sic] a telegram about this we’d risk having the thing 
taken seriously.”135 
The negotiations lasted for more than two months, and they were in the 
opinion of Sforza, “in themselves senseless.” Just one meeting made an 
impression on the assistant, as it was “the turning point of the adventure… 
and also because it showed an aspect of the sudden dangers that can surge 
up, in the midst of a gathering diplomats.”136 On March 3rd a procedural 
matter brought to light German isolation. The Conference should decide the 
adjournment “in view of the fact that the reports on the Bank were not yet 
ready, and the Germans did not want a discussion on the Police so long as 
the question of the Bank had not been settled.” Germany was defeated, 
since just Austria and Morocco voted her motion.  
Writing to Guicciardini, Visconti Venosta minimized the importance of 
the event, but it is true that in the days after there was a “gradual and 
progressive acceptance of the French demands by the German 
Government.” 137 The final agreement was signed on April 7, 1906 on the 
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base of the compromise reached on March 31st. The police would have been 
recruited between Moroccan Muslims and placed under the authority of the 
Sultan. The North African sovereign would have also appointed French 
instructors in four ports, Spanish in two others, and French and Spanish 
jointly in Tangier and Casablanca. The Inspector-General would have been 
Swiss or Dutch with his residence in Tangier, but without the power of 
exercising direct command. His task consisted in the control of the police 
action, that should be in compliance with the international agreements and 
the needs of public order. 
In brief, the peace was maintained, but the “shadow of the war” passed 
over the diplomats. In Sforza’s view, the fears of William II saved Europe 
from the conflict, even if they were undermining the prestige of the Reich 
and, in particular, the Triple Alliance.138 As he remembers, three days after 
the end of the Conference he was in Paris with his superior, and together 
they read the telegram sent by the German Emperor to the Austro-
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Goulochowski. William II 
praised the Austrian delegates – totally freezing out the Italians – for the 
support given to Germany and concluded, “You have accomplished a fine 
action as a faithful ally. You were a brilliant second in field and, in a similar 
case, you can count on a like service on my part.”139 “He’ll lead Austria to 
her ruin” was the verdict of Visconti Venosta. Sforza was “more irritated” 
by his superior and wrote, “in silence, then and there, on the menu a project 
for an autograph letter of the King to the Kaiser.” 
 
Briefly, the letter affirmed our loyalty to the alliance, guarantee of peace, but 
added that a firm alliance could exist only between equals, not between 
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duelists and «seconds» and that Italy being a country of public opinion, such 
manifestations as the telegram to Goluchowski did not strengthen the 
alliance. 
 
Sforza also suggested asking the German Emperor to recall Ambassador 
to Italy Count Monts in the name of “loyalty.” Finally, the young diplomat 
read it to Visconti Venosta and Guicciardini and told them that he 
“considered the letter a service rendered to the solidity of the Triple 
Aliance.”  They agreed, but Guicciardini wanted to submit it to Sonnino 
before giving it to the King. The Prime Minister “dissuaded” his colleague 
“from attaching any importance to Monts’ words” and said that “it would 
be better to keep silent” in order to avoid any diplomatic incident.140  
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CHAPTER TWO 
SHIFTING ALLIANCES  
 
 
 
Algeciras was a defining moment for the young diplomat Carlo Sforza. He 
had formerly been a “loyal partisan of the Triple Alliance” like “all 
responsible Italians.”141 Sforza, nurtured with the Risorgimento’s values, was 
never a Germanophile, but he was aware that the fracture of the Alliance 
would have aroused suspicions and intuitions which might have turned 
into a war. The diplomat thought that even Paris was interested in keeping 
the Triple Alliance alive.142 Above all, the “responsible” Italian politicians 
and diplomats had a common belief: expressly, “No conquest of irredente 
lands is worth a war.”143 Such a statement came from the belief that Italy 
would complete its unification by following a diplomatic method and 
thanks to article 7 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. 
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Due to this firmly held belief, the alliance with Austria had to be accepted 
even if it was difficult to be enthusiastic, as it meant choosing between peace 
and war. In one of his works, issued in 1940, Sforza remembered that at the 
beginning of the XX century it was common to say, “With Austria, we can 
only be at war or in alliance.”144 Sforza’s point was that no one wanted a 
war, and “peace worked for the constant strengthening and progress of 
Italy, the alliance proved satisfactory, despite the inevitable clashes in a 
marriage of reason.”145  
Between 1906 and 1914 Sforza served in different embassies such as the 
one in Constantinople and London. He had the opportunity to attend 
events at the Austrian Court thanks to his wife’s family. To sum up, Sforza 
was a Triplicist because the Alliance was a guarantee of European peace. 
Nevertheless, he gradually left the Triplicist feelings because of his 
experiences and circumstances. 
 
 
 
2.I.  MADRID: CUT AND RUN WITH DIPLOMACY  
 
Since February 1906, Sforza had known that his new appointment was at 
the Embassy in Madrid, but he showed no interest in the new assignment. 
The diplomat was ordered to go to Madrid as soon as the conference closed, 
in part because Ambassador Silvestrelli requested it. 146  In those days, 
beyond any doubt, Spain was not the center of the European relations, and 
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Sforza would have likely felt himself downgraded after the “important 
success” of Algeciras.147 What seems more decisive on the young diplomat’s 
attitude is that the Ambassador had been designated as delegate for the 
Conference, before being replaced by Visconti Venosta. Sforza found a ruse 
to avoid the new office – as he was prone to do, and adopted a dilatory 
behavior excusing himself on several different pretenses. 
In March, when the Conference was almost ended, he wrote to the 
Foreign Affairs Minister that he had familial matters which requested him 
to stay in Italy for a few days. Moreover, Sforza believed that to not 
accompany Visconti Venosta in his return trip to Italy from the Conference 
in Algeciras was inadvisable.148 Sforza reminded the Minister that the old 
diplomat had asked for his political secretary to keep the accounts of the 
journey. Surely, during the Conference he was always a very diligent 
assistant and showed a great esteem for his chief, but it must be underlined 
that Visconti Venosta also had a private assistant with him, his son Enrico. 
This meant that the Italian delegate would not have been alone. 
Visconti Venosta was fully satisfied with his secretary, as the final report 
he sent to Rome proves. He acted as a reference for Sforza and wrote to the 
Minister that the note was a “certification” of the young attaché’s 
entitlement to obtain an advance in his career. Visconti Venosta was sure 
that Sforza would have done honor to the Italian diplomatic corps. 149 
Consequently, Sforza obtained the promotion as “second category” 
Secretary of Embassy and his wage increased by 4,000 Italian lire, but it was 
not enough for him. He complained to the Ministry about the fact that he 
would have been the only official in that Embassy without the title of 
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Counselor. 150  Nevertheless, his request was not accepted, and the 
experience in Madrid was not as promising as the Conference. 
When the international meeting ended, Sforza decide to go to Italy 
without listening Silvestrelli’s recommendations. The Ambassador was 
disappointed by the official’s behavior and in the following months little 
changed. Meanwhile, the administrative staff of the Consulta had to deal 
with the embarrassing situation. Silvestrelli also becalme the new Foreign 
Affairs Minister’s cousin. In May, once again, Giolitti had appointed 
Tommaso Tittoni as Chief of the Italian Diplomacy with the aim of restoring 
the relations with the Central Empires after the breach Algeciras had 
created in the Alliance. Tittoni was right wing, free of any irredentist 
ambition, an admirer of Germany, and respectful of Austria-Hungary. 151 
Even if the international situation was markedly altered, the main issue the 
new Minister found on the table was the automatic renewal of the Triple 
Alliance. This would occur by July 8th, 1907 unless there was a request for 
changes or any denouncements. 
Considering Tittoni’s conservative approach, the Italian security meant 
the maintaining of European and Mediterranean peace. The Alliance with 
the Central Empires was still considered vital for the continental issues; 
whereas, the friendship with England was necessary to achieve the 
Mediterranean and colonial aims. Vienna and Berlin were aware of that 
despite Tittoni’s ambiguous behavior.  As Albertini highlights quoting 
Monts, the German Ambassador in Rome, “The Italian Minister is not yet 
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born who will refuse to be part of an Anglo-French defensive arrangement, 
strengthened at need by agreements with Russia.”152 
Somehow, this ambiguity seems to be confirmed by the new mission 
assigned to Sforza in June 1906. He was one of the members of the Italian 
delegation sent to the Moroccan Sultan guided by the ambassador-at-large 
Giulio Malmusi, representative of all Great Powers gathered in Algeciras. 
Sforza had to leave Madrid to reach Fez, where the Sultan resided, to obtain 
the ratification of the Algeciras final document. It was a difficult task, but 
not so relevant considering the consequences. In effect, Tittoni had already 
tried to minimize the meaning of the Conference when he was in charge in 
November 1906 by choosing Silvestrelli as the delegate.153 After six months 
his strategy did not seem to be different. 
The Sultan was reluctant to sign the document: notably, Malmusi wrote 
that the Moroccan Sovereign was strongly influenced by groups which 
didn’t agree with the Conference’s decisions.154 Consequently, the Monarch 
formulated some reservations, and Malmusi promised that the Italian King 
would notify the other Great Powers of them, but it did not happen. As a 
result, the Moroccans were disappointed, but the agreement reached during 
the Conference was safe – meanwhile, any major conflict was avoided.155  
                                                
152 Albertini, European relations from the Congress of Berlin to the eve of the Sarajevo murder, 178-
84: 181. Albertini criticizes Tommasini’s analysis arguing that Italy should have adopted a 
“greater frankness” in order to have more cordial and trustful relations with her allies; so 
that, maybe, they would have been more cautious in 1914. See also Decleva, Da Adua a 
Sarajevo, 331. 
153 Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, 288. 
154 DDI, s. III, vol. 10, Malmusi to Tittoni, June 19, 1906, no. 25. 
155 DDI, s. III, vol. 10, Nerazzini to Tittoni, November 24, 1907, no. 543. After more than a 
year Nerazzini, who was a member of the delegation, wrote to Tittoni that Malmusi 
destroyed or hid all the recordings of those talks with the Moroccan Sultan. In fact, the 
mission has not been considered by Francesco Tommasini, – Tittoni’s major biographer – 
and only the two documents quoted are included in the recently published volume of the 
collection of the Italian Diplomatic Documents. There is nothing about the mission in 
Sforza’s Papers.  
	 	 	
49 
The mission, understated by the Italian diplomacy, represented a new 
opportunity to escape from Madrid for Sforza. During the trip back to the 
Embassy, Sforza – who had received Malmusi’s praise,156 was notified of his 
mother’s serious disease. So, he left the group in Larache and took the last 
part of the trip “in two days instead of the usual six.”  But, he had an 
accident and fell from the horse he was riding.157 Sforza finally arrived in 
Turin where his mother was, but it was 24 hours after her death. He asked 
to stay in Italy until the end of August to accomplish the succession’s 
bureaucratic procedures and have his injured knee treated. Silvestrelli was 
annoyed by his long absence. The Ambassador wanted him back in Madrid 
by August 15th, since Silvestrelli would be on leave from September 10th on, 
and Sforza was the chargé d’affaires of the Embassy.158  
The young diplomat addressed Tittoni talking ironically about the 
Ambassador’s directions to the point that in Rome there was some 
embarrassment about the awkward situation. The Undersecretary wrote to 
Sforza on August 17th asking him to respect his chief and to find a 
compromise with him.159 In fact, Silvestrelli wrote to the Minister on August 
22nd complaining about Sforza’s behavior which was directed to escape 
from “any kind of authority and control.”160 Silvestrelli asked Tittoni to act 
on Sforza’s insubordination in order to respect his directions. As a 
consequence, Sforza went to Madrid by the end of August. 
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Nonetheless, the relationship between the two had already reached a 
point of no return, and Sforza was moved to another Embassy with the 
Royal Decree of October 3rd. In November, he received communication 
saying that he had to go to Constantinople, where he would work with 
Ambassador Guglielmo Imperiali di Francavilla. The latter was an 
experienced diplomat coming from Southern Italy. Imperiali’s family was 
close to the Bourbons; but, as young student he supported the establishment 
of the liberal State. Imperiali entered the career in 1882, the year the Treaty 
of the Triple Alliance was signed, and drew the Minister Mancini’s 
attention. Indeed, he served in embassies such the one of Berlin, Paris, 
Washington and Brussels. Before arriving in Constantinople, Imperiali was 
appointed as Consul General in Sofia and, then, plenipotentiary in 
Belgrade. He had been in the Ottoman capital as Italian Ambassador since 
June, 1904.161 
Sforza had to wait for his successor before leaving Madrid. So, when 
Silvestrelli went back, the young secretary was still there, even if he was 
trying to accelerate the procedures necessary to leave the Spanish city. 
Silvestrelli wrote in his final report that in those few days Sforza acted as if 
he had no superior: he went to the office only to get his mail, he tried to 
write every report related to him, and attempted to appoint his successor as 
Counselor without the consent of the Ministry.162 
To sum up, according to Silvestrelli, “Sforza could have been an excellent 
diplomat, but he should have been more disciplined and duteous, and 
respect his superiors not only as a pro forma, but as substance.”163 However, 
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at the end of November the Ministry permitted Sforza another leave from 
his office in order to get medical treatment for his injured leg before going 
on to Constantinople. By the beginning of the new year, Sforza was in 
Constantinople.164 
 
 
 
2.II.  A NEW BEGINNING IN CONSTANTINOPLE 
 
Sforza returned to Constantinople five years after his first mission there. At 
that time the Ottoman Empire, better known as the “Sick Man of Europe,” 
was experiencing a deep crisis, and its days seemed to be numbered. The 
situation was particularly difficult; the European States were deeply 
involved in the diplomatic struggle for the purpose of securing their own 
zone of influence. The construction of the Eastern Railway and the 
Macedonian uprisings were the touchstone of this rivalry between the Great 
Powers. 
According to the principle of “inorientamento” fixed in the 1887 Triple 
Alliance’s Treaty since, Italy would obtain compensations if territorial 
changes occurred in the Balkans’ map without recurring to war. So, if a 
change had occurred, it should not have endangered any Italian interest.165 
Assuming this perspective, the Macedonian situation was explosive 
because in that territory converged the interests of the Balkan States – 
namely, Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks,  and those of Austria-Hungary and 
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Russia. The Emperor and the Tsar had found an agreement in October 1903, 
the “Mürszsteg Punctuation.” The entente concerned the reforms to be 
applied in the Ottoman province. The principal points consisted in: the 
institution of two civilian agents nominated by Austria and Russia, who 
should work with the Inspector-General Hilmi Pasha; the reorganization of 
the Gendarmerie and the boundaries of the administrative areas. Moreover, 
“steps should be taken to reorganize the administrative and judicial 
institutions.”166 
Italy, like the other Great Powers, was not considered in the agreement, 
despite Tittoni’s attempts. Nevertheless, the Italian government was 
instructed to support the reforms in order to avoid any major clash within 
the European Concert. Though, “keen annoyance” was felt in the 
diplomatic circles of Constantinople with respect to the Austro-Russian 
entente. Regardless, a new secret agreement was signed in October 1904 by 
Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg and 
Lamsdorf, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister. With this agreement the 
two Powers, with the purpose of maintaining the status quo, guaranteed 
each other a “loyal and absolute neutrality” in case of war against a third 
Power “which sought to endanger the security.”167 
In 1907, Constantinople was concerned as well for the Anglo-Russian 
Entente and the ongoing financial and commercial penetration of the 
Germans in the Ottoman territories. As a matter of fact, at that time secret 
negotiations between the Austrians and the Sultan’s delegates were 
underway in order to obtain a concession for the construction of a railway 
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from the Bosnian frontier to Mitrovitsa through the Sanjak of Novibazar.168 
At the Italian Embassy no one knew about them, even though the main 
directive given to the Ambassador was to act in agreement with his 
colleagues of the Triple Alliance. 169  Tittoni, as a conservative, robustly 
opposed any adventurous policy. He was a brilliant champion of Giolitti’s 
pragmatism and empiricism: in other words, a belief in freedom and faith 
in facts. In Tittoni’s opinion, the action of the Foreign Affairs Minister 
should always have a specific goal and an actual effect.170 
According to what Sforza suggested to the Army General, Romei, for his 
meeting with the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II on May 1907, Italy would not 
renounce its peaceful policy. The chargé d’affairs advised the military 
official to tell the Sultan that the Triple Alliance was unanimously desired 
by Italians, since it was the safest guarantee for maintaining peace. 
Moreover, Sforza believed that the Alliance was even more prized because 
it allowed a friendship with other Powers, who were historically bound to 
Italy. No doubt, these relations were useful to the strengthening of the 
peace.171 Nevertheless, Sforza had to notify Tittoni of the danger provoked 
by the “state of extreme drain on the Ottoman treasury,” which was leading 
Constantinople to become closer to Britain and France. In effect, the state of 
war in territories like Yemen and Macedonia requested continuous military 
and financial efforts that forced the Sultan to request a new loan of 200,000 
Turkish lire from the Ottoman Bank, which while it was the State bank, was 
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mainly controlled by French financiers.172 The total amount of the Ottoman 
debts with the Bank equaled 800,000 Turkish lire.173 
Sforza noticed that this situation alarmed the Germans, who were the 
new factor in the region. They had already lost the Constantinople’s Society 
of Platforms because of the Franco-English Entente. Almost certainly, Berlin 
hoped that the “granted income,” which the Sultan had used as a guarantee 
to obtain the loan, would have been used to finance the construction of the 
second section of the Baghdad Railway. Germany aimed to keep its 
privileges in the Ottoman territories and defend its interests from the 
Anglo-French competition. The three Great Powers tried to find a 
compromise on the Baghdad Railway, but Sforza, claiming to have 
confidential information, foresaw the failure of the negotiations.174 
To underline the point, Sforza was worried about an increased French 
and English influence in the Ottoman Empire. The dangerous signals were 
the French ownership of the public debt and the daily communications with 
the English Embassy concerning the Ottoman debt. The young diplomat 
wrote that the importance of such a situation was greater than the railway 
issue and concluded his report with a quote from the Ambassador 
O’Connor. The British representative had told Sforza that he was 
recommending the study of the financial status to the Sultan, since the 
Empire was close to bankruptcy.175 
Sforza’s goal was to highlight the growing rivalry and urge action. In 
1907 the Italian interests “represented only a little over one percent of the 
total outstanding Ottoman debt.” This allowed Italy to have a 
representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Council; any Ottoman 
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Government which wanted to alter the fiscal system also had to obtain 
Italian consent.176 However, this membership was not enough to reach the 
same level of influence as the other European Great Powers. Moreover, the 
relations with the Empire were prejudiced by the Sultan’s suspicion related 
to the Italian interests in North Africa and Albania. 
In this context, Tittoni’s prudence was strategical, despite the fact he 
believed in the strategy of economic penetration of the East. The main goals 
of the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister, in fact, should have been the 
conservation of the status quo and to stop any fight between nationalist 
groups that could cause the fall of the Empire.177 The same approach was 
adopted in the Macedonian question. As a Sforza’s note shows, the Italian 
policy aimed to go beyond the Mürszsteg Punctuation and internationalize 
the reforms’ issue – so that, Rome also could play a role.178  
Imperiali agreed with Tittoni’s strategy even if he had a different 
personality.179 The Ambassador, not always in step with Sforza, was an 
“excitable and rhetorical” man.180 However,  “in the critical years of 1908-
14,” Italians succeeded in “penetrating both the Ottoman Empire and the 
Balkans.” The reason for this success would lay mainly in the “skilled and 
professional” Italian labor, which was employed in several fields. Secondly, 
the Italian diplomats’ “art of dealing with the Ottomans consisted largely 
in underhanded and private contacts.”181 Indeed, the Ottoman diplomatic 
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atmosphere was a complex system of “checks and balances” where the 
alliances were not always so obvious. 
To Sforza, those days were particularly important. As a regular of the 
Cercle d’Orient, Sforza was in contact with many colleagues and Turkish 
elites. In this period the diplomat also met his future wife, Valentine 
Errembault de Dudzeele et d'Orroir, who was member of one of the most 
ancient Belgian family with connections to the Habsburg family.182  Her 
father was the Belgian Ambassador in Constantinople, Count Gaston 
Errembault de Dudzeele, and her mother was  Marie-Hélène d’Abensperg 
Traun, who belonged to an Austrian noble family.183 At that time Belgium 
was a strategical partner for Italian exports, but also for the flow of direct 
investments coming from Brussels that contributed to the development of 
the Italian modern industries.184 In the Ottoman Empire, Belgians worked 
closely with French and British, that meant having their diplomatic support 
in that territory.185 In 1909 Count Gaston would have been appointed as 
Ambassador in Vienna. Consequently, he introduced the future son-in-law 
at the Austrian Court.  
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2.III. THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION 
 
In order to seize a zone of commercial influence, Italy, like Belgium, should 
have worked with the other Powers hoping that a joint pressure would have 
convinced the Ottomans “to abandon their systematic obstruction and 
vexation.” At least this is Webster’s point. He argues that the Ambassador 
in Constantinople could do little, and it seemed to be confirmed by the 
events occurred in the first months of 1908.186  
As Tommasini suggested, by that time the Great Powers’ representatives 
heightened their awareness of the impossibility of applying their program 
of reforms and the increasing power of nationalisms. Nevertheless, the 
British Government were determined in forcing the Sultan to enlarge the 
Ottoman Gendarmerie to fight the Macedonian militias. The proposal 
encountered not only the opposition of the Ottoman sovereign, but also of 
the other States, particularly Russia, Austria, and Germany which 
supported different national groups. Tittoni, who had cooperated with 
England since 1903 in the Eastern Question, understood that the stability of 
the Empire was seriously compromised, and Italy could do little. Therefore, 
Rome should be cautious and act in accordance with the other Great Powers 
in order to save its interests in case of a change of the status quo.187 
On January 27, 1908 when the negotiations for the Macedonian judicial 
reform were still ongoing, Aehrenthal – who had become Austrian Foreign 
Affairs Minister in 1906 – decided to communicate to the Delegations of the 
Austro-Hungarian representatives the agreement reached with the Sultan 
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for Mitrovitsa Railway. The day after a long memo left the Italian Embassy 
in Constantinople directed to Rome. Imperiali related the meeting he had 
the day before with his Russian colleague concerning the details of the 
Austro-Ottoman relations. It is worth mentioning that a draft of the 
document is also among Sforza’s papers. 
The document could be a detailed description of the diplomatic 
atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire, made of duplicities and trickeries.188 
The Italian diplomats from Constantinople suggested a cautious behavior 
to Tittoni. Imperiali was distrustful of the Russian Ambassador, Zinoviev, 
who was particularly bothersome in highlighting the importance of the 
Austrian foul play. 189  In particular, the St. Petersburg representative 
stressed the connections between the construction of the railway and the 
Austrian attempt to secure his influence in the Albanian territory, that 
counted for the Italian national security in the Adriatic area. Imperiali, 
thinking of a possible intrigue, did not react and maintained his reserve 
with the excuse of waiting for the Ministry’s orders. Meanwhile, he 
recommended a cautious and discreet attitude to Rome in order to prove 
the Italian loyalty to the Alliance.190  
Such a stance was also confirmed by the statement of the German 
Ambassador, Marschall, who was no nearer to believe that a final 
agreement for the railway had been reached. On one side the Sultan did not 
have said a conclusive word on that question, instead the Russian would 
have done everything to break the entente. On the other side, a compromise 
for the Macedonian judicial reform had not be found yet, and the Germans 
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did not want to jeopardize their relations with the Empire to support the 
Austrians.191 
Meanwhile, the Great Powers’ representatives in Constantinople were 
evaluating any possible option in order to submit a reform of the 
Macedonian judicial institutions to the Sultan. However, in February the 
Conference of the ambassadors decided to postpone the question, since it 
was impossible to find any compromise that would have obtained the 
consent of the Ottomans without resorting to violent means. While the 
diplomatic negotiations continued, on March 12th Tittoni spoke to the 
members of the Italian Parliament and restated loyalty to the Triple 
Alliance. 192 He seemed to agree with Imperiali; in fact, it was not the right 
moment for changing sides.  
One month after Tittoni’s speech, Sforza wrote to Rome in order to report 
about the severe and rigorous policy adopted by the Sultan towards the 
Italian economic endeavors, in particular against the opening of new post 
offices. According to the diplomat’s confidential sources, the Ottoman 
government “was resolute on carrying out a major resistance.” Indeed, 
watchmen would have been placed at the entrance of every Italian office, 
even at the Embassy in Constantinople. Sforza recommended to act 
strongly in order to make it immediately clear that Rome was determined 
to not accept any limit on its action. Therefore, he suggested to envoy 
warships to every harbor of interest.193 He noticed that the balance of power 
in the Sultan’s Empire was changing, and Germany was taking important 
shares of the Ottoman debt while French financiers refused to grant new 
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loans, “abiding by a command.”194 Moreover, on April 27th he wrote another 
cable to Tittoni denouncing the hostility of the English representatives 
mainly in Cyrenaica. He noticed that all across the Ottoman Africa the 
Italian and the English counsels feuded, and he was worried about the 
consequences of such a situation.195 
However, by the beginning of May the relations with the Sultan seemed 
to return to normal, and also the consular personnel were asked to not act 
without consulting the Embassy.196  Meanwhile, in Macedonia the revolt 
had flared.  The core of this conflict was in Salonika where the movement 
of the Young Turks, supported by the armed branch of the “Committee of 
Union and Progress,” led the protest against Constantinople.  
The official troops refused to fight against their compatriots, and on July 
24, 1908 the Sultan was forced to restore the 1876 Constitution and yield to 
the requests of the rioters.197 According to Sforza’s memory, most of them 
did not know what a Constitution was, but they “learned history of the 
French revolution in the lodges of secret societies of Salonika, simply 
hastened the day of the ‘rayahs’ deliverance.”198 Italians were particularly 
interested in the commercial activity of the Macedonian city. Sforza, as 
acting ambassador since Imperiali was on leave,199 met one of the leaders of 
the movement: Mustafa Kemal, who was only 28 at that time and not yet 
the “Father of the Turks” (i.e., Atatürk).  
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In 1908 Kemal was just one of the member of the revolutionary 
movement. As the others, he “believed the proclamation of the New 
Turkey, ‘one and indivisible,’ sufficient to fulfill the aspirations of the 
subject peoples.” In Sforza’s opinion, however, the Young Turks were not 
thinking of a dismantlement of the Empire. At the beginning of the 20th 
Century Salonika was –Sforza writes, a “melting pot” of different cultures.” 
The “Turks were all the more nationalistic because they were often streaked 
with Jewish blood.”200 The point, unclear to Sforza – in this moment and 
later, is that the movement expressed above all the refusal of tolerate the 
Great Powers’ meddling in the Ottoman internal affairs.  
The attempt of restoring the 1876 Constitution was a tool to avoid any 
other external influence. Imperiali has a better understanding of that 
situation. In July, the Ambassador once again recommended to act with 
caution. In his opinion, one of the main causes of the unrest among the army 
officials and the Muslims was the anger against the Ottoman authorities. 
The reason of their protest was the fact that the Government had 
disfranchised the population of any kind of freedom, but nothing was done 
to contrast the European political, financial and commercial influence on 
the domestic affairs.  
The Ambassador point was that Europe had forgotten the importance of 
the Muslims, deeply enraged at the European interferences. Therefore, he 
suggested to shelve any project of reform in Macedonia. This was, as a 
matter of fact, the first consequence of the Young Turks’ revolution which 
caught the European Powers, as the other Balkan States, unprepared and 
marked their diplomatic failure in the Easter Question. They could not do 
anything but observe the events. The result was, in Tommasini’s view, a 
                                                
200 Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, 346. See also, Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of 
Europe, 263. 
	 	 	
62 
widespread resentment across the Empire, chiefly oriented towards the 
Germans. Suspicion about the Italian attitude also grew. By contrast, 
England garnered good repute. 201 
 
  
 
2.IV. THE BOSNIAN CRISIS 
 
According to the Statute of the new constitutional Regime, a Senate and a 
Chamber of Deputies had to be established. Senators were nominated for 
life by the Sultan, and Deputies were elected by citizens. The members of 
the Chamber would be 278: 4 Jews, 44 Christians, and the rest were 
Muslims. The elections, held between August and mid-September 1908, 
confirmed the Young Turks’ tremendous success as they obtained the 
majority of the votes and 200 seats in the new Parliament.202 There were 
great expectations of modernization and enfranchisement in the new 
Regime.  
That was not true for the Italians. The Young Turks treated Italians “with 
less respect than they did the other official great powers.” At the Consulta 
they “were well aware that the new regime meant trouble.” 203  In his 
memoirs, Giovanni Giolitti, who was the Prime Minister at that time, 
recalled that, before 1911 he had already thought about a possible 
intervention in the Ottoman territories of Northern Africa. 204 After all, the 
Italian expansion in Tripolitania was envisaged by the 1887 Triple 
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Alliance’s Treaty. Everyone was aware of the Italian ambitions, even the 
Ottoman authorities. The Young Turks made no difference and, when they 
attained power, inflamed people’s political and fanatical sensitivities 
addressing them chiefly against the Italians. They adopted, primarily, the 
same strategy of the previous Turkish governments; they stalled when 
giving any answer and offered impossible deals, which if accepted, would 
have created a basis for conflict between the Great Powers. 205  Sforza’s 
scornful description of the new Ottoman rulers should be considered in this 
framework. Moreover, it must be said that he left his office during the 
summer, and when he returned the international crisis was about to 
begin.206 
In September, Aehrenthal communicated to Tittoni his will to proceed 
with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a right descending from the 
final resolution of the Congress of Berlin. In 1878 the Assembly of the Great 
Powers recognized to Austria-Hungary the right to occupy and administer 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the provinces should have remained under 
the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. The 1908 revolution of the Young 
Turks was an opportunity to the Austrians, who profited from the crisis to 
annex the region, before the new Turkish regime could regain control over 
it. To do that, Aehrenthal had previously obtained the Russian consent on 
Sept. 16, 1908; in exchange the chancellor had promised not to oppose the 
opening of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian warships. 
Sforza wrote that the Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister used “vague, 
ambiguous phrases, calculated to mislead the Italian minister by not 
permitting him to understand that the act was imminent.”207  Tittoni, in 
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Sforza’s view, was a “cold, deliberate” and “honest mind.” The two men 
would have the opportunity to work together several times in the next 
years, and Tittoni seemed to be held in a quite good estimation by his 
official, despite their “differences on several problems, […] which 
concerned the finality of ideals rather than immediate decisions of the 
moment.”208 
Sforza does not hesitate in his conviction that the Italian Government 
was “unaware” of the Austrian decision and was “rendered powerless to 
reproach Vienna with a flagrant violation of Article VII of the Triple 
Alliance, since Aehrenthal replied that he had not failed to apprise the 
Italians of his Government’s intention.”209 After all, Tittoni was not the sole 
victim of the Austrian design; the Russian Minister Izvolsky received the 
same treatment, if not worse.210  
In Makers of Modern Europe, and in his other books, Sforza wrote an 
apologia of Aehrenthal, “The most intelligent among the many Franz 
Joseph’s ministers.”211 In 1908, the Habsburg’s representative was accused 
of “foul play, of deceit, at the least of Machiavelism;” but, Sforza argues that 
it was a force majeure decision. Of course, it must be considered that the 
diplomat writes his books after many years and could have been influenced 
by other contemporary writers. Nevertheless, it is worth to quote his ideas. 
According to Sforza, “It was not fault of Aehrenthal if the Russian 
Imperialists played into his hands with their dreams.”212 Sforza agreed with 
Imperiali in describing the secret and conflictual negotiations that were 
ongoing in Constantinople. As Sforza points out, “complicated lies were 
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connected on all sides after the fait accompli; but if the annexation of Bosnia 
was the first grave element of disturbance in the Europe of the ‘armed 
peace,’ Izvolsky was eagerly working at the same time to secure a free 
passage for Russian warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
through the Straits, which would have been just as serious a factor of 
unrest.” To confirm his thesis, Sforza reminds that the Russian Minister 
“three months before the annexation of Bosnia, offered to Aehrenthal his 
approval of the annexation in return for the latter’s acceptance of the 
Russian plans.”213 
Sforza believed that Aehrenthal strategy was aimed: firstly, to reduce the 
Russian power in the Balkans; secondly, to give “new life and new prestige 
to the Monarchy.” 214  Those two goals determined the decision to 
accomplish “the Bosnia-Herzegovina coup and visit public humiliation 
upon Serbia,” which was a Tsar’s protégée. St. Petersburg was the 
“guardian” of the Slavs and of their interests in the Balkans and, according 
to a Tittoni’s memorandum quoted by Sforza, “The violence inflicted on 
Serbia was to destroy the growing sympathy the Southern Slavs under the 
Habsburg rule felt for the little kingdom.”215 To sum up, the 1908 choice 
was, in Sforza’s analysis, a tool to reaffirm the power and influence of the 
Austrian Empire. In the second place, Aehrenthal was thinking, as Sforza 
states, about a more independent policy from Berlin. This point is relevant 
in the diplomat’s view; it brought the Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister 
closer to Italy. 
Tittoni also wanted to reach a full entente with Austria, and he was sure 
of Aehrenthal desire of having better relations with Italy.216 The Bosnian 
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coup provoked a strong reaction and a keen anger among the Italians; in 
1908 the movement of Italian nationalists arose to fight that cautious policy 
which had been the cause of that humiliation.217 Instead, the Foreign Affairs 
Minister and Giolitti were determined to handle the situation following the 
diplomatic channels. Tittoni was careful in avoiding the word 
“compensations,” but he asked for a “gentle act” of the Emperor. For 
instance, the Foreign Affairs Minister tried to obtain the creation of an 
Italian University in Austria or a little change in the borders, so that 
Aquileia’s ruins would be into the Italian territory. They were little 
recognitions but would help the Government to face the strong domestic 
discontent.218 Nevertheless, Sforza believed that there was little that the 
Italians, like the Serbians, could do in order to change the fait accompli. It 
would have been pointless “begging” for compensation.219 
 
 
 
2. V. MEETING “THE MAKERS OF MODERN EUROPE” 
 
Considering Sforza’s leanings, it is not surprising that the diplomat was 
appointed in the summer of 1909 to Counselor of the Italian Embassy in 
London. In the English city, Ambassador San Giuliano was representing the 
Italian interests. At that time, he was well known for being one of the 
member of the Neocrispini – a political group, born after the African failure 
occurred in 1896 – and one of the earliest exponents of the Nationalists. 
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 Neocrispini believed that Italy should not renounce to be a “colonial 
Power” but build a diplomatic network able to open new avenues for 
expansion in the Mediterranean area.220 However, at the beginning of the 
XX century economic factors were becoming increasingly important in 
international relations; the conquest of new territories also meant the 
opening up of new markets. Thus, the Neocrispini, exhorted that the 
Government take action in order to defend the Italian sphere of influence 
from the other States’ enterprises.221 
In this perspective the Triple Alliance needed to be brought in line with 
the Mediterranean aspirations of Rome. In San Giuliano’s opinion, the 
Triple Alliance was a marriage of interests since it was essential to the 
achievement of the Italian design in the Mediterranean thanks to the 
principle of compensations. Nevertheless, the friendship with Great Britain 
would be important to grant the Italian achievements in the Mediterranean 
Sea. An Anglo-Italian entente cordiale should be the pivot around which Italy 
would negotiate with the other Powers. Indeed, San Giuliano’s goal in 
London was to obtain English support in order to relaunch Italian colonial 
action, but he was required to deal with the Anglo-German rivalry, which 
was making the international position of Rome difficult to handle.222 
In his books, Sforza confirms that this topic was a predominant theme at 
the Embassy. As a result, the counselor remembers that he had major 
debates with his chief about the Anglo-German quarrel. The two, indeed, 
used to promenade through Hyde Park, and “sometimes” they had “very 
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marked” arguments. According to Sforza, “San Giuliano was convinced 
that Germany was on her way to omnipotence, whereas England and 
France were on a down-hill path.” The young diplomat, in contrast, 
believed that Germany was in a decadent stage because of the “flattery” 
that marked the Hohenzollern court. This aptitude was “fatally lowering 
the moral character of the Germans.” So that, Sforza concluded, Paris and 
London were taking the lead, since “history is made with men.” Finally, San 
Giuliano answered ironically, “You are a moralist…”223 
However, Sforza stayed in London just for a few months because he was 
recalled in December 1909 from Rome in order to work as Chief of Cabinet 
with the new Minister, Francesco Guicciardini. It was a short experience, in 
fact a new Government was formed in March 1910 by Luigi Luzzatti, and 
San Giuliano was appointed as Foreign Affairs Minister. Regardless of the 
previous divergences, Sforza was confirmed as Chief of Cabinet for few 
months.224 Indeed, San Giuliano sent the diplomat to Budapest as an Italian 
general counsel. Despite it was not an Embassy, the destination was 
somehow strategic for the Italian foreign policy. Indeed, Sforza’s father-in-
law was the Ambassador in Vienna, and the young diplomat had become a 
habitué of the Austrian capital. So that, he did not seem to be disappointed 
about the new office nor the letter sent by his former colleague De Bosdari, 
who had defined the city as “boring.”225 
In 1910, Sforza was introduced to Vienna’s Court thanks to Count Gaston 
Errembault de Dudzeele et d'Orroir. His relationship with Valentine often 
brought Sforza to the Austrian capital city for the weekend and allowed 
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him entry into the European beau monde.226 Sforza was invited to the Cercle 
or “Ball bei Hof; in those days it was important to differentiate between that 
and a Hoafball which was far less exclusive.”227 Indeed, the latter was an 
official ball which brought together the descendants of sovereign medieval 
families and governmental officials. The Ball bei Hof, instead, was a sort of 
“private party for those whose birth entitles them to be received on intimate 
terms.” As such the Emperor’s attitude was different depending on the 
occasion, and he was less reserved at the Ball bei Hof.228 
Sforza remembers that he was the only stranger at the ball, and Franz 
Joseph, making an exception from protocol, answered to his bow “with a 
novel question, and in Italian: ‘Ce un terribil calor qui dentro: no le par?’.” 
Instead of asking if he had liked Vienna, the Emperor had asked Sforza if 
he the room was too much warm in a bad Italian. It was a shocking event 
for the Palace, and the day after, “at the Jockey Club, Prince Montenuovo, 
the Hof-Marshal, commented upon the extraordinary favour the Kaiser had 
shown me by speaking to me in Italian.” Sforza was aware of the Austro-
Italian dispute for the protection of the Italian language in the territories 
under the Habsburg’s rule and ironically replied, “Whether the Italian had 
not really been Venetian patois.” Montenuovo “never forgot that” and 
referred Sforza’s comments to Franz Joseph, “who soon tired of formality, 
declared the patois to have been Veronese.”229  
Sforza writes that this episode made him “rather popular in the Austrian 
society.” As a consequence, he points out that he was chosen to have a series 
of confidential meetings with Aerenthal without regard to the fact that he 
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was still a young second rank Counsellor of Embassy. 230  According to 
Sforza’s memory, the mission was thorny. He had been instructed to tell 
Aehrenthal the plain truth concerning the bilateral relations. It would not 
be accepted from a higher rank representative, as the Ambassador. In fact, 
Avarna, who was the Chief of the Italian Embassy in Vienna, told Sforza 
that he did not want to know anything about the secret talks; he preferred 
to be informed by San Giuliano whether the mission would have been 
successful.231 
Sforza in his books spoke of his meetings with Aehrenthal. The two men 
met more than once in “the study of a common friend near Vienna, and 
sometimes even at Nemzeti Casino at Budapest,” where “free language was 
permissible.”232 The diplomat broached several delicate matters such as the 
issue of the increasing naval armaments, the opening of an Italian 
University in the Austrian territory, and “the pin-prick policy against 
Austria’s Italian subjects.”233 Aehrenthal was “suspicious and irritated” at 
the beginning, but then he became “interested” and “sympathetic.”234 This 
was a cause of joy for Sforza, who felt free to talk sincerely to the Austrian 
Foreign Minister and took private notes of the conversations. 
 
You cannot expect us to remain indifferent to your efforts at denationalizing 
the Italians. Italy has risen from the dead in virtue of the law of nationalities. 
But if your Italians could be proud and happy to be Italians, and at the same 
time glad of being Austrian subjects, just as Italians of Tessin are proud to be 
Italian and are yet loyal Swiss; we should, indeed, be very pleased. Kill 
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irredentism by satisfying them – and we shall all be the better off. I believe 
in influences greater than those of territorial aggrandizement.235 
 
Sforza was neither an irredentist nor a nationalist. As his experience 
shows, he seemed to have a pragmatic approach. Clearly, he had an idea 
about the finality of the Italian foreign policy, but what seemed to prevail 
was the awareness of the need that Italy had to maintain the balance of the 
European Powers – that meant peace – in order to develop and grow. In the 
meantime, during his career he was never scared of expressing his 
thoughts; Silvestrelli’s and Imperiali’s reports offer some evidence of 
Sforza’s particular personality and relationship with his superiors, so 
Aehrenthal was not an exception. Sforza’s words were tough, and the 
Austrian Foreign Affairs Minister “was silent for a few moments.” 
However, Sforza tells that Aehrenthal replied later, “I believe you, I not 
only believe in your sincerity, but also in the objective truth of what you 
say. But were I to repeat your words and to admit that I believe them, I 
should be taken for a madman here.”236 Therefore, it should be assumed 
that the unconventional talks were not successful, as Avarna expected, - 
and, perhaps, San Giuliano too. Yet, in Sforza’s perspective, San Giuliano 
represented an important insurance for the Austrians against any possible 
rupture of the Alliance.  
In other words, San Giuliano was essential for the maintenance of 
European peace. As the Minister stated at Parliament on December 2, 1910, 
“the main goal of [the Italian] policy [was] the preservation of the peace and 
the continental status quo, that was an imperative condition.”237 It is not by 
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coincidence that in a report on January 17, 1911, Sforza, after a new meeting 
with Emperor, wrote about the appreciative comments of Franz Joseph for 
the Minister’s speech.238 San Giuliano’s words had, in fact, a considerable 
impact on Austro-Hungarian politics. On February 15th, writing about the 
Kingdom’s Foreign Affairs balance report, Sforza mentioned once again 
San Giuliano’s speech. Particularly, he noted, there was a convergence on 
the objectives of the Alliances.239 If the major purpose was European peace, 
they were all aware that it was connected to the wholeness of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Balkan States. Moreover, this approach, in San Giuliano’s 
point of view, allowed Italy to keep also its relations with the other States 
which were not members of the Alliance, namely, Great Britain, France and 
Russia. In the meantime, the penetration to the East would continue with 
“calm and temperance […] avoiding shows of bravado.”240  
Those were the guidelines of San Giuliano’s foreign policy. Italy would 
continue its cautious policy of expansion to the East, even into the Far East. 
In the Spring of 1911, just after the wedding with Valentine, celebrated in 
Vienna on March 4, 1911, Sforza was moved to China, where he could 
resume the policy of commercial and financial penetration.241 
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2.VI.  A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN “ENIGMA” 
 
In 1911 Beijing was not a prime interest in Italian foreign policy, in fact there 
was not a representative with the rank of ambassador, but just a minister 
plenipotentiary. However, San Giuliano aspired to foster Italian presence 
in China where Italy had obtained in 1902 the concession of Tientsin, thanks 
to the participation in the expedition against the rebels.242 A change had 
already been underway in Rome since 1910. In January, the Director 
General of Political Affairs Bollati had addressed a memo to the Director 
General of Economic Affairs where he indicated the guidelines in order to 
seize political and economic influence in China like the other Great Powers. 
At that time, Sforza was Chief of the Foreign Affairs Minister’s Cabinet and 
worked with Bollati, who belonged to the “Moderate” group and was close 
to Tittoni.243  Indeed, Bollati highlighted the lack of action of the Italian 
financiers, who did not contribute to the Chinese industrial development 
making the Italian action marginal in the Far East, a situation that could be 
no longer accepted. Bollati had in mind the German model; indeed, Italy 
and Germany were both Country which only recently had reached the 
national unity.244 
Several ambassadors had been consulted by the Director General, i.e. the 
representatives in Tokyo, Berlin, London, Paris and Brussels, for 
suggestions regarding an economic and political strategy to develop in 
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Beijing. Among the many initiatives exhorted, there were actions such as an 
advertising campaign, both domestic and in China, in order to promote new 
investments and Italian products. They recommended the institution of a 
permanent commercial chargé, a Chamber of Commerce, and direct sailing 
routes. Moreover, they suggested the creation of “joint-ventures” with 
other States to be certain of the Great Powers’ diplomatic support, as it was 
routine in Belgium.245 
Finally, Bollati let the Director General of Commercial Affairs to decide 
which action would have been the most effective. Meantime, he urged the 
importance for Italy of taking part in the Chinese market in order to not be 
in a subsidiary position compared with the other Great Powers. 246  In 
particular, according to Sforza’s recollections, in the years preceding the 
First World War Germany had become the main economical actor in the Far 
East. Berlin – starting with the improvement of the privileges acquired in 
1898 for the province of Shandong, increased its commercial presence and 
railway and mining concessions.247 The Italian diplomat in one of his books 
remembers that “the rise of the German business and enterprises seemed to 
be astounding.” A fact that was confirmed by the reports of the Italian 
counsels, that agreed in saying that “the German trade was overwhelming, 
whereas the English was dropping.”248 
In short, it should be noticed that San Giuliano supported the idea of the 
economical penetration, so that it cannot be a coincidence that Carlo Sforza 
was sent to China, where he had already been as a counsel in 1903, after the 
Boxer Revolution. The Tientsin “settlement” was the result of the Italian 
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contribution in the restoration of the order after the revolt. The purpose 
behind the concession consist in developing Italian business in Northern 
China, but Governments did not show a real interest in Tientsin until 
1912.249 Somehow, Sforza’s presence was strategical. The diplomat knew the 
situation of the Italian interests in that region and was an advocate of the 
policy of commercial and financial penetration, as he had shown from 
Constantinople. It is true that he did not agree on important topics with San 
Giuliano. The Hyde Park conversations are an example of that. Sforza’s 
books, nevertheless, evidence a great esteem for the Italian Minister. As a 
matter of fact, in June, after his arrival in the Far East, the diplomat received 
a promotion and was appointed as First Class Counselor of Legation.250  
The problem was that China was a litmus test for the Great Powers’ 
rivalry, and on July 1, 1911 Europe reached a new level of crisis because of 
the Franco-German quarrel about Morocco.251 San Giuliano suspected that 
Berlin and Paris would have found an agreement at Rome’s expense, that 
meant the loss of Libya. For this reason, and partly also from the pressure 
of public opinion, San Giuliano stressed the importance of the intervention 
in Libya and finally convinced Giolitti. 252  Therefore, by the end of 
September Italy sent its ultimatum to the Sultan, and the war began. This 
violent action was strongly condemned by the Chinese newspapers since it 
symbolized European brutality and imperialism against Eastern countries, 
which could do nothing but cope with.  
According to a cable that Sforza sent on October 13, 1911, the Chinese 
attitude was a genuine reaction coming from the “secret terror” which the 
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Eastern countries felt for Europe. Beijing, in fact, was “sympathetic” to 
Constantinople. It should also be considered that at that same time a 
revolution had broken out in the city of Wuchang, where the rioters 
protested against external influences and Imperial rule. 253  Meanwhile, 
Russia, profiting from the Qing government’s weakness, threatened China 
to occupy the Mongolian territory. Therefore, as the Russian representative 
told Sforza, the Italo-Turkish was a good “apologue” for the Chinese. 
Nevertheless, Sforza thought that the Mediterranean conflict was a pretext 
used by the newspapers to push the government to hasten and complete 
the rearmament. 254 
Sforza noticed that the opinion on Italian behavior changed only with the 
news of the landing in Tripolitania, “an evidence of the Italian diplomacy’s 
power to secure its freedom of action in Europe.” So that the newspapers’ 
titles passed from the “reckless assault” to the recognition. “The success and 
the strength demonstration were a special topic for the Orientals,” Sforza 
ironically commented. 255  Thinking about those “special readers who 
needed to see a different Italy from the weak and sectarian one,” the Italian 
diplomat did not have any “concern about exaggerating the news.”  
Against this strategy was acting German press agency, the Ostasiatischer 
Lloyd. The impression was “miserable,” even if there was not a real 
objective of libeling the Italian endeavor, but in Sforza’s view it was just a 
“tactless” attitude. As a result, the Italian representative decided to talk 
with his German colleague. Sforza told the Berlin official that he was aware 
of the attention Germany owed to Turkey in Europe and in the Near East. 
On the contrary, China’s situation was different; there the “Turks did not 
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exist. It would have been better whether the instructions had required to 
show the Triple Alliance, as it happily was, united and harmonious.”256 
By the end of November, after the Moroccan crises was settled, Sforza 
had a new meeting with the German representatives. This time he talked 
with Count Karl von Luxburg; at that time, the young diplomat seen as “a 
great resource of the German diplomacy.”257 Luxburg went to visit Sforza 
for lunch on November 25th and told the Italian diplomat that he was in 
close contact with Berlin.258 Consequently, Sforza felt free to reveal to his 
colleague that he was “shocked” by the violent attacks of the German press 
against Italy.  
Luxburg replied that he did not agree with the articles – “thoughtless,” 
according to him – but added that the Italian Government embarrassed the 
Germans. The reason was that the European peace had been broken before 
the Moroccan Question was completely solved. The problem, in Luxburg’s 
opinion, was that French military power was now a considerable danger, 
since its factor of “force noire” was too high. Once occupied the region of 
Souss, Berlin wanted to use it to derange the French Africa. Germans 
counted on Tripolitania, in case of war, to “spill” weapons and munitions 
from there to Tunisia and Algeria in order to rise the locals.259 
Sforza replied that in that case it should not have been a risk if Italy took 
Tripoli, since it meant that an ally occupied the territory. Luxburg said that 
Rome did not communicate its intention with enough notice in contrast to 
the Austrian behavior of 1908. Sforza was baffled by the comparison with 
the Bosnian crisis, since he remembered that Marschall, who was the 
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German Ambassador in Constantinople in those days, asserted he had not 
been informed about the Vienna’s action.260 
Undoubtedly, the rivalry with the Allies of the Triple was a recurring 
theme in Sforza’s cables from Beijing. The Chinese Empire was collapsing, 
and the European Great Powers were replicating the same scheme he had 
already seen in Constantinople. On one hand, Sforza communicated with 
the Republican leadership represented by Yuan Shi-Kai who counted on the 
Italian diplomatic support for the survival of the new political system. 
Indeed, he did not believe that the Imperial Government had any chance of 
survival.261 The Italian State-building became a sort of model for the new 
rulers in order to handle the complicated relationship between the State and 
the Emperor. In one meeting, the Chinese provisional president asked 
Sforza about the Law of Guarantees, “that famous Italian law which I have 
heard spoken of as a masterpiece of wisdom.” According to Sforza’s 
memoirs, the real point of interest was the compromise “by which Italy had 
made a sovereign of the Pope at the very moment she was dispossessing 
him, and through which it had been possible for two sovereigns to live 
together in the same capital?”262 In effect, Sforza believed that in Yuan Shi-
Kai’s ideal political system the Imperial Court would have become a sort of 
symbol representing the unity of China. Instead, on this point the 
revolutionary groups did not find an agreement, and, on February 12, 1912  
Empress Lung Yu signed on behalf the Child Emperor, Puyi, and 
proclaimed the Republic with an imperial decree.263 
Whether a compromise had been found in the regime, this was the 
beginning of an instable time. Like the Ottoman Empire, China had to find 
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a way to keep the different territories together, now there was not a 
symbolic figure to maintain the unity of the State. Additionally, the 
financial situation was critical and required a “honest” and “tougher” 
stance, in Sforza’s opinion. 264  The new Government needed help from 
foreign financiers in order to overcome the crisis that was engulfing the 
entire country. Sforza addressed San Giuliano highlighting the efforts 
Vienna was supporting in order to participate in the Chinese loans. He 
urged a similar engagement from Rome if there was any interest in 
economic expansion. The Italian diplomat argued that  immediate action 
was needed in order to not jeopardize the access to the potential market 
Beijing represented thanks to its 400 million inhabitants.265 
 
Is the fact that we do not want to move our capitals from more essential 
endeavors enough to excuse the non-expression […] of our broadest reserves 
related to the right of the Italian finance to not be excluded from the shares 
of the international loans for China and – seizing the opportunity to assert it 
implicitly – from every kind of control and akin situation where the Great 
Powers are involved in? 
Can we – even if we have more moral, if not material, interests than Austria 
and […] greater expectations of expansion for the future – be less than 
Vienna’s Government which, as I had previously said, has already claimed 
its rights?266 
 
Sforza was following the guidelines Bollati gave in 1910, and the same 
guidelines San Giuliano had used when he was Ambassador in London and 
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wanted to foster the Italian expansion in the Mediterranean. San Giuliano 
answered that the Government would stay focused on the national 
objectives and the Italian role in the European Concert.267 Evidence of this 
stance is that the Italian interests in China were also marked by a military 
presence. There were several missions of the Royal Navy underway. In 
particular, the Italian soldiers would protect the religious missionaries and 
the small Italian manufacturers’ activities developed in that country. 268 
However, as Sforza’s reports outlined, the European alliances were 
changing. If in 1911 Sforza went to the German residence to ask for 
explanations, by 1912 he was working in close contact with the English 
representative, Sir John Jordan, in order to help Yuan to maintain the power 
endangered by internal conspiracy. The Italian diplomat was aware of the 
limits of the man, but for the moment the Chinese President “proved to be 
self-reliant and silent, leaving a little to chance, knowing how to weaken the 
hands of almost every man in whom he saw a rising danger.”269  
In short, Yuan was enough to grant the conditions Rome needed to 
accomplish that plan of economic penetration of the Far East. The problem 
was that in the summer of 1913 the Italian initiatives were still minute. So 
minute that, Italy risked to be excluded from future possible organizations 
that would have been created to protect the interests of  capital invested in 
those territories.270  
At the beginning of 1914, Sforza received an offer by the new Chinese 
Minister of Finance to create a Sino-Italian Bank with an initial capital of 5 
billion Italian Lire. Indeed, the cabinet reshuffle occurring in those days, 
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was a manifestation of Yuan Shi-Kai’s will to centralize the power in the 
President’s hands, that could mean a more favorable situation for Rome.271 
Actually, the new Government committed to secretly deposit 50 percent of 
the total capital of the future joint Bank. It would be a “success,” according 
to the Italian official since usually foreign banks have to fight against 
Chinese wariness, instead Rome would have Beijing’s secret cooperation.272 
Nevertheless, the European situation was quickly degrading, and Sforza 
was compelled to observe the events from his faraway lookout. 
When the World War broke out San Giuliano asked all the ambassadors 
their opinion on the situation, and “exceptionally” the Italian minister also 
consulted Sforza, who considered the request as evidence “that he bore 
[him] no grudge” for the divergence in opinions they had in the past.273 The 
diplomat answered his chief from the Chinese perspective. In fact, Sforza 
noted the progress Germany had made in the Far East challenging the 
English influence. “Even from a diplomatic point of view, Germany was 
about to reach the primacy she enjoyed in Constantinople with Marschall,” 
he remarked. Despite its predominant position, Germany had undertaken 
an inescapable path to war. It meant “that the leading spirits in Berlin [were] 
not up to their task or that they harbor dangerous claims to domination.” It 
was not important at that point, but Sforza noted that Italy did not have any 
option. “Neutrality becoming for us a manifest duty,” he wrote. The only 
choice to be made was related to the shape this stance would have taken.274 
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For my part, unless you send me different instructions, I shall intensify and 
develop our interests here without any mystery of my friendship for the 
colleagues of the Entente. 
 
Finally, San Giuliano would have never sent “different instructions,” but 
the truth is that Sforza had already launched that policy few years before, 
without asking for any permission as he was prone to do even when he was 
a simple chargé d’affair. After one month, the Foreign Affairs Minister, 
“tormented with gout,” wrote to Sforza to tell him that his young official 
was, perhaps right, “and the old tottering mail-coach [was] safer than the 
shining motor-car.”275  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
Sforza was on leave when he wrote the telegram to San Giuliano in support 
of the choice of neutrality. The diplomat was spending his vacation with his 
pregnant wife in Shanhaiguan, close to Manchuria. Their first daughter, 
Fiammetta Bianca Maria, was born on October 5, 1914.276 Sforza recalls in 
his memoirs that San Giuliano “began […] to ponder on the manner in 
which Italy might enter into the war on the side of the Entente” as soon as 
the Government declared neutrality on August 3rd. Sforza argued that San 
Giuliano had a plan that was “marked with a clearness of vision.” 277 In his 
memoirs the Italian diplomat considers San Giuliano’s choice to avoid the 
denouncement of the Triple Alliance as a necessary step. “To remain 
patient” was Italy’s duty. The “eventual decision to abandon neutrality” 
would be made when the Italian minister had been sure of the Entente’s 
commitment in defeating the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Sforza in his 
memoir, does not take into account that San Giuliano, in the meantime, was 
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trying to obtain the “terre irredente” on the basis of Article VII of the Triple 
Alliance Treaty in exchange for leaving Austria free to act against Serbia. 
This option would allow Italy to accomplish his national unity without 
going to war.278  
 
 
 
3.I. ITALIAN NEUTRALITY AND ORIENTAL WARFARE  
 
The Austro-German warfare challenged Italian diplomacy and the project 
of seizing zones of influence in which Sforza had been strongly committed. 
The Austrian attack against Serbia and the German invasion of neutral 
Belgium, his wife’s homeland, were clear signs of the imperialistic stance of 
Vienna and Berlin. Moreover, Valentine’s family was strongly connected 
with the Belgian Court, and since August 4th the couple had followed the 
events with apprehension.279 Indeed, King Albert and Queen Elisabeth did 
not leave the country after the invasion, but they “settled on the last parcel 
of free Belgian soil, and wove around them a legend.”280  
Sforza did not understand how it was possible to stay on the Austro-
German side “discarding any other consideration, such as the fact that the 
Treaty was purely defensive.” The diplomat was far away from the internal 
political quarrel that followed the Italian declaration of neutrality, but he 
followed the debate. 281  According to Sforza, there was only an Italian 
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politician who supported the intervention on the side of the Central 
Empires in the summer of 1914. This man was Sidney Sonnino who would 
succeed San Giuliano at the Consulta, after the old Minister’s death on 
October 16th. Sforza’s view in hindsight was probably influenced by his later 
relationship with the new Foreign Affairs Minister, whose “essential trait” 
was the “puritanical” and “pharisaical” obsession of “thanking God that he 
was ‘not as other men are.’ A mania which may easily become intolerable 
cant in private life and an element of incomprehension in public life.” The 
diplomat preferred different political models. For instance, Cavour was the 
kind of statist able to “[assent] to compromises in transitory incidents” 
without being opportunistic; he had always “in view some general noble 
purpose.”282 San Giuliano “possessed neither the courage nor the vision of 
Cavour,” but he was a “believer in diplomatic finesse.”283 
To confirm his analysis, Sforza recalled a conversation he had with the 
former Minister and Senator Pietro Bertolini some years later, during the 
Spa Conference in 1920. 284  Bertolini explained that Sonnino was 
“unconsciously” influenced by his Tory tendencies and endowed with a 
“naïve pride of going against the country’s unanimous opinion.”285  On 
August 17, 1914 Bertolini, worried about irredentist pressure motivating an 
entrance into the war, wrote to Sonnino. In his answer on August 18th, the 
future Foreign Affairs Minister recognized that while he was previously for 
the intervention with the Allies, the majority of the people supported the 
choice of neutrality. Once the Government had made their decision, it 
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should be maintained, “resisting the airy incitements of the public 
opinion.”286 
Instead, in September, San Giuliano, when Germany seemed close to a 
defeat, changed his policy. At that point, the Foreign Minister started 
looking for an agreement with the Entente in order to obtain the missing 
Italian lands.287  This does not mean that he had not already scrutinized the 
alternative option in the previous months. Since July 1914, he ordered his 
ambassadors to plumb the Entente’s willingness towards Rome.288 In fact, 
he made a program in the case Italy would enter the war on the side of Great 
Britain, France and Russia. Sforza reported San Giuliano’s plan as follow:289 
• Italy should make sure that the Entente fought and opposed the 
survival of the Austrian Empire in the postwar system, instead of 
“wrongly” considering Germany “as the main enemy,”; 
• Italy should seek an alliance with Romania and an agreement with 
the Serbian Government; 
• The new Italian border should be the natural frontier, that meant 
the Alps until the gulf of Fiume – “where Dante had fixed, in the 
Divine Comedy, the Eastern boundaries of Italy,” so that Dalmatia 
would be excluded except for the annexation of few islands. 
San Giuliano also had a plan for the postwar Europe, which consisted of 
an alliance among the winners to “maintain the new map of Europe” and 
an Italo-Serb entente to ensure “the pacific Italian influence in the Balkans.” 
Sforza believed that this program was “far-seeing,” mainly because it was 
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limited to the lands inhabited by Italians. The new Minister should have 
adopted his predecessor guidelines upon appointment. 290  The Prime 
Minister Salandra, instead, chose Sonnino as new Chief of the Consulta, a 
choice that Sforza strongly opposed. The two men had two different 
approaches to Italian foreign policy. Sonnino was the major rival of Giolitti, 
and Sforza advanced his career thanks to men close to the latter. Sforza was 
“convinced of Italian superiority and sure of [its] power of penetration,”  
and the main goal of a Foreign Affairs Minister should be “to throw open 
the doors of the East to Italian influence.”291 
As Foreign Affairs Minister – after November 5, 1914, Sonnino did not 
change his attitude. His name meant a total change in the diplomatic 
method, especially when compared to San Giuliano’s approach. The two 
men had different characters: the latter was as flexible as the former was 
rigid. It was impossible that Sonnino kept his predecessor’s legacy alive: he 
wanted to shed some light on the Italian foreign policy. Rome had to make 
its decisions regardless of the development of the European war, and 
consider its objective to be national unity.292 There were two possible ways 
to obtain Trento e Trieste. Italians could negotiate their passage under the 
Italian Kingdom with Vienna in exchange of the Italian neutrality. 
Otherwise, the war against Austria would be the only way to realize the 
fulfillment of unity. The greatest problem with the first option was that 
Sonnino wanted a real commitment from Austrians, who should have 
                                                
290 Ibid., 286. 
291 Ibid., 300. 
292 See also J.Burgwyn, The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War and the Paris 
Peace Conference, 1915-1919 (Greenwood, Westport: 1993), 17-19. 
	 	 	
88 
yielded the territories by a definite time; but he chose this stance in 
November coherently with the neutrality declared in August.293 
In this complicated situation, Sforza’s legation had become more 
marginal than before; even if, the European conflict had consequences also 
in the Far East. The Chinese Government had issued a declaration of 
neutrality on August 6, 1914, but Japan declared war to Germany on August 
23rd, which meant attacking Berlin’s concessions in the Shandong peninsula. 
The Japanese warfare had been supported by the British. London was not 
only allied with Japan but also its influence in the Far East had been 
endangered by the Germans. The divergence from the Japanese plans was 
that these were more ambitious actions than the mere exclusion of Germany 
from the area. Since the end of 1914, Tokyo had made a list of requests to 
submit to Beijing in order to find a conclusive settlement of the Sino-
Japanese relations. They were presented directly to Yuan Shi-Kai in January 
1915. No one was informed of the Japanese action, not even the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Sun Pao who compelled to resign, or the British 
Ambassador, who represented an ally of Japan. All the other foreign 
representatives were also kept in the dark about the Sino-Japanese talks.294 
Regardless of the secret that was covering the negotiations, on January 
23rd Sforza sent a long memo to Sonnino. Tokyo had seized the opportunity 
of a previous Chinese note, related to the Japanese military operations out 
of the Shandong territory, to ask for several privileges and concessions in 
the “richest provinces […] which would assure to the close Empire a 
preponderant influence.” 295  Sforza foresaw that Tokyo wanted to take 
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advantage of the actual international situation and present Europe with a 
series of faits accomplis. What was happening in Beijing should be placed in 
the European war context.296 
Western Powers’ lack of action, due to the European war, meant that 
Yuan Shi-Kai would have to accept the Japanese requests, perhaps after 
having adopted some dilatory ruses. In fact, when the Japanese intervention 
had already started, the Chinese President replied to some Southern 
officials’ call for resistance that “the only stance that China could adopt was 
the one of patience.”297 On February 4th, Yuan Shi-Kai answered to a new 
plea coming from the governors of the major provinces suggesting they 
wait and informing them that the “Demands” were not as severe as they 
were expected to be.298  
Sforza reported on the content of the Japanese requests on February 11th. 
They could be divided in five groups concerning four different zones (i.e., 
Manchuria, Eastern Mongolia – that meant the Southern Manchuria, 
Shandong and Fukien) and some general requests related to control of the 
army and the administration and to cooperate in the maintenance of the 
national order. The Italian representative was personally not surprised and 
considered the demands obvious to Beijing. Only the fifth group seemed 
too improbable to be accepted. However, if Yuan’s government could resist, 
it meant that Tokyo, “as in the oriental way,” made more questions in order 
to pretend to yield something and obtain the most important.299  
The Japanese goal was the exclusion of every Western country from an 
area that Tokyo considered to be an exclusive zone for its development. 
Japanese authorities had planned to achieve that objective without 
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resorting to the military power but using diplomacy. Among the Great 
Powers, no one seemed to have the necessary tools to stop the Japanese 
advance, not even Germany. Great Britain’s difficulties were also evident in 
Beijing. Clearly, Lloyd George was not able to stop Tokyo, and his main 
concern was the reaffirmation of the open-door policy. London did not have 
any other option; this was the only way to save the English endeavors in 
the Far East.  
Germany, according to the Italian diplomat, was literally doomed to lose 
everything. Having this in mind, Sforza had already interrupted any 
cooperation with Berlin’s representatives preferring the Triple Entente side. 
The diplomat also began to support the group of the interventionists in 
Italy. On February 15th he wrote to the director of the Italian newspaper 
Corriere della Sera, Luigi Albertini, to endorse his battle in favor of the 
intervention against the Central Empires.300 In a cable addressed to Sonnino 
on April 19th, Sforza ruled out any possibility of German interference in 
Beijing behaviors, a hypothesis contended mainly by the French Press. 
There were no Chinese authorities who believed that Berlin could have any 
influence in the Far East in the near future.301  
At that time, Sforza was unaware of the ongoing negotiations between 
Italy and the Triple Entente Powers, and he did not know the contents of 
the so called “Pact of London.” The secret agreement, signed on April 26th, 
was the legal precedent of the Italian intervention; it represented the 
guarantee to obtain in case of victory those territories needed to complete 
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the national unity and achieve the strategic security of the country. The 
Italian requests were mainly focused on the Adriatic side.302 The Entente 
promised Rome, in Articles 4, the regions of Trentino and southern Tyrol to 
the natural boundary of Brenner, plus, Trieste, Gorizia, Gradisca and the 
Istrian Peninsula to the Kvarner, including Volosko and the major islands 
of Cherso and Lussino with the nearby minor islands. Fiume would be part 
of Hungary. In Article 5, it was established that Italy would control the 
Dalmatian coast from Zara to Cape Planca and the Dalmatian islands, 
excluding Brac, Bua, Solta and the two Zirona. The left part of the Dalmatian 
Coast would be neutralized. Italy also obtained Valona, Sazan and the 
creation of a small Muslim Albanian State in the central part of Albania, 
which would be under its protectorate. The remainder of the Albanian 
territories would be divided between Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. In 
regards to the Middle East and the African territories, in Article 9, France, 
Great Britain and Russia recognized, “to a degree,” that Italy was interested 
in the maintenance of the statu quo in the Mediterranean area. For this 
reason, Rome would have a sphere of influence in the province of Antalya, 
in the southern coast of Anatolian Turkey, and an enlargement of the 
African Italian colonies in case of division of the German colonies. On those 
conditions, Italy committed itself to enter the conflict one month later and 
on May 23rd declared war on Austria-Hungary. 
On May 25th, China and Japan signed the “Twenty-one Demands” 
agreement. It might be said that Tokyo strategy was successful, but London 
had a major role in the negotiations. The British did not want a war between 
Japan and China that would endanger Chinese independence – one of the 
objectives of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. So that they placed pressure on 
Japan to moderate its requests in the Fifth Group and on Yuan Shi-Kai to 
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accept the other terms, even if Beijing considered them “modified in the 
terms rather than in the substance.” 303  Tokyo would have its requests 
satisfied, in particular, those related to Manchuria, Shandong and Fukien. 
The only exceptions were the Eastern Mongolia and the fifth group. To 
conclude, the British believed that the crisis in the Far East was settled and 
Sforza, as a simple onlooker, was certain of the influence that London 
would exert in that zone in the future. The Italian official argued that his 
Government should act in agreement with London and earn its favor in 
order to enhance the Italian endeavors in the Oriental region. He appeared 
to be truly confident about the cooperation with the British, “especially now 
that the Royal Government left the ‘wise neutrality’.”304 
 
 
 
3.II. APPROACHING THE EUROPEAN WAR  
 
By the end of the summer, Sforza was appointed as Italian Minister in 
Serbia.305 None of his previous appointments made him the most suitable 
for the role, except that San Giuliano had thought Sforza as Italian 
representative in Albania in June 1914.306 At that time, when the relations 
between Rome and Vienna were particularly strained, the diplomat could 
have been considered because of his family’s ties with the Austrian 
Monarchy. San Giuliano was still trying to save the Triple Alliance, but it is 
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not clear why Sonnino chose him.307 One year later the balance of Powers 
was totally changed; the Italian role in the new Alliance remained marginal 
because of the refusal to declare war against Germany and sending more 
troops in Balkans to support the Serbian resistance.308  
Sforza had openly joined the interventionists, and in China he had 
supported the cooperation with the Entente, chiefly with Great Britain. The 
new office represented an advancement in Sforza’s career and strained the 
relationship with Sonnino. The instructions the Italian Minister sent to 
Sforza did not arrive, and the two had apparently a misunderstanding 
related to the diplomat’s return from Beijing. The Foreign Affairs Minister 
had to send directions twice to the official. Sforza was ordered to secretly 
leave the Chinese legation without waiting for his replacement, to avoid a 
long period of “uncertainty” for the Serbian Government.309 Finally, Sforza 
left Beijing with his family by ship on September 30, 1915 and arrived in 
Rome by mid-November to meet the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister.310 
Regardless of the previous instructions, Sonnino did not allow Sforza to 
reach his new destination, and the diplomat – disappointed, was put on 
leave without further explanation.311 Sforza seized the opportunity to spend 
some time in his hometown. He left Montignoso on November 27th to meet 
the King Vittorio Emanuele at his headquarters close to the front line in 
Udine. En route Sforza first stopped in Bologna with his university fellow 
and the leader of Socialist party Giuseppe Modigliani. The city was blacked 
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out when they arrived. It was a sign of the war which upset the diplomat, 
as it was his first real contact with effects of the conflict.  
During the trip, the two men deeply debated the Italian intervention. 
Modigliani was sure of the German victory, which would not be a danger 
to democracy. According to the socialist advocate, if Berlin became a world 
power, it would have been compelled to acquire modern institutions. 
Sforza’s companion argued that the Italian intervention had been decided 
by few people in Rome and Milan, who were influenced by the Nationalist 
and French propaganda. Modigliani jeered at the Belgian resistance, 
glorified by the press to inflame the Italian masses. Obviously, Sforza did 
not agree with this analysis, and he reported Modigliani’s speech to the 
King when they met on November 30th. Vittorio Emanuele was skeptical 
about a possible German renovation. He seemed to be worried about the 
German attempt to build a new alliance with Vienna and St. Petersburg.312 
There is no other information about this meeting, but in those days the 
diplomat was appointed as a secret envoy in Bern. It is definite that, after 
December 8th, Sforza was in the Swiss capital.313 The Italian representative 
writes that “Sonnino begged [him] to go to Switzerland first on confidential 
mission and investigations.” 314  On February 1, 1916, Sforza sent a 
confidential note to report about a meeting of January 24th with Monsignor 
Heylen, bishop of Namur – a Belgian city in the Meuse Valley which was 
under German occupation.315  
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The meeting, organized by the Belgian Minister, Baron de Groote, was 
crowded. Indeed, Monsignor Heylen was coming back from Rome, where 
he and the Belgian Jesuit Father Hénusse had met Pope Benedict XV.316 
According to Monsignor Heylen’s account, Benedict XV authorized him to 
reveal that the Vatican would never support the peace negotiations without 
having a guarantee for Belgian independence and the commitment of 
paying acceptable compensation.317 Monsignor Heylen’s words came from 
a misunderstanding: indeed, the Italian newspapers, as Corriere della Sera 
and Osservatore Romano, denied any statement related to the Belgian 
situation coming from the Pontifex.318  
Benedict XV wanted to maintain a position of neutrality and, in the 
previous months, had tried to mediate between the two fighting parts. The 
Pope was determined to enhance his international role in order to take part 
in the future peace conference contrary to what the Entente Powers agreed 
on with article 15 of the Pact of London in 1915. In October 1915 the Vatican 
worked in order to facilitate a separate peace between Germany and 
Belgium. For this reason, the Belgian prelates were invited in Rome, but the 
Entente Powers and the Belgian clergy were resolute to obstruct such an 
agreement.319 On January 30th, 1916, the Japanese Ambassador informed 
Sonnino by accident of an Anglo-French proposal for a joint declaration 
about the role of Belgium in the postwar negotiations. London and Paris 
wanted Brussels to have a place among the delegations which would decide 
the peace terms. They thought the Entente should declare that a peace 
agreement would be unacceptable if it did not recognize the complete 
independence of Belgium and include sufficient compensation for the 
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damages. The total amount of the reparations should be enough to insure 
the country a stable recovery of its economy and political institutions.320 The 
day after Sonnino spoke with the Japanese delegate, he met the English 
ambassador in Rome, who confirmed the Anglo-French initiative. The 
Italian minister at Le Havre – the French city where the Belgian government 
was exiled, also confirmed this information. 321  Finally, on February 1st 
Sonnino met the French Ambassador Barrère and showed his skepticism 
about the declaration. The Italian Foreign Affairs Minister defined it 
“dispensable” because there was nothing new to justify such an act.322  
The restoration of the Belgian independence, in the Italian Foreign 
Minister’s view, was already an essential condition for peace negotiations 
and the Allies were bound by the London Treaty of September 5, 1914. 
Sforza was allegedly not aware of Sonnino’s talks in Rome, but Bern was a 
strategic location for secret negotiations during the war. The Belgian 
sovereign, King Albert, had made overtures of agreement with Germany in 
order to spare his own country further destruction and ruins.323 Sforza’s 
contacts with the Belgian royal family were not a secret and, facing with 
such a circumstance, the diplomat advocated for Monsignor Heylen’s 
reliability and reiterated his support for an Italian declaration of war against 
Germany. The Italian official assured the “literal accuracy” of his report and 
shared that Monsignor Heylen did not overstate the Pope’s words.324 Sforza 
would have preferred a greater Italian commitment against Germany, 
instead Sonnino was opposing a determined resistance which endangered 
the Italian position among the Entente Powers. In those days the relations 
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with the Allies also were strained. The crucial issues were the Italian 
reluctance to send more troops in the Balkans and the Italian non-
declaration of war against Germany, from which brought on distrust from 
the other Allies. London and Paris were acting together, often without 
informing their Mediterranean partner.325 The different views between the 
Italian Foreign Minister and the diplomat could also explain why Sforza 
was recalled to Rome where he had to stay for some months. 
Waiting to leave in order to reach the Serbian Government, Sforza was 
authorized by Sonnino to submit a project of reform for the structure of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On March 16th Sforza addressed a new letter to 
Sonnino with his proposal. The diplomat argued that considering the future 
peace negotiations the bureaucratic system needed a major renovation 
inspired by the principles of expertise and efficiency.326  
 
In future peace negotiations, the Minister will personally manage our vital 
interests; but only the administrative branches of the Ministry can get to the 
heart of the many minor matters – which, frequently, have long and 
byzantine precedents and, if possible, will be easier to resolve with a peace 
agreement. 
For this reason, those departments should be something more than 
superficial. 
In fact, the reform should be fast and based on experience; it does not have 
to increase offices, expenses and officials. (The previous reforms of the 
Ministry always had personal objectives, even if they were legitimate; their 
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goals, covered by fine words, were  just the enhancement of a division rather 
than another.)327 
 
Sforza stressed the need to create effective and competent departments. 
The diplomat noticed that political and economic matters were always 
intertwined, and the political division was often more competent than the 
economic one. He added that legations, having limited possibilities, could 
not act in situations where political and economic elements had to be 
considered together. As a result, Sforza proposed to join the two General 
Directions of Political and Commercial Affairs into one structure: to have 
all the materials related to each country in one office. However, to avoid 
complaints from the actual General Directors, the diplomat suggested to 
maintain the two Divisions for European Affairs and Overseas. Sforza’s 
project included the abolishment of the internal hierarchy and the creation 
of offices dependent on the general directors. This would have been a way 
to increase accountability.328 
Sforza’s project did not have a follow-up. Sonnino was clearly occupied 
with more serious situations. The spring of 1916 was marked by a new 
deterioration of the Allies’ relations. In May, England and France secretly 
signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which determined the future spheres of 
influence in the Middle East. The Italian officials were informed about the 
existence of treaties related to the Mediterranean area, but the English 
Prime Minister Grey refused to communicate the exact contents. This 
refusal was related to Rome’s rejection of declaring war against Germany. 
As a consequence, Sonnino and his officials began to change their strategy, 
but there was still some resistance among the members of the Government. 
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The turning point was marked by the violent Austrian attack in Trentino 
from mid-May to mid-June which caused the crisis of Salandra Cabinet on 
June 10th.  
On June 11th Sforza met the King in Udine.329 The diplomat was about to 
leave for Corfu, the Greek Island in the Ionian Sea where the Serbian Court 
and his Government were exiled under Franco-Italian military protection. 
Vittorio Emanuele was worried about the internal political situation and 
appeared to be aware of the weakness of the Italian position. He warned 
Sforza about the fact that “Serbs were mad at Italians.” Nevertheless, “they 
seemed to be furious also about French.” In the meantime, Vittorio 
Emanuele praised the Serbian King, Peter I Karageorgevic, and his regent, 
Prince Alexander. That was the opportunity for the diplomat to question 
Vittorio Emanuele about which attitude should be adopted for the Adriatic 
Question. According to the sovereign, Italians should be willing to 
negotiate with Serbs; otherwise, by ten years’ time, another war would 
break out.330 The King, as the Statuto Albertino established, has a prerogative 
on Foreign Policy so that he determined the main line to follow; his words 
would inspire Sforza’s action in Corfu. 
Sforza’s departure coincided with a new direction of the Italian foreign 
policy. On June 18th, the new Executive, guided by Boselli, was established 
with representatives of different political groups to have a broader support 
for the warfare policy. On one side, this makeup made the Government 
weaker; on the other, Sonnino gained a privileged position which allowed 
him to lead the Foreign Affairs with more determination and take action to 
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position Italy on a more equal footing with its Allies.331 On June 16th, the 
decree which appointed Sforza as Minister in Corfu had already been 
signed.332 According to what he wrote to the Cosulta’s General Director of 
Political Affairs, Salvatore Contarini, the diplomat left Rome on June 28th 
with Fiammetta and Valentina, who was now pregnant with their second 
son; Sforzino would born on September 6th.333 The family spent a night in 
Brindisi from where they took the Royal Navy ship and arrive in Corfu on 
June 29th. 
 
 
 
 
3.III. THE ARRIVAL IN CORFU: A NEW MAP FOR THE BALKANS 
 
Sforza arrived in Corfu five months after the establishment of the Serbian 
Government on the island. The Italian diplomat stayed at the Hotel St. 
George, “in the lower town, on the Spianata, a pleasant square lined with 
trees opposite the old fortress.” His French and English colleagues, Auguste 
Boppe and Sir Charles des Graz, also resided there until the end of the war, 
“with trunks virtually unpacked.” Sforza was not as “optimistic” as the 
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other Entente’s delegates about the end of the war and signed a two-year 
lease. Sforza’s family moved to Villa Condi, “at Mandukio on the seashore, 
ten minutes by motor from the city.”334 
In his new residence, Sforza met the was the minister of national 
economy and future Foreign Affairs Minister of Yugoslavia, Vojislav 
Marinković, who also was the leader of the Progressive Party. Marinković 
rented the house before the Italian diplomat’s arrival, but he had never 
inhabited it and went to Villa Condi just to remove his belongings. It was 
an opportunity for Sforza to talk about the Serbian Prime Minister, the 
Radical Party’s leader, Nikola Pašić. The latter was 70 years old in 1916 and, 
for the last 25 years, had hold a political role, mainly as a Prime Minister. 
Marinković looked up to the Executive leader but also showed a kind of 
annoyance for his “over-cultivation.” Pašić was the “sort of man” that if 
someone “told him to go to the North Pole, he would prepare for a Polar 
expedition.” This temperament was “particularly useful,” according to 
Sforza who would become close to Pašić. The Prime Minister settled at the 
Hotel Bella Venezia, “in the upper quarter [of the island], far from shops 
and the crowd.” For three years, the Allies’ legates – such as Sforza, had to 
go there to meet the Serbian leader, but Pašić often went to Villa Condi for 
lunch or tea. Pašić and Sforza shared a passion for swimming. The two men, 
during their stay in the Greek island, would go “more than once swimming 
together in some creek near the Villa Condi. […] Amusingly enough, this 
man [Pašić ] who never knew the base pangs of vanity derived as much 
pleasure as an adolescent from the fact that he sometimes crossed the creek 
more quickly” than Sforza.335  
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The Italian diplomat, as the other Entente’s officials, interacted mainly 
with the Serbian Prime Minister and rarely met the Prince Regent. 
Alexander, indeed, “would leave his army in Macedonia only for short 
sojourns in Corfu, the time necessary to maintain contact with the members 
of the Government and the three Entente plenipotentiaries.”336 Sforza’s first 
official meeting with the Prince to present his credentials was not until July 
13, 1916.337 
 
My mission starts after creating a glorious brotherhood in arms has created 
between the two countries that kind of supreme bond made of the blood 
spilled against the common enemy. This will forever inspire my action. I am 
glad to think that, even if today I have to be received by you away from 
Serbia, the day is coming when the national independences are reclaimed 
and I will be able to follow His Majesty the King and Your Highness to the 
Serbian territory with the people whose pains and bravery have inspired 
such a deep and touching consideration in Italy and in the free Europe. 
 
Sforza’s words did not represent the real state of relations between Serbia 
and Italy. As Vittorio Emanuele noticed, Serbian authorities were 
disappointed by the Italian lack of support against the “common enemy” 
(i.e., Austria).338 Sonnino was trying to operate a major revision of the Italian 
commitment to the war; at least, it seems that Sforza understood his mission 
in these terms. Sforza also talked about “national independences” and not 
only about the Serbian independence. Considering his memoirs, he had 
already understood the end of the Austrian Monarchy. The socialist 
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Leonida Bissolati may have inspired Sforza’s future ideas.339  Bissolati and 
Gaetano Salvemini had been the main representatives of the democratic 
interventionism in 1914 and both of them believed that Italy should 
renounce to the annexation of the Dalmatian coast and the Dodecanese 
islands. Indeed, according with the Mazzini’s tradition, Italy should 
become the “guardian” of the freedom of the countries formerly subdued 
to the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire.340 But, in 1916, Sforza was still acting 
as a diplomat: his words were connected to the Minister’s directives and, 
even in the future years, he maintained the idea of the necessity to control 
Valona. The Albanian Port city – and the Albanian coast in general, were 
among the most important Italian interest at that time. The Italian troops 
had been stationed there since December 1914.341 The Pact of London, even 
if paradoxical, talked about an Independent Muslim State under the Italian 
protectorate. 342  Serbs were aware of the Pact’s contents – the Serbian 
Government had been informed when the Entente Powers were negotiating 
with Bulgaria for its entrance into the war in the summer of 1915. So, Prince 
Alexander’s skepticism is also understandable.343 The Regent remarked that 
the Serbian blood was “spilling” because of the national ideal, and he would 
expect “empathetic, perfect and friendly support” from the Allies.344 
The point is that the two countries had similar war aims: the achievement 
of national unification; Serbs wanted an outlet on the Adriatic Sea, and 
                                                
339 Haywood, Failure of a Dream, 512. 
340  M. Bucarelli, “Mussolini, la questione adriatica e il fallimento dell’interventismo 
democratico,” in Nuova Rivista Storica, XCV, Jan.-Apr. 2011, v. I, p.137-206: 139. 
341 On the Italian military operations in the Balkans see, A. Vagnini, L’Italia e i Balcani nella 
Grande Guerra: Ambizioni e realtà dell’imperialismo italiano (Carocci, Roma: 2016), 45 et seq. 
342 P. Pastorelli, L’Albania nella politica estera italiana, 1914-1920 (Jovene, Napoli: 1970), 3-7. 
343 Sforza, Fifty Years of War and Diplomacy…, 125 et seq.. See also W. A. Renzi, In the Shadow 
of the Sword, 219-29: 228. Even if Serbs did not know the contents of the Pact, the Allies – in 
order to silence the rumors, “communicated territorial promises to the Serbian government 
on August 15, [1915].” 
344 DDI, s. V, v. 6, Sforza to Sonnino, Corfu, July 13, 1916, n. 118, 80. 
	 	 	
104 
Italians aspired to a strategic control of the Adriatic Sea; finally, both of 
them had as their main enemy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the 
Italian program, the London Agreement represented a “working formula” 
from which Serbia also could profit, but, it effectively was the “beginning 
of a cold and diplomatic war between Rome and Belgrade.”345 Despite the 
Pact of London also envisaged an enlargement of the Serbian State, 
Belgrade was against such an arrangement. As Italy plotted to replace the 
Austrian Empire as the “major regional power,” Serbia could not tolerate 
another country’s hegemony in that area.346  Pašić progressively became 
closer to the Yugoslav exiles, like Supilo and Trumbić who were among the 
founders of the Yugoslav Committee in 1915. Besides, the radical leader had 
already given his endorsement to the cause of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovene 
tribes by the end of 1914, when in Niš he declared that “Serbia would put 
all her forces” for that cause.347 
Starting on July 19, 1916, Sforza sent reports about the difficult situation 
of the Serbian Army, which was mainly supported by the French. The 
diplomat seemed more worried about the French influence in the area. The 
Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister told him that the Serbs needed at least the 
presence of a Russian contingent in Thessaloniki to contrast the Austrian 
propaganda. There were rumors about a secret agreement between Moscow 
and Sofia which caused bad morale among the soldiers.348 On July 22nd, once 
again Sforza touched the military question.349 In a long report addressed to 
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Sonnino he established a connection between a potential Italian advance 
into Albania – particularly, into Valona’s hinterland, and the Allied 
occupation of Thessaloniki. Sforza supported a major war effort in order to 
increase the international value of the Italian occupation of the Albanian 
port city, which had appeared an “exclusive Italian affair” until that 
moment. He also stressed the strategic importance of such an action in order 
to prevent a “reformed” Serbian army moving toward Southern Albania.  
Sforza thought that Valona was a crucial point to Rome’s strategy. The 
Italian interest might have been restricted to the coast and Sazan before the 
war broke over Europe, but the modern naval technique in warfare 
involved the adoption of a new “formula.” Italy should take every territory 
needed to make Valona “safe.” Even if it was still neutral, in the summer of 
1916, Athens represented the main rival. Sforza was worried about the rise 
of Panhellenism due to Venizelos’ movement. The Greek nationalistic 
leader, backed by the French, opposed the King’s refusal to enter the war 
and supported the intervention on the Allies’ side. The goal of the 
nationalistic movement was the creation of a Greater Greece, including 
southern Albania. An event that could be accepted by Italian authorities, 
according to the Pact of London, if the disposal of the Treaty would be 
respected.  
Sforza, instead, thought that the Italian occupation was needed in order 
to present the other Entente members with a fait accompli, prevent a Greek 
action – which would make Southern Albania “more Greek than the 
Hellenic Kingdom,” and avoid the creation of a zone of French influence.350 
Sforza also kept urging the enlargement of the Italian occupation in 
Southern Albania to contrast the Franco-Serb of Korçë. It was the right 
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moment for the Italian troops’ expedition into the Greek territory because 
it would look like an action of support for the Allied operations. Thus, Italy 
would achieve a privileged position. Pašić, instead, was wary; when he met 
Sforza for the first time, on July 26th, he did not show any interest in talking 
with the Italian delegate of this topic. The conversation was formal and 
short.  
Pašić recognized the common interests, but he was also aware of the need 
for an agreement in which Rome and Belgrade would settle their different 
views on the future boundaries of the Balkan States. From this moment 
Sforza started to put pressure on his chief to enter into negotiations with 
Serbs. Sonnino disagreed with the diplomat. The war was still underway, 
and the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister was unwilling to negotiate about 
the future European map. Sonnino was chiefly concerned with the Anglo-
French secret agreements on Middle Eastern area, from which Italy had 
been excluded. His goal was to bring Italy to a position of equality with the 
Allies. To achieve this status, in August Sonnino obtained the 
Government’s consent to send an Italian division to Thessaloniki, and on 
the 27th he was able to issue the declaration of war against Germany.351  
Sforza communicated the Italian decision to the Allies’ representatives in 
Corfu with a private letter as soon as he received the information from 
Rome during the night of the 27th.352 The Italian diplomat also informed the 
French General, Baumann, who sent him back the text of the speech he 
made to the soldiers to announce the event. Baumann defined the Italian 
declaration as the “official blessing” of the Alliance. The document, 
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according to Sforza, was nothing but the emblem of a “nationalistic point 
of view,” but he did not attach importance to it. He wrote to Sonnino that 
nothing would have changed the relations with his colleagues in Corfu 
which were already “friendly and continuous.”353  
Sforza was less restrained with the Chief of Cabinet Aldrovandi. In a 
“strictly confidential” letter the diplomat expressed his annoyance about 
dealing with the French General. More than once, Baumann ironically told 
Sforza that when French soldiers had left Corfu, Italians would have taken 
the “key” of the island alluding to Rome’s rivalry with Greece.354 The bright 
side of this “state of mind” was that Italy had made its priorities clear and 
was not intending to let Greece expand into Southern Albania. Sforza 
thought that acting as the major interested party in the area was crucial for 
the balance of power among the Allies, for this reason a limited Italian 
participation in the battle against the Central Empires should not be an 
option. 
By the end of September, Sonnino authorized the advancement of the 
Italian troops in Northern Epirus. An action urged by Sforza because his 
program went beyond warfare, as the diplomat revealed in October. Greece 
should be lessened to allow the Serbian expansion towards South across the 
Vardar Valley as an alternative to the Adriatic coast.355 At that time, indeed, 
the “Pan-Serb intoxication, the desire to reach the sea and the pugnacity of 
the race” made Italy the main Serbs’ enemy.356 Propagandistic books, issued 
by the Yugoslavian committees, condemned the Italian annexation of the 
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territories on the Eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. This option conflicted 
with the creation of a Great Serbia and its economic development. Sforza, 
by contrast, argued that the Serbian growth was impossible without the 
control of the Vardar basin. The river rises in the same region of Morava, 
which heads North and flows into the Danube. Together the two rivers 
create a great corridor from Belgrade to Thessaloniki. The railway line 
between the two cities was evidence of this natural connection. All the other 
lines, which could be created despite any complication, would have been 
subsidiary. “A Serbia without the Vardar Valley would never be a Balkan 
Power alive.”357 This was the crucial point in Sforza’s view; it should be the 
base for the future Entente between Italy and Serbia. If Serbians addressed 
their territorial drives to South instead of West, the points of the contention 
would vanish. Plus, Greece would be weakened. 
To conclude, Sforza imagined a European map with a Great Serbia going 
from Belgrade to Thessaloniki, including the Macedonian region inhabited 
by Bulgarian speaking people who were also Orthodox. Bulgaria would 
obtain Serres and Kavala. Slovenia and Croatia would be excluded from 
this Great Serbian State.358 He did not say if those new entities would be 
independent or a part of the Austrian Monarchy as third autonomous State. 
Instead, Albania would be independent with Valona and its hinterland 
under the Italian sovereignty. This was the perfect country planning to 
protect the Italian borders. The division of the Slavs excluded the rise of the 
great and neighboring Yugoslavian State. Moreover, this option would 
have weakened the Slavs’ innate militaristic and Germanophile 
tendencies.359 
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In 1916 the diplomat was sure that Austrian sympathizers were present 
even in the most passionate Yugoslavian committees: i.e., the President of 
the Yugoslavian Committee in London, Trumbić; and Frano Supilo, one of 
the leaders of the movement for the Croatian independence.360 The main 
purpose of the London Committee was the reunion of Southern Slavs in a 
sole State. The new national body would include: the entire Dalmatia, Istria, 
Trieste, Gorizia, the region of Carnia, part of Carinthia and Styria, Bačka 
and Banat. Sforza was concerned about the Committee’s influence on the 
Allies’ policies and urged the opening of negotiations with Serbs to find an 
agreement before the war ended. For this reason, he asked Sonnino to be 
summoned in Rome for a confidential meeting. The Italian official ignored 
the fact that the Foreign Office was moving in a different direction. English 
diplomats suggested the “union of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Southern 
Slavs into one strong federation of States.” According to the British pundits, 
this would be the best solution to obstacle the German advance in the 
Balkans.361  
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3.IV. THE RISE OF THE YUGOSLAVIAN KINGDOM 
 
By the end of 1916, the rivalry among the Allies became more palpable. On 
the one hand, there was the Greek Question. In December France and Great 
Britain officially recognized Venizelos’ Government, established in the 
northern part of Greece. On the other, the Albanian Question contributed 
to increase tension. On December 10th, French military authorities assumed 
the protection of the so-called Republic of Korçe in Southern Albania. In 
January 1917, to further complicate matters, Austria issued a protocol with 
which granted the protection of the Albanian State.362  
Pašić was aware of the Italian interests and thought that this was the right 
moment to enter into negotiations with Rome. Indeed, the relations 
between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee had also 
become increasingly difficult. The South Slavic people were unwilling to 
submit to the Serbian Kingdom, rather they wanted a “Yugoslav State 
where the three tribes could live together.”363  Nevertheless, the Serbian 
initiative surprised Sforza. Pašić thought that Albania, as it was established 
after the London Conference in 1913, was not an alive State; the Albanian 
people had never been an independent nationality. Tirana needed an 
autonomous or special regime, but it could not survive without the guide 
of other States. As a consequence, the Serbian leader preferred to find an 
agreement with Italy. Sforza’s answer was “ambiguous and moot.”364 Pašić 
did not mention another important point in the Italian strategy: the future 
of Montenegro, from where the Italian Queen, Elena, came. Thanks to his 
French colleague Boppe, who was “totally imbued with Serb views and 
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ambitions,” Sforza knew that Serbs were acting in order to include the 
coastal territory in the future State.365 
Serbian ambiguity and Greek nationalism, both backed by the Allies, 
endangered the Italian interests in the Balkans. So that, a few days after 
Sforza had met Pašić, Sonnino called the diplomat to Rome.  The Italian 
representative stayed in Italy from February 7th to the 16th.366 During these 
days the Foreign Affairs Minister gave instructions in order to contrast the 
French and Greek action in the area.367 As mentioned above, Sforza had 
complained about the Greek threat and French diplomatic and military 
authorities’ behavior in Corfu more than once. Since his arrival Sforza had 
urged a greater commitment of the Italian army in the island and in 
Southern Albania. During the spring Sonnino moved in that direction and 
Pašić  seemed to appreciate that.368 The latter constantly informed the Italian 
delegate about the activities on the Italo-Serbian front, recognizing Sforza’s 
effort. Nevertheless, in June the decision to claim the principle of unity and 
independence of the future Albanian State under the Italian “protection” 
provoked a new stalemate in the bilateral relations.369 
The so called Proclama di Argirocastro also had internal consequences. 
Three ministers – members of the Socialist Party, namely Bissolati, Bonomi 
and Comandini resigned. They believed that the Protocol contrasted with 
the ideal of national independence which had inspired the struggle against 
the Central Empires. Only Sonnino’s clarification allowed the Government 
to emerge from the crisis. The Foreign Affairs Minister had to explain that 
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“protection” did not mean “protectorate.”370 Sonnino’s words, however, 
did not have the same effect on the Serbian Government. Pašić did not 
comment on the Italian initiative with Sforza, but with the other delegates. 
Obviously, he strongly disagreed with Rome’s choice to grant the Albanian 
independence and would have appreciated being consulted beforehand.371 
Sforza maintained his support for a major deployment of Italian forces 
across the southern part of the Albanian territory. There were no 
alternatives to face the Greek advance and French influence in the Adriatic, 
but he did not consider the Serbian reaction.372 Considering the collapse of 
the Tsarist regime – “the main supporter of the Serbian cause” – in March 
1917 and the Anglo-French attempts to start secret negotiations with 
Austria-Hungary, Pašić, whose office was also threatened by internal 
opposition, decided to invite the Yugoslav Committee to Corfu.373 On July 
20th an agreement was signed, better known as the Corfu Declaration. It 
established the principles for the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes ruled by the Serbian Dynasty of Karadjordjević. The 
territories of the three countries were considered to be part of the new State 
without any exception. In the Preamble, France, England, the United States 
and Russia are quoted as models of democracy and freedom. There is no 
mention of Italy. Sforza did not hesitate to question the Serbian Foreign 
Affairs Minister. According to the Italian diplomat, the decision came from 
the Croats and Slovenes, who were fighting against the Italian army.374 
As a result, Sonnino accepted Sforza’s proposal to meet Pašić by the end 
of the summer. In the Italian diplomat’s view, the meeting represented the 
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opportunity “to come to a compromise” and be ahead in the future 
negotiations with the Allies. Sforza accompanied Pašić, “who in his careful 
speeches” told the Italian Minister that “he was ready to accept a reasonable 
formula. Sonnino listened – and in the end answered nothing.”375 The Corfu 
Declaration had left no chance to find an agreement. The Italian Foreign 
Affairs Minister thought that the Serbian Government had chosen the 
policy of “absolute values, which do not allow compromises.”376 Sonnino 
was concerned about the consequences in the domestic political debate; 
Italy would have no interest to carry on the conflict if the Allies recognized 
the Yugoslavian claims. By contrast, Pašić did not consider the Declaration 
an insurmountable obstacle. The Italian military supremacy in the Adriatic 
Sea would be ensured by the annexation of Trieste, Pula, a part of the Istrian 
Peninsula, some islands and Valona. The proposal was not enough for the 
Italian Minister who claimed the respect of the Pact of London and excluded 
further negotiations on those conditions for the moment.377 Once, the Italian 
requests were accepted, they could negotiate adjustments.  
“Pašić , who was silent as Sonnino,” only said to Sforza, “I expected 
that.”378 The Italian diplomat dissented from his chief’s decision; now he 
openly agreed with those who supported the constitution of a Yugoslavian 
State. This line would have been the only one able to protect Italy from the 
Yugoslavian propaganda that was endangering the Italian interests in the 
Adriatic Sea.379 For this reason, the diplomat “urgently requested Sonnino 
to have [him] recalled.” The latter, nevertheless, wanted him to maintain 
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his post in Corfu. Sforza wondered about the meaning of such a choice since 
Sonnino “contradicted [his] language and policy.” He replied: 
 
You will go on speaking according to your conscience; I shall never lie to 
you. Even now, I have not done so. Only – and there he stopped a moment, 
and then went on, somewhat ashamed – I am like the peasants; it is on the 
market-place, at the last minute, that I cut down my prices. 
 
It was not a Machiavellian strategy, in Sforza’s view, but Sonnino’s 
character, and there was no chance he would change his mind. On October 
17th the Serbian leader tried to establish a new line of communication with 
the Consulta, sure that Croatians were ready to find a compromise even if 
Slovenes were still more inclined to negotiate with Austria.380 Sforza was 
skeptical, but he believed in Pašić ’s will to have, at least, extinguished the 
nationalistic campaign. Meanwhile on the Isonzo front, the Italian troops 
were compelled to retreat after the battle of Caporetto and a new 
Government guided by Orlando was established in Rome.  
Sonnino – appointed as Foreign Affairs Minister once again, called Sforza 
to go to Rome. The Italian official was leaving Corfu when Pašić met him to 
confirm the reliability of his words. Nevertheless, Sonnino’s stance was 
always the same. On November 10th, Sonnino confirmed his doubts about 
the Slavs, talking to Sforza. 381  The diplomat describes the Minister as 
“dejected” and “shattered.” The Russian retreat from the war, provoked by 
the Bolshevik Revolution, had made real the danger of an Austrian victory, 
as the defeat of Caporetto proved. However, in Sonnino’s view, this was 
not enough to lower the South Slavs’ ambitions. Once again, the different 
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approaches emerged. Sforza’s was mainly worried about Berlin’s influence. 
His fear was that Germans and Germanophiles would be masters of the new 
Austria. Italy should secure its own zone of influence in the Balkans; the 
exclusion from that area was unacceptable. There was no difference 
between Germans, French or Greeks. If Italy did not want other major 
European Powers in the Adriatic Sea, there would be no alternatives but a 
compromise with Serbs who were fighting for their national freedom. 
 
 
 
3. V. THE END OF THE WAR 
 
The diplomat knew he could do nothing to change Sonnino’s mind, but he 
also thought to be “in duty bound to state [his] conviction once more.”382 
Sforza had a new occasion in January 1918 when Lloyd George and 
Woodrow Wilson stated their policies for the postwar system. The English 
Prime Minister, talking to the Trade Unions on January 5th, recognized the 
principle of national self-determination for the Austro-Hungarian 
territories. With regard to the Middle East, Lloyd George envisaged the 
Ottoman Empire’s survival on condition of neutralization and 
internationalization of the passage between the Mediterranean and the 
Black Sea. Three days later the President of the United States addressed to 
the Congress proclaiming the Fourteen Points. The new international order 
should be based on people’s self-determination, democracy, free trade and 
the ban of secret diplomacy.383 In this new atmosphere, Sforza, also warned 
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by his American colleague, was sure that the defense of the Treaty of 
London’s secret terms would be counterproductive.384  
 
At the Peace Conference they will all know how to pay lip-service to Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points, and, underhand, to think only of their interests; we alone, 
bound by a formula too antithetical, will risk being at variance with Wilson 
and with everybody; and in a desperate struggle for the Treaty of London, 
we shall endanger all our interests. European hypocrisy will give itself face, 
as the Chinese say, by denouncing the Italian sacro egoismo which will 
probably turn out to be the least realistic of all the Allied egoism.385 
 
The Italian diplomat argued that the Allies would take advantage of 
American Points to invalidate the London Treaty: a secret agreement with 
which Italy also reclaimed no-Italian territories. Sonnino admitted that 
President Wilson could “complicate” the postwar negotiations and 
authorized Sforza to “renew” the conversations with Pašić, temporarily 
absent from Corfu. In the meantime, the Italian Prime Minister went to 
London and met with Trumbić, thanks to the good offices of the Times’ 
editor Wickham Steed. They had general exchange of views, and Orlando 
also invited the Yugoslavian leader to visit Rome. This overture did not 
coincide with a change in Sonnino’s attitude. In fact, when Pašić came back, 
the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister had cancelled his instructions. Sonnino 
“begged” Sforza to wait for new ones, “which never arrived.“386 
In London, however, the contacts with the Yugoslavian Committee 
continued. In February, Andrea Torre, chairman of a new parliamentary 
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committee for cooperation with the subject people of the Habsburg Empire, 
met with Trumbić. Sforza thought that “friendly and sincere expressions 
towards the achievement of Yugoslavian independence” were the most 
“useful and expedient decision” to make for Italy, in view of its relations 
with Serbia and the Allies. He was aware in the meantime that the Balkan 
Question was more complicated. “The most enthusiastic Italian supporters 
of the Yugoslavian unity” should consider that some Croato-Slovene 
ambitions were exaggerated even for Serbs. In private conversations, they 
often talked about Yugoslavians as a group in which Serbia and Serbs were 
not enclosed.387 It was possible that they would not agree, and Trumbić 
would find a compromise with Vienna. However, at the moment, it was 
important that Italy behaved as a friend of Serbia and other “oppressed 
nationalities.” There might not be immediate war advantages from this 
strategy, but from a political point of view, it made Rome a faithful member 
of the alliance against the Empires.388 
Sforza received the decision to host the Congress of the Oppressed 
Nationalities in Rome in this perspective. The initiative followed the 
London talks and was scheduled for April. It represented “one fresh fact 
[that] broke the psychological status quo,” according to Sforza. On March 
31st, the diplomat met with Kosta Stoyanović, among the members of the 
Serbian delegation. Stoyanović was also President of an ancient Italo-Serb 
Committee and told the diplomat that he was ready to work for a “real 
reconciliation.” Sforza was sure of that but had doubts on Trumbić. 389 Pašić 
had confidentially informed the Italian official of a conversation he had 
with the Croatian leader. Trumbić thought that Stoyanović and the other 
members of the Serb delegation were unreliable because they did not 
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recognize his leading position. Pašić reportedly told him that the 
Yugoslavian action also included a special partnership between Italy and 
Serbia.390  
Sforza had met Trumbić only twice and, despite his previous remarks, 
found him to be reliable. “Nothing saddened [him] so much as to meet 
people who would ask in a whisper if was really sure that Trumbić was not 
an Austrian agent.”391 The diplomat, talking with Pašić, argued that the 
information was “spread by important foreigners” interested in 
maintaining unfriendly relations between Italy and the future Yugoslavian 
Kingdom.392  Sforza had to admit that there was a legitimate reason for 
questioning the sincerity of Trumbić to the alliance with Serbia, not just to 
the relation with Italy. The Croatian leader, during the negotiation for the 
Corfu Declaration, strongly opposed any attempt to limit the independence 
of Croatia and Slovenia. The union and freedom from any external 
dominion of Southern Slavs were unquestionable. For this reason, there 
were Serbs who believed that Trumbić could find a compromise with 
Austria to the detriment of Belgrade. 
Sforza’s main concern was the Austrian background of Trumbić. He, as 
the majority of his fellow citizens, believed in “historic rights,” so that an 
agreement to be effective had to abide by the theoretical jurisprudential 
structure. Principles, indeed, were considered to be inviolable; only after 
“endless bargaining” could they be changed with a new juridical formula – 
which would constitute the basis for future generations’ disputes. As a 
consequence, for those born under the Habsburgs’ rule “no possibility was 
excluded.”393 
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Finally, the delegates signed an agreement on April 10th. All members of 
the Conference agreed to follow a common action against Vienna. In 
particular, the Italians and the Yugoslavians agreed that the unity and 
independence of the Yugoslavian nation were Italy’s vital interest, as the 
achievement of the Italian unity was a vital interest for the Yugoslavian 
nation. The delegates committed themselves to act together during the war 
and the peace negotiations to reach their common goals. They also claimed 
the freedom of the Adriatic Sea from any kind of enemy. The territorial 
controversies were postponed to future negotiations which would resolve 
the question according to the principle of nationality.394 
The document had only a symbolic value but it was a considerable step 
forward in Sforza’s view, and it deserved some consideration from the 
Italian Government. The Executive, instead, appeared to be divided 
between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs’ chief. The day after, 
Orlando received all the delegates during a solemn ceremony where the 
Foreign Affairs Minister did not participate. Sonnino did not want to meet 
the members of the Conference. Sforza strongly disagreed with this choice 
and believed that the Entente should claim credit for having appeased the 
Slavs’ attitude.395 
The Italian diplomat could be right. On one hand, Trumbić was less 
Austrian after the Conference. He came back with a “democratic air” and 
used to have conversations in Italian with Sforza. Even the French Minister 
in Corfu was surprised by the accord between the Italian and the Slavs’ 
representative.396 Trumbić was now ready to recognize the value of the Pact 
of London. The agreement would make impossible transactions that also 
represented a threat for the Slav interests. He seemed to be reassured by the 
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Foreign Affairs Minister’s character.397  On the other hand, Pašić, whose 
position was endangered by a strong internal opposition, needed external 
support.  
In May, the Serbian Prime Minister went to Villa Condi and tried to 
revive the project of a bilateral entente on the Albanian question.398 Pašić 
placed the potential agreement in the warfare situation and was ready to go 
to Rome in order to meet Sonnino. Pašić revealed that Vienna had decided 
to undertake an extreme action and destroy the Italian army on the Piave 
frontline.399 According to some secret informers, Austrians and Germans 
were so sure of a victory that they were ready to invade Lombardy, 
Piedmont and Southern France. Sforza had never seen the Serbian leader so 
worried and tried to assuage his concerns by explaining that Italians had 
become stronger after the defeat of Caporetto and no enemy could break 
the line. Pašić understood but wanted to remark on the need to strengthen 
the alliance between the two countries. From this viewpoint, he raised 
doubts on the treatment of Yugoslavian prisoners. As the Chief of Staff, 
Marshal Diaz also recommended to Sforza, the Serbian Prime Minister 
suggested the creation of a Yugoslavian legion within the Italian Army – 
wearing Serbian uniform and flag – to support the troops on the Eastern 
front. This would have been useful to weaken the Croat divisions that were 
still fighting against the Entente. 400 
Sforza was not convinced and kept his composure. In his report, he 
highlighted the ambiguity of the Serbian leader, noticing that he was still 
looking for a political agreement on Albania. Sonnino agreed to maintain 
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silence on the Albanian Question and on a special treatment for the 
Yugoslavian prisoners but did not mention their participation in the war. 
Sonnino opted for an “inscrutable silence,” and then, when the idea of a 
Yugoslavian troop seemed to become real, he said that he would exercise 
his “veto.”401 
Sonnino’s behavior would not cause any problem in the warfare. Sforza 
was quite sure of the Austrian defeat, but he was more worried for the 
aftermath of the conflict. He dealt with this issue during the meeting with 
Orlando in August. The Prime Minister was willing to find a compromise 
with Serbia, considering a Yugoslavia entirely independent.402 It was the 
best decision to make in Sforza’s opinion. Even if he was not sure that the 
Allies wanted the new State, a different approach would jeopardize Italy 
during the peace negotiations. At this point, Sforza was sure that the 
Austrian Empire could not survive. By contrast, Sonnino seemed to have 
still doubts.403  
In September, during a confidential conversation, the Foreign Affairs 
Minister narrated a memory from his youth when he was still living in 
Florence. Sonnino overheard two people talking and one said “they hate 
each other as if were two brothers.” The story, according to Sforza, could 
explain the Minister’s secret strategy: i.e., “it would always be more 
advantageous to look for support… in the German world.”404 The two men 
found only one common thread in October when the Balkan line was close 
to defeat. Indeed, they agreed to launch a new offensive on the Italian 
front.405 The battle begun on October 24th and the Austrian resistance was 
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stronger than in Macedonia. Only after six days were the Austrian troops 
defeated on Mount Grappa, and on November 4th, finally, the Italian troops 
could enter Trento and Trieste. On the same day Austria signed the 
Armistice, and in the night a telegram from Sonnino informed Sforza that 
he had been appointed High Commissioner in Constantinople.406 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR: 
RETHINKING THE ADRIATIC QUESTION  
 
On October 30, 1918 the Allies’ representative, the British Admiral 
Calthorpe, signed the Armistice with the Ottoman Empire’s delegates on 
the British battleship “Superb.” The Entente did not set harsh terms of 
disarmament or demobilization for the Sultan as they had for the other 
defeated Powers. According to Sforza, this was evidence that the Allies had 
not yet envisaged the collapse of the Sultanate.407 Indeed, after ten days, 
they decided to appoint three High Commissioners in Constantinople to 
maintain the relationship with the Sultan and protect their interests until 
the peace treaty would be signed.408  The three appointed officials were 
Calthorpe, the chief of the French division in the Levant Amet, and Sforza.409  
The Italian diplomat had already been in the Ottoman capital in previous 
years, but his role was different in 1918, and he felt charged with a real 
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authority. As Sforza writes, “Ottomans and foreigners addressed him and 
his colleagues for any kind of claim or need.”410 
 
 
 
4.I. LAST DAYS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: BACK TO THE NEXT 
TURKEY 
  
Remembering his arrival, Sforza writes that he “struck” by the “relative 
abundance of victuals.” Having the Italian situation in his mind, he 
expected something even worse in a “vanquished country.” Instead, 
“Turkey was far from dead; […] it was only temporarily down.” According 
to his memoirs, Sforza thought that if the Allies “pulled the rope too tight,” 
Turkey “would escape [their] hands.”411 . Turkish resiliency would make it 
challenging to occupy the country. For this reason, the Italian High 
Commissioner would declare that he was willing to work for an “early and 
honorable peace” which would protect all national interests. He would also 
add a refusal to participate of the Turkish partition – “knowing the projects 
of division” of the Ottoman Empire. Sonnino did not reply, but he did not 
recall Sforza either. The diplomat also writes that during those days he 
always agreed with his colleagues, and they worked “nearly” free from 
“nationalist jealousies.”412  
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But, it is known that before 1914, Italy had struggled to increase its 
economic interests in Turkey.413 In 1908 Sforza, as chargé d’affaires, had 
advocated actions in order to strengthen the Italian commitment in the 
Ottoman Question. After entering into the war, Sonnino tried to prevent 
Rome’s total exclusion from matters concerning the Near East. Article 9 of 
the Treaty of London recognized Italy’s role in the restoration of the balance 
of power in the Ottoman Empire and “just a share of the Mediterranean 
adjacent to the province of Antalya where Italy [had] already obtained 
rights and interests.” In fact, in August 1917 the Allies, signing the St. Jean 
de Mauriennne Agreement, made a provision that would allow Italy to 
occupy the vilayet of Konia and the southern part of the vilayet of Aidin, 
whose importance lied in the port of Smyrna.414  
As mentioned above, in the last months of the war Sforza and Sonnino 
were on the same page. Both of them believed in the necessity to use 
military force and occupy the Adriatic territories obtained by the Pact of 
London.  It was an act of force to compel the Allies to do what they had 
promised in 1915. On November 3rd the Italian troops began the operation 
and after two weeks they entered Fiume. The Dalmatian city was not 
included in the 1915 Treaty but the decision was motivated by the military 
activity of the Croatian Committee.  
In Turkey, Sforza maintained the same attitude and advocated for the 
use of force in the Near East. Using military force would be the last resort, 
and only used if Italian interests were in danger. As he told the Ottoman 
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Foreign Affairs Minister on November 22, the choice of a diplomat as a High 
Commissioner represented the friendly attitude of the Italian 
Government. 415  Meanwhile, he was determined to demonstrate the 
importance of the Italian contribution in the restoration of order. In the first 
days of December, he decided to claim the Venetian Ambassadors’ palace, 
which had become Austrian property after Campoformio. Sforza waited for 
the departure of the Habsburg representative and led the occupation 
himself. A French division joined the expedition, and its chief told the 
diplomat that French soldiers had received the order to support the Italian 
initiative with their presence.  
Sforza appreciated the French recognition. In his memoir, the diplomat 
writes that in this way the Ally showed consideration for his diplomatic 
conduct; “a clear and nonchalant attitude.” 416  In contrast, Sonnino’s 
behavior was influenced by the suspicion that the Allies were plotting 
against Rome. Indeed, the Foreign Affairs Minister was not able to defend 
Italian rights on the Palace when the United States’ pundits criticized the 
initiative. Sforza believed that “the suspicious creates suspicion,” whereas 
Sonnino should “Smile and let them have their say.”417  
The documents from that time show a different situation. Sforza had 
been concerned about the Allies’ behavior since his days in Corfu. He 
complained about the French ambiguity and repeatedly warned Rome that 
Venizelos’ political ideas represented a danger for Italian interests in 
Albania, regardless of the Pact of London. Now the question on the table 
was the Anatolian region. That was of vital interest in Sforza’s view, 
considering that the ideal objective of Italian foreign policy should be the 
penetration to the East. 
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Sforza knew that London sided with Athens. He was also aware of the 
French antagonism, and he denounced several times the attitude of the 
French Commissioner.418 He found in the Ottoman capital the same Italo-
French rivalry that he had seen first-hand in Corfu. The occupation of the 
Venetian Palace was just his first move. The second act consisted in the 
research of contacts with the only people able to obstruct the Greek 
aspirations and the Allies’ influence in the Near East; in other words, the 
Turkish nationalists.  He had already met the leaders of the Union and 
Progress in 1908, during the Young Turks Revolution. Sforza did not have 
a great opinion of those people, but as he wrote to Sonnino on December 
17th, they were the “main vital and organized energy of the country.”419  
For instance, the Nationalists’ leader – and former Young Turks’ 
exponent, Mustafa Kemal was able to avoid a police search in his house 
calling the Italian Commissioner. 420  The delegates of the Union and 
Progress also visited Sforza in mid-December on a Turkish initiative. The 
Italian diplomat, according to his reports, accepted the meeting without 
informing anyone of his colleagues. Sforza considered their return to power 
possible, but they needed to recognize the reality of a multicultural society. 
Sforza told them that their mistake in 1908 had been addressing only the 
Ottomans. Instead, they should consider the different racial groups and 
promise them autonomy. They had to transform the ancient patriarchal 
privileges into a new configuration, as if they wanted to create the “United 
States of Turkey.” In this way, they would have a chance to survive. Finally, 
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if they survived, they would need Western Powers’ support. He strongly 
recommended choosing European counsellors, mainly Italians “in their 
own interest.”421 
Mustafa Kemal gives a different account in his diaries. The Turkish 
leader writes that different meetings occurred with several Italian 
representatives.422 The Italians arranged the talks, and in the second one, 
Sforza offered unconditioned support to the Union and Progress’ actions. 
Kemal felt as if he was about to become a “servant” of the Italian 
Government and avoided any kind of commitment, asking if there were 
other matters to discuss. Kemal, indeed, had been told that important issues 
needed to be examined. The Italian diplomat had to admit that there was 
nothing to consider.423 
Sforza was aware that the Italian presence in the region needed to be 
supported by locals. The international system had changed with the 
intervention of the United States in the European conflict; the idea of 
annexations or administrative zones was now excluded. The Mediterranean 
Powers had reviewed the approach to their interests in the Near East 
according to the new rules. The new strategy was focused on assisting local 
people based on a precise territorial division. The interested Powers should 
help and guide these populations to freely choose their national 
governments. The Italian diplomat believed that British and French aims 
could easily be harmonized with Wilson’s principles.424 As he wrote to Elia, 
chief of the Italian army in the Aegean Sea, there were tendencies of 
absolute independence among Arabs. Nevertheless, Great Britain and 
France had people working for them in Syria and elsewhere. They had 
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expert agents, who could easily organize a movement of self-determination 
with Francophile or Anglophile tendencies. It was necessary to organize 
something similar “with extreme urgency.” The same kind of movement 
should arise in the Italian reserved zone. “It was a vital interest,” in Sforza’s 
view. In fact, it would be essential to prevent the diplomatic actions of 
Italy’s opponents. They could resort to the American formula and argue 
that locals were not asking for Italian assistance.425 
 
Since I arrived here, I strengthened a policy of friendship towards the 
Turkish race. The rest is made by the fear, the disgust, of the Turks against 
the simple idea that the Greeks could dominate them somewhere. 
Venizelos formally claimed in Paris the entire vilayet of Smirna (except for 
the Cazà of Denisli) and other territories. The Turks know it. It has been easy 
to persuade them to believe that the only route they have to save themselves 
from the Greeks is to ask for Italian assistance. It has been easy because it is 
the truth; they do not have another lifeline.426 
 
Sforza seemed totally skeptical about the glimmer of hope offered by the 
British government.427 He clearly said that he entrusted “two” or “three” 
Turkish people in order to achieve the national independence. He also told 
them to ask for Italian assistance because the creation of an independent 
country would be impossible without the help of a European Power, and 
Italy represented the “most favorable” choice.428  
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Sforza applied the same formula for the Italian administration of Libya. 
The diplomat believed that to pacify the North African country, and to 
contrast the external influences, Italy should negotiate with Turks and a 
local political force. That was the only option Rome had in order to make 
Libya a resource for the Italian economy.429 He thought that the Senussi’s 
religious clan – which mainly controlled Cyrenaica, was the best Libyan 
representative to find a compromise. In February 1919, Sforza met Ahmed 
al-Sharif, ex leader of the group which fought alongside the Entente against 
the Ottomans since 1916.430 The deal agreeing to cooperate together was 
signed by al-Sharif’s cousin, Muhammad Idris II. The latter, who was also 
the young son of the clan’s founder, Muhammad Idris, had become the 
head of the clan after al-Sharif left the country.431 Until 1916, al-Sharif had 
sided with Ottomans and Germans, who helped him to escape and find 
refuge in Anatolia. The Senussi’s ex leader became established in the city of 
Bursa from where he began to support the nationalist movement.432 
In his memoirs, Sforza writes that he met al-Sharif more than once.433 He 
considered al-Sharif as the “true” chief of the clan and other governments – 
namely, the French and British, were trying to reach him. Al-Sharif, 
nevertheless, knew that the Italians were the most interested, and he was 
willing to reach an agreement with Rome. Sforza believed that the Senussi’s 
representative still had disciples in Libya and was in contact with his 
cousin. Thus, the Italian diplomat wanted to use the exiled leader as a 
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mediator and create a system of cooperation with the whole Senussi’s clan, 
with possible support from the British.434 
Sforza’s plan would never succeed because Idris held the leadership and 
did not intend to share it with his cousin. Moreover, in 1917, the Italian 
government had recognized Idris’ role with the signature of the so-called 
“modus vivendi.”435 The government was more interested in finding a better 
deal with Idris, and eventually, using Sforza’s contact with al-Sharif, to 
inform the Senussi about their ex leader’s intentions.  
The experience was useful to Sforza in order to understand Kemal’s 
intentions. The diplomat writes that he was worried about a possible 
misunderstanding with the Union and Progress’ movement related to the 
conversations. To avoid troubles with Kemal and his group, he decided to 
give them “some hint” of the negotiations with al-Sharif. The answer 
received was surprising because Kemal expressed his total indifference 
toward the North African territory. The revolutionary leader thought that 
the maintenance of the Turkish domination over the Arabs was one of the 
causes of the Ottoman Empire’s fall.436 
 
 
 
4.II. LEAVING THE CONFERENCE: A "DANGEROUS" DECISION 
 
The “courage” of the answer impressed Sforza.437 This response confirmed 
to the diplomat the kemalist idea of a Turkish nation. The Union and 
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Progress’ leader had understood that the Imperial structure of the Ottoman 
Empire was a factor of weakness. Differently, a national State could become 
a factor of progress, which would help Turkey to play a more active role in 
central Asia. That awareness prompted Sforza to modify his attitude. The 
military force would not be useful in establishing an Italian influence but as 
a contrast to the other Powers’ actions. The choice of supporting the 
nationalist movement against those countries – which wanted to divide 
Turkey into zones of influence, could be more strategical in order to obtain 
commercial privileges in the long term.438 
The events of the spring confirmed the Italian diplomat’s hunch. In the 
first days of March, Elia wrote to Sonnino to report about the situation of 
civil disorder in Adalya.439 That would be the perfect excuse for a military 
intervention. On the 16th, the Patriarch of Constantinople claimed the 
annexation of the city to the Greek State.440 After twelve days, the Christian 
neighborhood of Antalya was shocked by a bombing. The attack provoked 
the reaction of the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister, who had secretly 
projected the occupation. Italian troops entered Antalya on the 28th 
following Sonnino’s instructions, which had been given to the High 
Commissioner to carry out.441 The soldiers advanced forward, along the 
railway Antalya-Burdur, but the British stopped the Italian action. To make 
the atmosphere even more tense, in the first days of April the French media 
dispersed false news that ten Italian ships had docked in Smyrna.  
That was a litmus test of the Allied Powers’ attitude against Italy. 
Particularly, the delegation led by Sonnino and Orlando, in the Allies’ 
opinion, was fixated on the defense on the Pact of London’s dispositions. In 
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those days, the talks were at a standstill. According to Sforza’s point of 
view, in Paris there was an unwholesome atmosphere, and Sonnino’s 
“undeniable” honesty could not succeed against the secret and selfish plans 
of his foreign colleagues. His stubbornness brought Italy into a condition of 
isolation.  
Sforza was among those who thought that the war had represented a 
victory for Italy. Indeed, the age-old enemy had been defeated: i.e., the 
Habsburg’s Monarchy.442 Instead, Italian nationalists created the myth of 
the “mutilated victory.” The High Commissioner shared that belief with 
other diplomats, such as the Director of General Affairs at the Consulta, 
Salvatore Contarini. In their opinion, the First World War had been the last 
war of the Risorgimento.443 Both of them were critical of the Italian policy; it 
was excessively focused on the “Adriatic Question.” The delegation did not 
consider that such an attitude could impair other vital interests, like the 
Italian role in the Near East. Their position could be encapsulated in the 
concept of “gradualism.”444  
The Italian Government could not accept a compromise also because the 
nationalist reaction could provoke a governmental crisis. For the same 
reason, when Wilson had visited Rome in January, Orlando and Sonnino 
were particularly careful to avoid any contact of the President of the United 
States with Italian people. 445 That was not enough, because in April Wilson 
addressed the Italian people after the Italian formal request for a full respect 
of the Pact of London on April 19th. The American President highlighted 
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that Italy could obtain the natural boundaries which excluded the 
Dalmatian territories and Fiume. Finally, he recalled the principles that 
inspired the United States’ intervention into the war and hoped that Italy 
respected those values. The huge domestic debate, which followed that 
statement, provoked the strong response of the Italian delegation. On April 
24th Orlando and Sonnino went back to Rome and left just a “delegate” in 
Paris. The Italian High Commissioner was concerned about the 
consequences of such an act. 446 
Sforza did not agree with Sonnino’s strictness and impetuous decisions. 
Sonnino claimed the full respect of the Pact of London and wanted to 
separate the problem of Albania from the question of the Eastern 
boundary. 447  By contrast, the American President was determined in 
considering the Albanian Question as a part of the whole Adriatic Question. 
In Sforza’s view, Italy could do nothing but to accept the American 
conditions and negotiate the settlement of the whole Balkan region. Sforza 
thought that the President of the United States had made a “serious formal 
mistake” in addressing the Italian people. But, in the diplomat’s opinion, 
the Pact of London was nothing but a confidential “entente” based on the 
idea that the Habsburg’s Empire would have survived.448  
In those days, the Allies agreed on the distribution of the mandates for 
the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire and invited Greece to occupy 
Smyrna. According to Sforza, this decision was the most mediocre action 
Wilson could have made; even if the Allies’ delegates did not ask for the 
American president’s opinion. 449  Lloyd George had replaced Italy with 
Greece, as the Mediterranean strategic factor of English foreign policy with 
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an anti-Turkish function.450 As a consequence, on May 6th the important city 
was offered to Venizelos, and while Orlando went back to Paris on the 7th, 
it wasn’t until May 12th that this was  communicated to him. 
Sforza had been aware of the new situation of Smyrna since the 9th thanks 
to his contacts in Constantinople.451 For this reason, and in accordance with 
Sonnino’s previous directives, he ordered the occupation of Makri and 
Bundrum. The Italian operations started on the 11th, and the day after 
Calthorpe invited his colleagues to the English Embassy to communicate 
about the occupation of Smyrna. Sforza “was convinced that the affairs of 
the Entente would take a very bad turn in Turkey.” But, the “instructions 
were categorical and nothing could be done.”452 
The Greek soldiers entered into Smyrna on May 15th; meanwhile, in Paris 
the Allies reacted against the Italian military operations. They claimed that 
the Italian behavior threatened the Conference’s talks and the achievement 
of Italian interests in the Near East. Alternatively, Sforza believed that this 
situation would be counterproductive for all the Great Powers. In his 
memoirs, the diplomat writes that he “was the only High Commissioner 
who told his capital and Paris that it was not only desirable, but imperative, 
to conclude a satisfactory peace with Turkey;” Turkish satisfaction was the 
Allies’ best guarantee to acquire equal privileges in the area.453  
From Sforza’s books emerges the frustration of a diplomat that found no 
opportunity to influence the decisions in Paris. As he highlights the Great 
Powers were focused on their particular interests, without considering the 
broader framework: “The French, engrossed as they were by their situation 
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on the Rhine, were not inclined to oppose too plainly the English on a part 
of the chessboard less vital to themselves. It was the same with the Italians, 
preoccupied exclusively in their turn, with the Adriatic question. The 
English – instead – were Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon.”454  
Sforza admired Lloyd George, at least for his attitude during the war. 
The situation changed in the postwar years. The diplomat believed that the 
British Prime Minister was wrong in considering the East as if it was the 
West. His ideas had been influenced by Venizelos; “a remarkable man 
[…with] a great idea, ‘the megala idea’ which had consoled so many 
generations of Greeks during the centuries of slavery and misery.” 455 
Venizelos’ plan was to realize the ‘the megala idea’ with the help of England 
and London wanted to use Athens to acquire a major influence in the Near 
East. In Sforza’s view, both of them did not consider the Turkish factor.456 
The Powers had chosen the wrong strategy, and Sforza did not hesitate 
to express his objections: it would be “a thankless task.”457 For instance, 
when Lloyd George offered the substitution of the English troops in the 
Caucasus with the Italian soldiers, the High Commissioner discouraged the 
Italian Government more than once. In April, the High Commissioner 
noticed the difficulty pacifying a territory inhabited by Georgians, Tartars 
from Azerbaijan, Armenians and Russians, who publicly hated each other 
and would not like a colonial Power, as they did not accept the British 
administration. Sforza also noticed the danger of compromising the 
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relationship with Russia. Seeking commercial and financial advantages 
should be considered preferable in any military adventure.458  
The diplomat asked if there were active oil wells in that territory because 
experts told him that there were few possibilities to have good results from 
the research. As an alternative, Sforza suggested a joint venture with a 
Russian company to obtain concessions in Baku. In the diplomat’s opinion, 
the local population would accept a pacific commercial penetration. 459 
Those recommendations, backed up by the King’s doubts about the 
expedition, were not considered by Orlando and Sonnino.460 In particular, 
the Prime Minister addressed the King to remark the importance of 
controlling a territory which was rich of natural resources.461 Orlando also 
wrote that the expedition would not threat the Italian relations with 
Russia.462 The truth is that the Government had already taken the decision 
in the first days of June and the troops were ready to leave. The only thing 
that made it impossible was the fall of the government on June 19th and the 
appointment of Francesco Saverio Nitti as Prime Minister. His first decision 
was the cancellation of the expedition which would have cost 1 billion and 
200 million.463 The main purpose of the new Prime Minister was, indeed, to 
disarm in order to suspend the state of war, which Orlando had 
maintained.464  
Sforza appreciated that decision, above all because some people from the 
Bank of “Sconto” tried to dissuade the Prime Minister from canceling the 
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expedition. 465  Nitti – as the other statesmen of democratic Italy, was 
“straight as an arrow,” according to Sforza. However, the Prime Minister 
paid his opposition to the Georgian endeavor with a strong campaign 
against him. From this moment, financial and military groups cooperated 
to have Nitti out of the Cabinet. Nevertheless, Sforza thought that the 
“tragedy” of Nitti’s government was that the Prime Minister was not able 
to lead the State. The diplomat appreciated Nitti’s eloquence and his skill in 
convincing: as a professor, the Prime Minister expressed himself better in 
speeches than in action, but, finally, nothing would happen.466 
 
 
 
4.III. ROME CALLING: NITTI’S UNDERSECRETARY 
 
The new Government was established on June 23, 1919. As mentioned 
above, Nitti’s main purpose was the Italian disarmament and the economic 
reconstruction, that meant the European recovery. To reach these goals, the 
cooperation with the United States and Great Britain was necessary in order 
to limit the French revanchisme against Germany. Indeed, he appointed, as 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Tommaso Tittoni who was well known for his 
Germanophile inclination.467 On the same day, Nitti also wrote to Sforza. 
The Chief of the Consulta communicated to the High Commissioner that 
the Council of the Ministers had approved his proposal to recall him in 
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Rome as the new Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.468 Tittoni also asked 
Sforza to go to Rome as soon as possible. The Minister, in fact, had to reach 
Paris where the Peace Conference was going on, and on the 28th the 
delegates would sign the Treaty with Germany, which also included the 
Statute of the League of Nations – the new international organization that 
the President of the United States wanted to maintain the world peace.  
The diplomat had already been informed of his new role by Nitti on the 
20th, according to his memoirs. Nitti chose Sforza as he was a young 
diplomat who could cooperate with a Minister like Tittoni. The latter had a 
long experience in politics and international affairs; Sforza would enter his 
political career in that moment, at the age of 47, becoming “Count” by 
mistake.469 Nitti writes in his memoirs that an official wrongly titled Sforza 
as a Count on his appointment as Undersecretary. The King thought that it 
was not necessary to edit the document and since that moment Sforza had 
maintained the aristocratic title with which he would be known in Europe 
and the United States.470 The Italian historian Maria Grazia Melchionni, 
who interviewed Valentine Sforza, writes that the King himself erroneously 
titled Sforza as a Count during a royal reception.471 Having saying that, the 
High Commissioner was not enthusiastic about leaving the Ottoman capital 
where he acted as a “leader.”472 Sforza was aware that he would not be free 
to act in Rome, as a “simple undersecretary,” but he could only give 
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recommendations and suggestions.473 Plus, the diplomat had spent the last 
three years abroad and was not familiar with the domestic situation.  
In the summer of 1919, the internal political debate had become 
exasperated. The prewar clash between interventionists and neutralists was 
now transformed into a dispute among those who cried a “mutilated 
victory,” and those who believed in the necessity to find a compromise with 
the new states that had succeeded to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
first group denounced the failure of the Italian delegation in Paris as 
something that they could have expected. The ongoing diplomatic disaster 
in Paris was due to all those who had been in favor of the war.474 Despite 
the fact that Italy was among the winners of the war, the political climate 
had come to a showdown. The legacy left by Orlando and Sonnino was 
difficult to handle because the international isolation coincided with the 
internal crisis, which was worsened by the unfavorable economic 
conditions. 
 Nitti had been the Minister of Finance since November 1917. He 
resigned only in January 1919 because Orlando and Sonnino rejected his 
plan for a fast withdrawal of the Italian troops from the occupied 
territories. 475  As mentioned, Orlando and Sonnino were not always in 
concord, and before the Conference began, the Prime Minister had thought 
about changing the Foreign Minister. Orlando had a conversation with 
Nitti, and the latter suggested to appoint a young person who could serve 
the Country’s interests. Nitti was thinking about Carlo Sforza.476  In his 
memoirs, Sforza writes that he met Nitti when he was the Minister. The two 
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men talked about the Adriatic Question, and both of them criticized the 
attitude of Sonnino and Orlando, but Sforza did not like Nitti’s cruel 
sarcasm. The Minister did not understand Sforza’s idea of “changing to 
create.” In Sforza’s opinion, Nitti was just interested in “changing to 
dismiss,” and his government followed this line, which was fully supported 
by his Foreign Ministers: Tittoni and his successor Scialoja, who in June was 
a member of the new Italian delegation at the Peace Conference.477  
One of the first decisions of the Cabinet was the change of the delegates 
in Paris. The Ambassador in London, Imperiali, who was among the 
members of the old delegation, was informed about his return to Great 
Britain on the afternoon of the 23rd. It was a clear sign of the intention to 
give a new direction to the Italian foreign policy. Imperiali also negotiated 
the Pact of London in 1915. His name was strongly connected to Sonnino’s 
behaviors, even if the Ambassador did not agree with the first Italian 
delegation’s choice.478 According to Imperiali, Sforza’s appointment was a 
proof of the “new atmosphere” and was strategic in dealing with the Near 
Eastern Question, which Tittoni had to face upon his arrival in Paris on the 
29th. 
On the 30th Tittoni received an Anglo-French memorandum where the 
Pact of London was contested and the Italian occupations in Anatolia were 
considered illegitimated actions. The Allies exhorted Italy to find a 
compromise which would reconcile the Italian interests with the other 
involved countries’ aspirations. To conclude, the document announced that 
Rome would lose all its rights and support if the troops did not withdraw.479 
Sforza might have been a thorny presence in Constantinople. As a High 
Commissioner, he had been a loyal executor of Sonnino’s plans and an 
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advocate of a stronger action against the Greek expansionism. The diplomat 
was strengthening his contacts with Mustafa Kemal and his movement 
when he was recalled in Rome. On the basis of Kemal’s account, the idea of 
a nationalists’ expedition against the Greeks came from Sforza, who 
promised Italian support.480 Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were aware of 
the Italian action, and their suspicion did not disappear with the removal 
of the High Commissioner.481 Lloyd George, in his memoirs, denounces the 
Allies and their lack of loyalty towards the British, which would become 
unabashed in the following years. Referring to the 1921-22, the British Prime 
Minister writes that Rome – and Paris – supported Mustafa Kemal and his 
men; Italy and France sold them weapons and helped them to avoid police 
controls. Otherwise, Athens could easily have defeated the 
revolutionaries.482 
Obviously, Sforza had a different opinion: English and Greek obstinacy 
was the real driving force of the nationalists.483 He disagreed with Tittoni’s 
program which focused on the restoration of the relationship with Great 
Britain, which meant a compromise with Greece. Looking for an alternative, 
Sforza ran to Paris to meet his chief as soon as he took his new office. The 
diplomat advanced the proposal of talking with Pašić in order to find an 
agreement on the Adriatic Question, avoiding the Allies’ directives. 
However, that conversation was not actualized, and Sforza had no choice 
but to come back to Rome and to oppose Tittoni’s plan secretly from there.484 
The Foreign Minister – having Nitti’s consent – began the negotiations 
with Venizelos on July 15th. The pivot of the Minister’s program was the 
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obtainment of a protectorate over the central part of Albania and its 
partition as it was planned in the 1915 Pact of London: Serbia also enlarged 
by annexing the northern part of the Albanian territory, whereas Greece 
obtained the South. As a consequence, Venizelos gave his support to the 
Italian mandate; in return, Italy recognized Greek interests in Thrace and 
Northern Epirus. On these premises, the Agreement was signed on July 29th. 
In addition, the two statesmen agreed on Italy’s renouncing the 
Dodecanese’s islands – with the exception of Rhodes. Greece confirmed the 
neutralization of the Canal of Corfu and promised to leave a part of 
Southern Anatolia to Italy.485   
The day after Sforza obtained Nitti’s signature on a letter addressed to 
the Foreign Affairs Minister. 486  The document recommended a public 
declaration in favor of the Albanian independence, as Sonnino had claimed 
when he was still in office. The unusual convergence of ideas between 
Sforza and Sonnino was caused by the Undersecretary’s belief that such an 
act would grant the Italian influence in Western Balkans and weaken 
Yugoslav and Greek aspirations. Moreover, Italy would side with 
nationalists, showing respect for the American principle of people’s self-
determination. Allegedly, the Undersecretary did not force the Prime 
Minister to sign the document, but the withdrawal of Italian troops from 
Albania meant a reduction of Italian public spending, which was important 
to Nitti’s program. However, Tittoni easily understood that Sforza was the 
real writer of the letter. The minister replied reaffirming his stance, and 
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from that moment Sforza was left in a marginal position without a chance 
to influence any decision.487  
On August 4th, Tittoni presented a new proposal to solve the Adriatic 
Question. The Agreement with Venizelos was included in the project, and 
the Eastern border would match the so-called Wilson line’s position. In the 
American President’s plan Istria had been divided into two parts: the first 
part, Trieste and Pula, along with the railway connecting the two cities, was 
included in the Italian borders; the second part, Fiume and Ljubljana, was 
given to the Yugoslavians. The Italian Foreign Minister was willing to 
accept this division on the conditions that no concessions were made to 
Yugoslavia in the Drin Valley and Albona that should be in the Italian zone. 
Two options were left for Fiume: the creation of an independent state with 
a special statute; or the neutralization of the territory after which it would 
then be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Tittoni was also ready to 
renounce the Dalmatian coast with the exception of Zara.488  
On August 6th the French Ambassador, Barrère, visited Sforza. The 
Parisian representative praised the new Government’s work. Barrère said 
that Athens was causing friction in the relationship with France.489 In his 
diary, Sforza did not comment, but he had become critical of the Executive 
decisions and had major problems acting inside the Ministry. 490  Sforza 
understood the importance of the Albanian national movement; so, if 
accepted, Tittoni’s program would create an unstable system. Sforza 
warned his superiors about the risk of the local populations’ uprisings, but, 
probably, without enough conviction. Not only were they indifferent 
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toward those suggestions, but Nitti and Tittoni did not realize Sforza’s 
objection to their action.491 As Nitti writes in his memoirs, the diplomat 
always remained loyal to his ministers.492 
On September 10th, the Allies signed the Treaty with Austria and the 
Italian government had to withdraw its troops from Fiume, where they had 
been stationed since the signing of the Armistice on November 3, 1918. As 
Sforza writes, “For many Italians, irritated as they were by the difficulties 
which they attributed to the blindness of the Allies,” the city had become 
“something like the symbol of victory.”493 Sforza also thought that Fiume 
was “undeniably” Italian and should be included in Italian territory. The 
crucial point consisted in the need of finding a compromise between the 
national principle and the new States, which were the new factor in the 
international system.494 After all, the diplomat had advocated the necessity 
of an agreement with the neighboring country since his days in Corfu. 
Moreover, the economic and social crisis which Italy was experiencing 
stressed the importance of peace with the Allies. For instance, in September 
an agreement with France was signed in order to obtain protection for the 
Italian migrants.495 Italy was also reliant on United States’ credits and Great 
Britain’s coal.496 
The Government’s efforts to negotiate a solution for the Adriatic 
Question were brought into question on September 12th, 1919 by the well-
known expedition of Fiume, led by the Italian poet Gabriele D’Annunzio.497 
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According to Sforza, D’Annunzio’s feat was the result of the wrong policies 
followed by the Italian government and Nitti’s incapability in controlling 
the Army.498 During the summer, Italy had been appalled by the popular 
riots for the high cost of living. The protests continued until September, and 
Nitti did not to intervene; indeed, the rioters had the sympathy of the 
soldiers as well as D’Annunzio.499 
In his diary Sforza defines the Italian authorities as people who were not 
able to lead, nor could they take on their own responsibilities.500 Sforza 
strongly disagreed with Nitti’s method. The Prime Minister did not 
understand that presenting Fiume as a national interest was not enough to 
persuade Wilson to be on the Italian side. On September 25th, after a 
“Council of the Elders,” Sforza criticized Nitti’s decision of sending a new 
telegram to the President of the United States. Wilson would see such an act 
as an “anxious weakness.”501 The Government should have looked for a 
compromise with the local authorities and the Allies. This way the Italian 
soldiers’ presence would have been legitimate. French and British troops 
could be stationed in the North of the city, and their ships, in the Port, could 
be augmented.502 It was a way to create a fait accompli, which could have 
forced Wilson to accept the Italian presence in the city. Sforza believed that 
a national problem had to be framed in the broader field of the European 
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political scenario to influence American decisions.503 Nitti, instead, was sure 
that there was no chance of success and rejected Sforza’s proposal.504 
On September 26th, Sforza met Sonnino who had not attended the 
Council of the Elders. The Undersecretary had been ordered by Tittoni to 
question the ex-Foreign Minister about his opinion on Fiume. Sonnino 
suggested not to challenge the Americans, but to play for time while the 
Government negotiated with the neighboring countries which offered 
better possibilities to reach a compromise. 505  After all, Wilson’s 
international position was weakened by his internal opposition. However, 
the negotiations with the Allies entered into a new phase of paralysis. On 
September 27th, Tittoni addressed the Italian Parliament and declared that 
Italy was ready to give up to the Albanian mandate, but not to Valona. The 
Italian Minister’s speech was not enough to overcome the international 
stalemate; indeed, nothing was decided on about the Adriatic Question.  
In the meantime, the Albanian nationalists began new protests, and 
Sforza opened a line of communication with D’Annunzio and his 
legionaries. Sforza suggested that Tittoni use the poet as a mediator with 
the Yugoslavian nationalist and separatist movements.  
By the end of October, the contacts had been established.506 Formally, 
Sforza – with Marshal Badoglio (who was first Commissioner for Venezia 
Giulia and then, from December 2nd  on, was Chief of Staff) – was charged 
of negotiating a “modus vivendi” with D’Annunzio’s aides. The agreement 
was reached in December, but D’Annunzio did not accept it, and the 
situation remained the same, even if the contacts with the separatists 
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continued. 507  His approaches to D’Annunzio and to the Yugoslavian 
separatists continued during the first months of 1920. The Undersecretary 
was seen as the “outsider” of the Government by D’Annunzio and his 
entourage.508 However, those connections did not necessarily represent the 
intention to destabilize or destroy the new Kingdom. The diplomat thought 
that D’Annunzio and his “legionnaires” were a useful tool in order to put 
pressure on the Allies and Belgrade. His real aim was to find a compromise 
– which he considered vital to maintain domestic and international order.509 
In January 1920 Sforza’s personal life bridged once again to his 
professional life. On January 9 his brother-in-law, Gaston, married Nathalie 
Kostantinović who was a descendant of the Obrenović, ex-reigning family 
of Serbia and the widow of Mirko Petrovic-Njegos of Montenegro, son of 
the exiled King Nicola and brother of the Italian Queen Elena. Nathalie had 
three sons from her previous marriage, Stefan, Stanislav and Michel, who 
could claim the Serbian Crown, but Sforza acted as a mediator with the 
royal family to avoid the spread of a dispute for the throne.510 Sforza, as a 
diplomat, was careful in maintaining contacts with everyone.  
In the meantime, the negotiations on the Adriatic Question were still on 
going. Nitti presented a new proposal to solve the Adriatic Question, 
following the Allies’ memorandum of December 9th. This joint declaration 
established the acceptance of the Wilson line more Albona, which was 
included in the Italian territory. The request for the independence of Fiume 
was rejected; the city would be an autonomous corpus separatum within a 
buffer state under the control of the League of Nations, which would also 
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have authority over the independent Zara. The Dalmatian city, 
nevertheless, would be in a customs union with Yugoslavia. Italy obtained 
the sovereignty over the islands of Lissa, Lussino, Unie, Pelagosa and 
Valona. Italy also got the mandate for Albania, whose northern borders 
were those of 1913; while, future negotiation would decide the southern 
limits. However, the Yugoslavs obtained the right to build a railway in the 
Drin Valley.511 
As the Allies memorandum restated the connection between the Italian 
resignation to Albania and compensation in northern Adriatic, Nitti’s 
proposal, of January 14th, included the same principle.  The new 
compromise referred to the memorandum of December with few 
differences. Fiume would be an independent – but contiguous state under 
the League of Nations’ authority. Dalmatia was yielded to Yugoslavia with 
the exception of Zara, which would be also independent and under the 
League of Nations’ authority. The islands of Lussino, Lissa and Pelagosa 
were ceded to Italy, and all the Adriatic islands should be demilitarized. As 
for Albania, the Tittoni-Venizelos’ agreement was confirmed: Italy would 
obtain Valona and the mandate on central Albania; the Yugoslavian State 
would annex the northern part; and Greece would have the South, with 
Koritza and Argirocastro. However, “Nitti’s compromise” was a new 
fiasco; so that, the Allies referred to bilateral negotiations the settlement of 
the Adriatic Question.512 
Meanwhile, Italian society was still experiencing a deep crisis. December 
and January were the most turbulent months; almost all Italian workers 
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went on strike, stopping trains, mail service, industrial and agricultural 
production.513 The Government had to deal with the rise of prices and the 
lack of resources, so that the German and Eastern Questions became 
particularly compelling. Nitti needed to stabilize the internal situation, and 
an economic recovery was impossible without agreements able to secure 
Italian supplies. Considering this premise, Italy's economic reconstruction 
was closely related to the Prime Minister’s broader design of European 
recovery which would also include the German Question and the relations 
with France. The clash between Italian and French interests was an 
inevitable conclusion. Paris, in fact, was determined in obtaining a total 
execution of the Treaty of Versailles; whereas, Nitti thought that the Allies 
should try to keep their demands within reason.514 
In March, the conflict between the Allies’ policies emerged during a 
reunion of the Supreme Council in London, where Berlin requested access 
to the Ruhr for its troops in order to restore the social order. France strongly 
opposed the German request and was also ready to intervene once it 
obtained the Allies’ consent. Nitti openly expressed his opposition to the 
intervention during a conversation with the French Ambassador Barrère. 
Henceforward, the Italian Prime Minister maintained an attitude of harsh 
criticism with respect to French behaviors towards Germany.515 Such an 
attitude determined a deep crisis in the relationship with Paris, but the 
Undersecretary also seemed to disagree with his Chief. Sforza, indeed, on 
the eve of the San Remo Conference, wrote to Albertini that French politics 
were partially legitimate, even if not entirely embraceable. A rearmament 
of Germany was possible, and for this reason, it was necessary to avoid 
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Berlin taking possession of all the resources which had previously been 
under its control.516 
According to Sforza, the cooperation with France was important to 
secure Italian interests.517 He reaffirmed his idea also in a letter addressed 
to Nitti on the eve of the Conference of San Remo, which was scheduled for 
April 19th. 518  The Undersecretary had a confidential conversation with 
Barrère on the 16th. The French Ambassador complained about the political 
difficulties he was encountering. Sforza replied that if the bilateral relations 
were changed, the responsibility laid in the French representatives: “Grands 
hommes de Versailles.” 519   Yet, the Undersecretary thought that Barrère 
should not be considered as an enemy because his name was related to the 
relationship between Rome and Paris. Sforza believed that the French 
Ambassador was aware of the unfairness of the memorandum of December 
9th.520 If Italy accepted that document as a compromise to solve the Adriatic 
Question, the public opinion would be right in claiming that the peace 
agreement was an act of disloyalty by the Allies. As a result, Barrère would 
do everything he could to push the Serbs to yield Fiume to the Italians.521 
To conclude, in Sforza’s view, the Government could not forget that France 
was a “bad animal, which bit as long as it was alive;” the maintenance of a 
friendly relationship was convenient until it could be ignored with 
security.522 In San Remo, Nitti made a new proposal which acknowledged 
the memorandum of December with a few changes in order to protect the 
Italian interest in Fiume. The Allies did not accept the new project, and no 
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solution was found; so, the problem was definitely deferred to bilateral 
negotiations.523  
In regards to the German Question, Nitti could do nothing but to 
reiterate his position, entering into a new dispute with the French Prime 
Minister Millerand. In this atmosphere Rome’s action was doomed to be 
thwarted with regard to the Italian interests in Germany as in the Near 
East.524 The Ottoman Question was the other important issue on the table of 
the inter-Allied Conference. Sforza had kept working on this problem since 
his arrival in Rome. He paid particular attention to the procedures which 
brought to the so called Tripartite Agreement. The Undersecretary was still 
convinced that the commercial expansion in the Near East was crucial to 
Italy to get beyond its lack of resources. Indeed, the deal aimed to establish 
zones of exclusive commercial and industrial influence in the Ottoman 
territories, including areas under the British and French mandate (i.e., Syria, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia). The Entente affirmed the principle of equality 
in the composition of the International Committees which controlled the 
different branches of the Ottoman administration. The former German 
enterprises were turned over to a Tripartite corporation. Each Power 
committed to respect the limits of the assigned area and to support the 
others in maintaining the position acquired.525 
However, London refused to sign the document until Turkey signed the 
Peace Treaty while final draft was agreed upon in San Remo. As a result, 
the Tripartite Agreement assigned privileges to Italy that were impossible 
to realize without Ottoman cooperation.526 Among those privileges there 
was also the concession of the Eraclea’s coal deposit. Despite de marginal 
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importance of the miner, the question became important to the Italian 
government. In May, Sforza urged the necessity to activate production in 
the area.527 Indeed, the Italian lack of resources did not allow them to wait 
longer. Sforza wanted the British Government to intercede with the Turks 
so that they could allow Italian society to begin production.  The 
Undersecretary brought that matter up again when he was in London 
without success.528 
On June 5th, Sforza left Rome to reach London where he had to meet 
Lloyd George. The Undersecretary’s official mission consisted in explaining 
the Italian policy on the Reparations, but unofficially, Sforza was told to 
contact Krassin, who was the Soviet Commissioner of Foreign Commerce.529 
Since the beginning of the year, thanks to the Allies’ openings, Nitti had 
started a transformation of Italian policy towards Russia, which was 
considered a crucial factor in the process of European – and Italian, 
reconstruction as well as the cooperation with Germany. The Italian 
Government had to handle the permanent lack of resources which was even 
more urgent in postwar crisis.530 Indeed, the purpose of the Prime Minister 
was not a formal recognition of the Bolshevik regime, but the relaunch of 
commercial relations. Nitti also thought about obtaining the socialists’ 
support for his Government. However, the Russo-Polish conflict, which 
flared during the spring, had caused a stalemate in this process of 
approaching the East.531  
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In his diary, on June 9th Sforza wrote that he had a long conversation with 
Krassin. The meeting was positive for both of them. The Undersecretary 
confirmed the Italian will of restoring commercial relations and 
communications, but he also said that a relaunch of political relations was 
impossible. Nevertheless, the Russian historiography has seen this meeting 
as the first official contact between Italy and Soviet Russia.532 Sforza told 
Krassin that Italy would do anything to get wheat and essential resources 
from the Black Sea.533 In his report to Moscow, the Russian Commissioner 
urged a resumption of commercial relations, but he also warned about a 
possible political crisis in Rome which would end Nitti’s experience.534 The 
danger was mentioned by Sforza, who would take up the duties of Foreign 
Minister in the future Government and the negotiations with the Soviets. 
 
 
 
4.IV. FOREIGN MINISTER: SFORZA AND THE ADRIATIC QUESTION 
 
On June 10, 1920 the news of the governmental crisis reached Sforza while 
he was about to leave London in order to reach Paris.535 As requested by 
Nitti, the Undersecretary had to meet with the French Prime Minister 
Millerand before coming back to Rome.536 On the same day, Sforza was 
informed that the new Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, had chosen him as 
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Foreign Affairs Minister.537 The Allies were alarmed by the return of the old 
statesman, who was well known for being a neutralist. So that, the choice 
of Sforza as chief of the Italian diplomacy was a clear sign that the old 
statesman wanted to cooperate with the Allies. 538  Moreover, Sforza 
extensively knew the situation of the Italian international relations because 
of his previous role.539 The priority Giolitti had placed on foreign policy was 
necessary to focus later on the domestic issues.540 According to this plan the 
new Cabinet would immediately deal with the following issues: Albania, 
Fiume, and Yugoslavia.541  
In his diary, Sforza wrote that he wanted to stay away from the ongoing 
discussions in Rome, and for this reason, he stopped in Paris.542 His name 
had not been the only one on the table when Giolitti was considering 
candidates; several others were rumored: Carlo Alberto Aliotti, at that time 
Commissioner in Bulgaria, would be Giolitti’s second choice if Sforza 
refused; Pietro Bertolini, who was the Italian delegate for the Reparations’ 
Commission; Giacomo De Martino, who was an ambassador in Berlin.543 
The latter was also suggested by Tittoni, who wrote to Giolitti on June 
10th. 544  According to the ex-Foreign Minister, De Martino had all the 
necessary skills to guide the Consulta and to negotiate with foreign 
authorities. Sforza, instead, was not the most suitable person for that job 
because he was not a fluent enough speaker for addressing the Chambers. 
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Tittoni suggested confirming Nitti’s previous decision to send Sforza in 
Tripolitania as Governor. The ex-Minister added that the proposal had also 
been accepted by Sforza.545  Actually, the diplomat was not enthusiastic 
about the idea of Governor and saw it as a clear attempt to move him away 
from Rome.546 
The political crisis made Nitti’s plan impossible to realize, and on June 
12th Sforza met Millerand in a changed atmosphere. They talked about the 
political change which was ongoing in Italy. The Undersecretary said there 
was nothing to worry about; Giolitti wanted the Allies to forget his old 
choices. 547  The day after, Sforza was in Rome and met the new Prime 
Minister. The two occasionally had come across each other in Parliament 
when Sforza was Undersecretary, and on the train to Frascati, a town close 
to Rome, where they went on vacation with their families.548   
According to Sforza’s memoirs, when he met Giolitti on the 13th, the 
Prime Minister did not mention the formation of the new Cabinet. He 
directly asked about the diplomat’s opinion on the “whole Adriatic 
problem.”549 Sforza first explained his idea about Fiume. In his opinion, the 
city represented “a pretext” for D’Annunzio to “try the conquest of Italy as 
a new aesthetic sensation.” Nevertheless, that situation “contained worthy 
elements of patriotic feelings,” and it was up to the Minister of the Interior 
– who would be Giolitti – to deal with it. Sforza added that he did not agree 
“with any of the so-called cautious and practical men who think that, cost 
what might, we must heal the gaping wound of the Adriatic question.”550 
He referred to Tittoni who had thought about a “liquidation” of the Adriatic 
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Question. By contrast, Sforza warned Giolitti that he wanted to follow a 
policy of “reconstruction.”551 
Sforza meant that the Italian government needed to “impose on Belgrade 
[the] amplest and most complete geographic frontier line.” As he had 
always thought, the diplomat argued that Italy did not have to insist on 
Dalmatia because such a possession would mean the necessity of 
safeguarding the other side of the Adriatic. The result of such a line would 
be a limitation of the Italian “diplomatic freedom for the future.” That 
design had a major concern: the “danger of Habsburg restoration.”552 Sforza 
believed that a potential return of the Austrian Monarchy made an 
agreement with the neighboring country essential. Indeed, if the 
Habsburg’s restoration “would mean a lessening of the value of Italian 
victory,” it also represented a real danger for the Yugoslav unity.553  
Sforza’s program wanted Italy to be “the leading power in Central and 
Oriental Europe,” and such a goal could be achieved only if Rome, as a great 
Power, gave its support to the Successor States of Austria-Hungary. 554 
While, he could not been completely sure, in Sforza’s opinion, the Allies 
would support such an action. The future Minister had not been clear when 
he talked with Millerand in Paris.555 On that occasion the diplomat had also 
complained about the French behavior in the Balkans, so the Albanian 
Question still potentially represented a limiting factor in the bilateral 
relations. Sforza remembers that Giolitti was also skeptical of his plan, but 
all the same Giolitti offered the Foreign Minister position to the ex-
Undersecretary.556  
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Sforza accepted, and again met Giolitti on June 18th. The first problem 
they dealt with was the Albanian Question. Their plan was to focus on the 
independence of Albania and the renunciation of the mandate, but the 
retention of Valona, at least at first. Indeed, it was well known that the 
Albanian Government was determined on having the Italian troops out of 
their territory.557 Sforza tried to find a compromise in order to maintain 
Valona when, in July, he met his Albanian colleague, Konitza, in Paris. The 
latter, according to Sforza’s diary, seemed to agree on having further 
meetings in Rome.558 On July 23rd, however, the Albanians attacked the 
Italians troops stationed in Valona and they could hardly defend their 
position. The news upset Sforza, but not enough to give up.559 He thought 
that the repeal of the Tittoni-Venizelos’ agreement would allow the opening 
of new negotiations. The Italian Minister had already announced the 
decision to Venizelos during the Spa Conference in the first days of July, 
but the new situation accelerate his decision. On July 26th, the Greek 
Ambasador, Coromilas, was notified of the Italian decision, but the 
Albanian authorities were not willing to negotiate at all: they left no choice 
to the Italian government but to evacuate the Eastern Adriatic shore.560 As 
a result, on August 2nd, the agreement was signed, and Sforza completely 
changed his attitude, causing the disappointment of the Allies.561 
The Albanian Question was “cleverly” closed, in Sforza’s opinion.562 It 
was true that the initial program was different, but it was impossible to 
contrast the Albanian nationalists with the Italian means. The Government 
had no alternative but to renounce Valona, which clearly had a strategical 
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importance but only if the Albanians agreed with the Italians.563 Despite 
Sforza also had followed a different strategy until that moment, Tirana 
became the “safety valve” in case of impossibility to reach an agreement 
with Belgrade. Henceforward, Rome’s purpose should be to have a friendly 
relationship with Tirana, indeed the Foreign Minister would be careful not 
to touch the Albanian Question during the negotiations with the 
Yugoslavs. 564  The agreement of August 2nd was the first step toward a 
peaceful Italian penetration into the Balkans and the Albanian 
independence became an anchor of Italian foreign policy.565  
Rome had to oppose the Greek and Serbian plans of annexation in the 
Albanian territories. With regard to Greece, on August 10th was signed the 
Bonin-Venizelos Agreement with which Sforza renewed almost all the 
commitments previously taken by Tittoni. In this way, the Minister tried to 
compensate for repealing the previous agreement. That action, indeed, 
disappointed the Allies and the Serbs who did not appreciate the change in 
the Albanian policy.566 Moreover, on the same day the Treaty of Sèvres was 
signed. It was unreasonable to go back on the most important commitments 
undertaken with Athens. However, the Albanian agreement would 
inevitably influence the negotiations with the Yugoslavs. Even if the 
Yugoslavs did not accept the Pact of London, the Albanian deal should not 
be jeopardized.567 
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In July, during the Spa Conference, Sforza had started the negotiations 
with the Yugoslavs. On the 17th the Italian Minister had a long meeting with 
Trumbich. 568  The chief of Italian diplomacy announced his intention of 
negotiating because he wanted the two countries to be allied. As the 
Minister explained to Giolitti, Rome should act with Belgrade as an “equal” 
and recognize its aspirations in order to realize in the Balkans the “true 
Italian colonies.”569 Sforza was thinking of an economic penetration of the 
Adriatic Eastern shore. He was determined to obtain “real” Italian borders, 
which guaranteed the protection of Trieste, and he was ready to abandon 
the Dalmatian territories with the exception of Zara. It meant that Mount 
Nevoso should mark the Italian boundaries: it had a strategical importance 
and was demanded by the public opinion.570 
Once the Government’s program had been decided, the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Minister worked to obtain internal support.571 During the 
summer, Sforza met Sonnino and Benito Mussolini, by that time leader of 
the fasci di combattimento (i.e., “fighting leagues”). The meeting of August 
23rd with the ex-Foreign Affairs Minister was not a success. The two men 
wrote different accounts of the conversation. According to Sforza, Sonnino 
begged him not to yield the Dalmatian territories, as established in the Pact 
of London.572 Instead, Sonnino wrote a long report about the conversation 
of that day. 573  Starting from the disrespectful behavior of the Foreign 
Minister, the old statesman criticized the Government for following a policy 
of “renounces.” The Albanian Protocol and the decision to leave Valona had 
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been “big mistakes.” 574  The abandonment of Dalmatia in favor of the 
Yugoslavs would be another one. Sonnino did not agree with the approach 
of the new Government; they were just following the previous “bad 
policies” of finding a compromise regardless to the cost. A “good policy” 
would consist in solving the problems in the best way. If this was 
impossible, the Government should resist and not give up on a vital 
national interest. The agreement with Belgrade was an illusion. A situation 
of friendship and peace was impossible, because the hate against Italy 
constituted the sole bond which kept together the Kingdom. Sforza agreed 
with Sonnino on this point. In fact, in the diplomat’s opinion, the agreement 
would mean the end of Yugoslavia.575 
Sforza established a better relationship with Mussolini, who during the 
war sided with democratic interventionists and understood the need of 
closing the dispute with the Yugoslav Kingdom. Sforza, in a letter written 
in 1947, wrote that he had met the fascist leader already in 1918, when it 
was decided to hold the Congress of Nationalities in Rome. On that 
occasion, Mussolini approved the idea of an entente with the Yugoslavs.576 
In the same document, Sforza affirmed that he received Mussolini at the 
Consulta during the summer of 1920. Mussolini still had the idea of 
reaching a compromise with the neighboring countries to the point that he 
agreed on the constitution of Fiume as a free State and suggested focusing 
the negotiations on Zara as an autonomous city “with the diplomatic 
representation under the Italian control.” The two men met again during 
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the fall, and Sforza obtained Mussolini’s cooperation in dealing with 
D’Annunzio and convinced him to accept the future disposal.577 
In the meantime, Giolitti and Sforza secured the Allies’ approval. The 
Prime Minister met Lloyd George at Lucerne on August 22nd and 23rd and 
Millerand at Aix-les-Bains on September 12th and 13th. 578  Both foreign 
leaders accepted a mediation with Belgrade, but the turning point was the 
French action, as the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vesnić confirmed.579 The 
French Prime Minister also recommended Giolitti delay the conversation 
with the Yugoslavs and to wait for the American elections in order to avoid 
Washington’s intrusion.580 
On this basis, the bilateral negotiations were opened at Rapallo on 
November 7th. It took only five days to reach the final entente which was 
signed on November 12th, but it was not easy.581  At the beginning, the 
Yugoslavs did not accept Mount Nevoso as a new border nor the Italian 
annexation of Zara. “They found it hard to cede half a million Slavs.”582 On 
the first question, the Government was determined; it was “necessary” to 
obtain Mount Nevoso. 583  Sforza remembers in his memoirs that “the 
discussion, one night reached a degree of dramatic tension.” The Italian 
Minister threatened Trumbić and told him that such a stubbornness could 
bring to the ruin of his country. Sforza said that everything could be used 
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as a weapon against them: Albania, Hungary, Montenegro, and the 
Habsburg.584  
The Chief of the Consulta was clearly taking advantage of the isolation 
which Belgrade was experiencing in that moment because of the French and 
British indifference. That situation in turn was caused by the Yugoslavia’s 
disagreeable attitude against Austria.585 Plus, the Yugoslavs also had lost 
the support of the United States where Wilson’s policy was called into 
question by the elections. Indeed, Trumbić had to change his mind and to 
accept the condition of Mount Nevoso. The same strategy was used for 
Zara. Vesnić asked Sforza to wire Giolitti and to inform him the reasons 
why they opposed the Italian requests.586 The Prime Minister was willing to 
renounce the littoral town; its independence or the autonomy would have 
been acceptable.587 Instead, Sforza said that Giolitti “completely” supported 
his views, and the Yugoslavs gave up.588 
On November 12th, the Treaty of Rapallo was signed. Italy had obtained 
the Alpine frontier line, Istria, the islands of Lussin and Cherso, Zara and 
privileges for the Italians of Dalmatia. Fiume became an independent city 
although “contiguous” with the Italian boundaries. In addition, there was 
a secret exchange of notes between Sforza and Trumbić related to Porto 
Baros. The agreement placed the Port outside the territory of the 
independent State, in the Yugoslav part. The agreement was possible 
thanks to this disposal, according to Sforza.589 
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The Treaty of Rapallo definitely solved the Adriatic Question, allowing 
Italy to follow a free diplomatic action. It also marked the independence of 
the Albanian question and the end of the D’Annunzio’s expedition. Finally, 
in Sforza’s view the importance of the entente laid in anti-Habsburg 
Protocol. During his speech at the Italian Parliament to obtain the 
ratification of the agreement, the Minister highlighted the importance of the 
disposal with which the two Governments agreed on opposing any 
potential action that was geared toward the restoration of the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy.590  
 
Italy will protect its own wealth and the one of its neighboring Country, 
which should have been a ruthless rival, instead has transformed into a 
friendly, economic and political Ally with the purpose of avoiding the 
reconstitution of unnatural conglomerates as the dynasties, which left such 
a bitter memory as in Rome and as in Belgrade. Nothing divides the two 
Countries anymore, and there is no illusion in hoping for a near future in 
which Italians and Yugoslavs will find in the common friendship a precious 
gift in a political and in a moral field. 
Indeed, by the Treaty of Rapallo, the Austrian ideal, with its lasting anti-
Italian feature, has been definitely destroyed. It was a danger which could 
jeopardize the best result of our victory.591 
 
Sforza, like Contarini who had an essential role in the negotiations, 
believed that the Great War had to be considered as the final chapter in the 
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long story of the Italian unification process.592 Finally, Rome had succeeded 
in the defeat of its most dangerous enemy: the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, a result that the Government had to protect. Indeed, Sforza 
completed his design with the support he gave to the formation of the Little 
Entente, which was an alliance among Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and 
Romania. The Foreign Affairs Minister also signed a commercial agreement 
with his Czechoslovakian colleague Beneš in February 1921.593  
The ententes with the Yugoslav Kingdom and the other successor States 
of Austria-Hungary answered to the necessity of protecting the Italian 
borders and increasing Italian influence in territories where it was 
impossible before – also coming up against other European Powers, mainly 
France. The King, recognizing the importance of Sforza’s diplomatic action, 
gave the title of Collare dell’Annunziata to the Foreign Minister, that meant 
to become the cousin of the sovereign. Moreover, Contarini, who went to 
Stazione Termini to greet the Minister coming back from Rapallo, was 
appointed as a Senator.594 Nevertheless, the Treaty had to face a strong 
domestic opposition. Sforza was labeled as a defeatist by the nationalists 
who were not sensitive to the political or economic advantages which 
would come from the entente. In particular, Luigi Federzoni, one of the 
main representative of the nationalist group, blamed the Government for 
giving up territories – which had been conquered by the Italian Army – for 
nothing but a promise of friendly relations with the Yugoslav Kingdom – 
i.e., with Serbs.595 Federzoni did not believe in the principle of political and 
economic cooperation with the neighboring country, above all because the 
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cohabitation of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes was seen as a factor of 
instability.596 The common fight against a potential Habsburg restoration 
was not enough to create a steady relationship. As a consequence, he also 
criticized the Italian support for the Little Entente. The weakest point of the 
Treaty, indeed, lied in the lack of guarantees for Italian security since the 
Austrian danger was replaced by “Yugoslav imperialism.”597 
 
 
 
 
4.V. SFORZA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER RAPALLO  
 
A few days after his return from Rapallo, on November 28, Sforza left Rome 
to meet Millerand at the Elysée.598 The conversation focused on the Turkish 
Question. The Italian Foreign Minister had opposed the Allied policy in 
favor of Venizelos’ requests more than once. In June, during the Conference 
of Boulogne, and in July at Spa, he did not hesitate in saying that the 
entrance of Hellenic military forces into Anatolia was a mistake. It was the 
best move to strengthen the Turkish nationalism and militarism. 599 
Nevertheless, the Chief of the Italian diplomacy could do nothing but to 
imply that his  Government would not wait to take advantage of the 
favorable occasion.600  
The atmosphere was changed by the results of the Greek elections in 
mid-November. The leader of the Greek nationalist, Venizelos, was 
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defeated and King Constantine could come back to lead the country. 
Constantine had opposed the Greek entrance into the war and the Allies 
were concerned about his return. Millerand realized that it was time to 
change the policy towards the Turks and invited Sforza to visit him before 
going to London, where an inter-allied Conference was scheduled. The 
Italian Government would participate to the meeting, even if they had been 
invited last minute at the meeting.601 
The Turkish question would be at the center of the inter-allied 
Conference and was also the main topic of the conversation with the French 
president.  It was an evidence of a changing spirit in the relations between 
the two Mediterranean Countries. Millerand said that it was impossible to 
rely on Greeks for the future in order to stabilize the region. After all, there 
was no chance for a military intervention of the Allies. As a consequence, 
there was a “last solution:” i.e., the Turks.602 The French President was also 
concerned about a possible alliance between the Turks and the Bolsheviks 
against the Western countries. They had a vital interest in finding as soon 
as possible a solution of the problem.603  Sforza, obviously, agreed with 
Millerand and, on the same day, left Paris to reach London.  
At Victoria Station the Italian Minister found Imperiali and Lord Curzon 
waiting for him.604 On the night of the 28th and the day after, Sforza had long 
conversations with his English colleague. The Chief of the Consulta had to 
defend himself from the accusation of selling weapons to the Turks. Lord 
Curzon remarked the ambiguity of the Italian policy. Sforza said that he 
was willing to cooperate for a solution in the public interest. It meant 
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reaching a peaceful compromise and taking action in order to divide the 
Russians from the Turks. The Greek question represented a less important 
problem.605 Lloyd George agreed with Sforza on this point when they talked 
few days later.  However, he could not support Sforza’s stance and agreed 
on negotiating with Kemal. As the Italian Minister wrote to Giolitti, the 
British Premier was “intoxicated” against Constantine and “for reasons of 
protestant psychology was also against every attenuation of the Turkish 
Treaty.” 606  Sforza replied that he would endorse every preventative 
measure against the Greek sovereign, but “it would be difficult to him to go 
against the will of people.”607  
In the British capital, the Allies did not agree on the terms of the revision 
of the Treaty of Sevres and decided to postpone the discussion. Sforza, 
during the proceedings highlighted the need of talking with Kemal and his 
representatives. On December 3rd, he argued that the Allied policy was 
doing nothing but creating conditions for an alliance between the Turks and 
Russians, as Krassin had told him.608 The French representative Berthelot 
supported that argument, but Lloyd George was not worried about that. 
The main concern of the English Prime Minister was the Greek political 
situation and a possible return of King Constantine, which was not 
acceptable.  
The final resolution was a joint declaration which was addressed to 
Athens. In the document, the Allies stated their freedom of action if 
Constantine returned.609 They also convened on waiting for the decision of 
the Greek Government to decide the necessary actions in order to establish 
                                                
605 Sforza to Giolitti, London, November 29, 1920, in ACS, CS, b. 1, f. 2. 
606 Sforza to Giolitti, London, December 1, 1920, in ACS, CS, b. 1, f. 2. 
607 Ibid. 
608 British Documents on Foreign Policy (BDFP), First Series, v. VIII, Notes of a Conference, 
December 3, 1920, n. 98, 847. 
609 Micheletta, Italia e Gran Bretagna, 270. 
	 	 	
169 
a lasting peace in the Near East. Such a statement aimed to “open the path 
for a revision of the Treaty, which was the main goal,” in Sforza’s view. 
Indeed, the Minister’s goal was exactly a change of Sèvres’ dispositions.610 
In the meantime, in London, Sforza negotiated the commercial 
agreement with Krassin. As Minister, Sforza had not abandoned the policy 
of the previous Government, but delayed the closure of the entente in order 
to wait for London’s decision on Moscow. By the end of the year, Sforza 
was ready to sign the deal, at the same time as the British. Instead, Krassin 
refused to sign a pact that was the exact copy of the English one. The Soviets 
were interested in having political recognition from Italy, so that they 
would create a breach in the Western Alliance.611 Obviously, the Russians 
could count on the Italian lack of resources, but it is true that Sforza was 
trying to follow a differentiation strategy. At that time, Italy was largely 
dependent on Great Britain in terms of coal imports, and Sforza’s policy of 
“penetration to the East” has to be framed in this situation.612 
British exporters were not enthusiastic about that strategy. Lloyd George 
was clear in expressing his disappointment over a lunch with Sforza in 
Paris, during an Allied Conference in January 1921.613 To further complicate 
the Anglo-Italian relations was the decision to remove Imperiali from his 
office. The latter was replaced by Giacomo De Martino who was well 
known for being Germanophile and close to Tittoni; indeed, the ex-Minister 
had suggested the Ambassador as a Foreign Minister to Giolitti.614  
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Once again, the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister had to defend his actions. 
Sforza declared that the Italian Government was not interested in an 
isolated action in the Near East, but the goal consisted in creating “a close 
entente with England.” 615  The Executive hoped for the creation of an 
independent and vital Turkey where it was possible to expand Italian trade 
and firms. Rome was ready to use “all its influence” to reach peace as soon 
as possible.616 Indeed, in January Rome had also hosted a Congress of the 
nationalist Turks, and the Minister offered his mediation with the 
Government of Angora.617 Lloyd George ironically declined the offer, but 
all the same, Sforza authorized informal contacts with Mustafa Kemal in 
order to find a bilateral entente. The Italian Minister also invited the Turkish 
leader to participate at the Conference of London, on his own initiative.618 
The eminent Turkish personalities who gathered in Rome had adopted a 
resolution which included a program of revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. 
The assembly from the Italian capital declared that “liberty must be given 
to [the Turkish State] to live and act” as it had been reduced to its 
“ethnographical limits.” They demanded “the expulsion of the Greeks from 
Thrace and Asia Minor […], but also the abolition of the zone of economic 
influence, of system of control, of the policing of Straits, and of 
capitulations.” 619  Considering these premises, Sforza’s policy seems 
impracticable. He did not understand why the British Government refused 
to receive the Turkish delegation in February during the Conference of 
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London– which “should have opened the eyes of the most confident,”620 as 
the Italian Minister writes.  
The results, in fact, were not satisfying. The British Government did not 
believe in the Italian project of a Mediterranean Entente and, above all, had 
no confidence in Sforza. The Foreign Office was informed about secret 
transitions going on in Rome in which members of the Angora Government 
were purchasing “arms, ammunitions, & c.”621 The American Embassy also 
observed the presence of an “unofficial Legation of the Angora Government 
at Rome, located at Piazza dell’Esquilino.” According to Washington officials, 
this Legation was mainly focused on propagandistic activities, and the 
members of the staff were correspondents for Constantinople newspapers 
or former Turkish officials in “close relations” with the Italian 
Government.622 
 
It is stated by the informant that the Kemalist party is at present cooperating 
with the Italia Foreign Office at the Conference in London. The support of 
the Italian Government has been gained by concessions in Asia Minor and it 
has made several political sales of manufactured goods to the Angora 
Government. However, the Kemalist here seem to believe that it would be to 
their interests to have a radical revolution in Italy, rather than to rely on the 
good faith of the present Government. They feel that once this Government 
is strong. It will willingly throw over the Turkish nationalists and keep the 
concessions which were given it as the price of its support. However, there 
is no doubt that for the present, although puzzled by the obscure political 
situation in Italy, the Kemalists are not intriguing against the Giolitti 
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Government, and would prefer to have it remain in power, but only as a 
weak and precarious Government on which they can bring pressure.623 
 
The American information was correct.  Sforza signed an agreement with 
Bekir, chief of the Turkish delegation at the Conference of London which 
was held from February 21st to March 12th. Indeed, the Turkish and the 
German Question were the main topics of the reunion. With regard to the 
latter, the impossibility to reach an agreement with the Germans on the 
reparations, on March 5th, provoked the decision to occupy the Ruhr river 
ports of Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort. Sforza openly revealed his 
opposition to the military action, but did not take any concrete action: 
Italian Government was against severe measures in Germany, but Sforza 
did not want to endanger the friendly relations with France.624 Moreover, 
the resolution taken by the Conference also established the Allied control of 
the the Rhenish customs offices and a levy on German exports of 50 
percent.  So, there was an economic interest to protect, and Sforza requested 
– and obtained, an Italian representative in the Allied Rhineland 
Commission, in which Rome had not been represented until that moment.625 
Finally, Sforza had already announced to Lloyd George that Italy would 
support no British action in Germany as long as it did not obtain any 
privilege in the Mediterranean.626 As a consequence, on March 8th the Allies 
occupied the three German cities without the Italian support and on March 
13th, Sforza signed the agreement with the Turks. The entente established 
the principles of the Italo-Turkish cooperation in the zones that the 
Tripartite Agreement assigned to Italy. There was also an additional 
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disposition with which the Italian Government committed themselves to 
support all the Nationalists requests related to the Treaty of Sèvres and to 
the situations in Thrace and Smyrna.627  
The French Government also reached a compromise with the Turks. 
When Lloyd George and Lord Curzon discovered the agreements, they 
immediately asked for the two texts. Sforza, as usual, played for time. The 
Italian Minister communicated to the British Ambassador in Rome all the 
provisions except the last one, mentioning the Italian support for the 
Turkish aspirations of revisionism.628 The Chief of the Consulta, moreover, 
did not produce a written copy because of “parliamentary reasons.” He said 
that “in no way” the entente constituted a “real and special international 
pact.” 629  In Sforza’s view, it was a guarantee of the privileges already 
recognized by the Tripartite Agreement. The Italian Minister was not 
thinking to anything more. However, Sforza realized that the Turks could 
make more requests once they obtained the Greek defeat.630 
Sforza did not have to wait too long to understand that the compromise 
with Kemal was impossible. By the end of May, the Italian troops had to 
start the withdrawal from the Anatolian region because of the 
“predominance of fanatic elements.” 631  However, if his real goal was a 
Mediterranean Entente, the mistake would consist in annoying the Foreign 
Office. The March agreement marked the relations with Great Britain and 
opened a crisis difficult to recover. Another example of this policy was the 
attitude he had towards Afghanistan. On May 12th, he received a delegation 
from Kabul with the purpose of establishing economic and political 
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relations. The agreements were signed on June 3rd: the first provided that 
an Italian commercial mission would be sent to Afghanistan to study a 
formula of economic and technical cooperation; the second established 
diplomatic relations between the two countries with the exchange of 
permanent political delegations.632 
During those same days, the Government entered into a political crisis 
which would determine the end of Sforza’s experience at the Consulta. The 
Foreign Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister were attacked by the 
nationalists when the secret disposal of Porto Baros came out.  The critics 
were strong because of their “pliant” policies. Thus, the Government was 
compelled to resign, and Ivanoe Bonomi was appointed as the new Prime 
Minister. The latter, as Minister of War in the previous Cabinet, was one of 
the negotiators of the Treaty of Rapallo. Bonomi would have been favorable 
towards confirming Sforza at the Consulta, but the diplomat refused. The 
ex-Foreign Minister did not consider his confirmation appropriate, but 
someone else should follow his foreign policy’s guidelines. 
 
 
 
4.VI. SFORZA, THE PARIS EMBASSY AND THE FAREWELL 
 
Bonomi appointed Pietro Tomasi Della Torretta as Foreign Affairs Minister. 
When the Prime Minister asked Sforza’s opinion, the diplomat replied that 
Della Torretta was a “honest” man. He was not brilliant but he could be 
good, if Bonomi led the diplomatic action and prevented the nationalist 
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influence on himself.633 Della Torretta, in Sforza’s view, could be only an 
“executor.”634 Despite his skepticism, in September the diplomat recognized 
that the Government was following his foreign policy. This was positive 
since, as he wrote to Albertini, his policy was a “historical imperative.”635 
Nevertheless, Sforza was left apart for few months. He was an observer 
until October when rumors about his possible appointment as Italian 
delegate at the Washington Naval Conference came out. On September 30th, 
Sforza met Bonomi who confirmed that the diplomat was the most suitable 
person for that role.636 The problem was represented by the many adverse 
voices to his name. Considering those voices, Sforza wrote to Della Torretta 
and informed the Minister that he would be available to go to the United 
States and represent his Country.637 He could boast a full knowledge of the 
American diplomatic method and of previous agreements, plus a good 
reputation in the Far East, since the Conference would deal with the 
security of the Pacific area. 638  Those skills were not enough for his 
appointment, and he had to resign himself to accept his exclusion from the 
diplomatic life, at least until December. 
After being a Minister, Sforza represented a burning issue for the new 
Government. It was necessary to find an acceptable office for his rank that 
meant: Ambassador in France or Great Britain, first delegate of an 
important international mission, or Minister, again. Clearly, Sforza aimed 
to come back to the Consulta: he kept in touch with everyone, above all with 
Giolitti. Days before Christmas, Sforza met the Prime Minister. Bonomi 
hinted at the possibility of Sforza’s appointment as Ambassador in Paris. 
                                                
633 Sforza, Diario, July 25, 1921, 67. 
634 Ibid., August 20, 1921, 67. 
635 LAE, Sforza to Albertini, Forte de’ Marmi, September 19, 1921, 1493. 
636 Ibid., September 30 and October 2, 1921, 68-69. 
637 LAE, Emanuel to Albertini, Roma, October 1st, 1921, 1301-2.  
638 Ibid. 
	 	 	
176 
The bilateral relations between Italy and France were in a difficult moment. 
Della Torretta’s behavior, influenced by the nationalist pressure, 
jeopardized the reconciliation with the neighboring Ally. By the end of the 
year, the atmosphere was charged to the point that Bonomi was worried 
about the isolation of Rome. In October, the French government had 
denounced the commercial agreement provoking a strong propagandistic 
campaign in Italy. In November, Millerand announced a decree which 
could modify the regime of nationality in Tunisia. To complicate the 
situation, a diplomatic incident occurred during the Conference of 
Washington between Briand, the French Prime Minister, and Schanzer, the 
first Italian delegate.639 
Despite his initial reluctance, Sforza accepted the new appointment. He 
would have preferred to be appointed in London, but Paris would be a 
diversion from his main political objective of returning to the Consulta.640 
Seeing the domestic political crisis, it was better to be away from Rome and 
avoid to being called as a Minister in one of those Governments “which last 
six months.” 641  Paris represented a good placement for waiting for the 
formation of a more stable Executive where, eventually, he could come back 
as Minister.642 When he was officially appointed as Ambassador in Paris on 
January 29th, Barrére expressed his appreciation for the Italian choice. The 
French Ambassador wrote to Poincaré, Foreign Affairs Minister, that Sforza 
had represented the only exception among the Italian Ministers in the 
postwar years, mainly oriented towards the English partnership. Sforza 
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“played the role of mediator between the English and the French point of 
view.”643 
Barrére did not know that Sforza had been the author of the letter with 
which Nitti had requested the Ambassador’s recall to the French 
government in the spring of 1920.644 The French diplomat knew that the 
former Minister had been supportive of Paris’ policies, above all towards 
Germany.645 For instance, in 1921 Sforza entered into a major dispute with 
the Foreign Office for the Question of Upper Silesia where on March 20th – 
as the Treaty of Versailles established, people voted to choose the State, 
between Germany and Poland, which would control the territory. The 
importance of the area laid in the presence of important coal deposits. Until 
that moment, the principle, which had inspired the Anglo-Italian 
concordant action, was the exclusion of the division of the industrial area. 
This would be not economically viable, but Sforza completely changed the 
Italian approach. He made a new proposal – the so-called Sforza line, which 
envisaged the division of the region according to the principle of 
nationality. 646  As a result, Upper Silesia would be divided, and Poland 
would obtain the richest part. After all, as he wrote to Albertini in the spring 
of 1920, the Allies should avoid the rearmament of Berlin. Moreover, Italy 
could easily reach a commercial agreement with Warsaw which was 
annoyed with the French yoke.647 
Sforza’s policy was Francophile as long as it was convenient to the Italian 
interest, which, in his opinion, consisted in the “penetration of the East” and 
in finding a solution for the lack of resources. In this context, the opening of 
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new commercial channels was crucial. On March 9th, 1922 Sforza arrived in 
Paris having this design in his mind. His arrival in France coincided with 
the establishment of a new Government in Rome. The Prime Minister was 
Luigi Facta – who belonged to Giolitti’s group. Sforza did not think highly 
of his ex-colleague. His Cabinet represented just a transition’s moment. 
According to the diplomat, Facta was chosen because “the great leaders 
agreed on reserving themselves for a future Executive; in this case, Facta 
was appointed to pave the way for a new Giolitti’s Government.”648   
The Foreign Affairs Minister, Carlo Schanzer, was also a member of the 
group which was close to the old Italian statesman. The new Chief of the 
Consulta started his career as a civil servant and entered the political career 
siding Giolitti. He had also been Minister of Finance in the Government led 
by Nitti, who had already suggested the name of Schanzer to Bonomi.649 
According to Sforza, that would be enough to know that Schanzer was an 
“awful choice.”650 In 1914, the new Minister had supported the choice of 
neutrality and, during the Washington Conference, had run into the 
diplomatic incident with Briand. Even if in the United States he had 
achieved the important result of the naval equality between Paris and 
Rome, the new Foreign Minister encountered major critics abroad and in 
Italy.  
Paris was concerned about the political changes in Rome. The Ottoman 
Question and the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres were still the main issues 
when the Sforza arrived in the French Capital.651 In the first days of March, 
during a meeting with Millerand, Schanzer had made clear that the Italian 
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cooperation in the pacification of the Near East depended on two 
conditions: the confirmation of the Tripartite Agreement’s legitimacy; and 
the inclusion into the new Treaty of financial clauses which could easily 
activate the Tripartite’s stipulation. The Allies should not yield the control 
of the concessions to the Turkish Government. If that happened, Italy 
would have to deal with a new and more independent Turkey which 
offered no guarantee for Italian economic penetration. Indeed, in the Italian 
strategy, the Tripartite represented an important tool to protect the balance 
of power in the Mediterranean.652  
The Italian Minister in that occasion did not connect the Agreement with 
the French and British mandates in the ex-Ottoman territories, but the 
relation was implicit and would become definite in a short time, provoking 
Sforza’s embarrassment. The diplomat was not at ease with Schanzer who 
was unable to have any international design.653 In April, Sforza wrote in his 
diary that the Minister wanted him to be anti-French for the only reason 
that Francophobia was the trend of the moment in Italy. 654  The 
disagreement between the two men became clearer in London on the eve of 
the opening of the XIX League of Nations’ Council. On July 15th, Sforza had 
to inform the Quai d’Orsay that the Italian Foreign Minister had not enough 
time to study the project of the Syrian mandate and asked for a delay of the 
reunion. The Italian Ambassador, however, added that his Government 
adopted that attitude because Turkey had not approved the Tripartite 
Agreement yet. The Tripartite should secure, for his country, a 
counterweight to the Allies’ mandates.655 
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According to the French Minister Poincaré, such a stance was 
unacceptable. Indeed, the deal had not been recognized by the Turks 
because it was res inter alios acta, but the Allies had already agreed on 
considering the Entente effective among them. 656  Italy had a definitive 
guarantee and a complete satisfaction. France could not accept that the 
mandates were connected to the Tripartite. The mandates could not depend 
on a condition which had been already fulfilled. Sforza agreed with the 
French Minister and did not reply.657 
The question of the mandates marked an irreparable fracture between 
the Ambassador and the Minister – a “miserable” person, in Sforza’s 
view.658 However, the Embassy’s staff seemed to have its hands tied. On the 
21st, the Italian Chargé d’affairs, Carlo Galli, tried to justify the Italian 
request of opening new negotiations with the difficult Italian domestic 
situation.659 The press had not stopped to attack the Allies behaviors. As 
Galli said, the Peace Conference’s procedures were still bright in the 
memories of Italian people. The Adriatic Question, the mandates and the 
Greek expedition of Smyrna were considered as acts against Rome.660 So 
that, Schanzer wanted to be able to show the Parliament an agreement 
which secured the national interests. “Tout à fait intolérable,” according to 
Poincaré and his official, who told Galli that Sforza would be able to find a 
compromise with the French Foreign Minister and to persuade the Consulta 
to respect the previous agreements.661 
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Though, it has to be mentioned: Italy was noticeably experiencing a 
critical time. In July, the Italian workers called for a new general strike; in 
the meantime, conversations for the formation of a new Cabinet were 
ongoing in Rome. Schanzer’s concerns were comprehensible because on 
July 19th the Government had been defeated in the Chamber. Sforza 
followed the national events and was concerned about the “social 
disorder.”662 He considered the Prime Minister to be unable to handle the 
situation. A simple Cabinet reshuffle meant the “death” of the liberal 
system, and for this reason, the Ambassador solicited Giolitti to form a new 
Government. 663  His name was enough to represent the “passage to a 
broader atmosphere.” That meant a Government able to obtain the support 
of the “honest fascists” and the socialists.664 But the King decided not to 
replace Facta and to make only make minor revisions in the Executive team 
because it was necessary to reestablish the order in the Country.665 The 
authorities were scared of a possible revolution, and on August 1st a new 
parliamentary vote of confidence confirmed Facta, with Schanzer as 
Foreign Minister. Even if the strike was not a success, it represented the 
opportunity for the fascists to occupy the city halls and other meeting places 
during the month of August.  
As a matter of fact, no one had understood what the fascism really meant 
and, between 1921 and 1922, Mussolini was able to transform the movement 
in a party. The Government could barely stabilize the situation and 
Mussolini was considered as a representative to speak with for the 
formation of a new Cabinet able to control the country.666Those political 
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conversations were still ongoing when Sforza was in Italy for his vacation 
on August 22nd. He spent almost a month in the countryside, but he also 
met Giolitti.667 Facing the precarious social and political conditions, Sforza 
also had contacts with Mussolini.668 The Ambassador aimed to dissuade the 
fascist leader from organizing fascism in the Italian colonies in France. Plus, 
Sforza was worried about the effects fascism could have in southern Italy.669 
Informing Giolitti about the conversation, Sforza explained that in the 
North fascism had “useful” effects because “historical and moral elements” 
controlled it. By contrast, in the South “brigantaggio” (i.e., banditry) could 
spread and provoke a war to extirpate it. The result could be the formation 
of a fascist cabinet or, as alternative, a Giolitti’s Cabinet. 670  As regards 
France, Mussolini relied on Sforza to persuade his agent not to act unwisely. 
The Ambassador, however, “somehow” regretted the Mussolini’s “limited” 
authority. Both of them shared the criticism of the “weak” action carried 
out by Schanzer with regard to Fiume, a topic on which the two agreed.671 
 The Ambassador went back to Paris on September 17th, and after few 
days he received a telegram announcing the death of his father, so he was 
back in Italy on October 3rd. 672  In the meantime, there was an ongoing 
Congress of the Socialist Party in Rome. The political crisis – which had 
been formally solved in August, had not ended yet. The result of the 
Congress was the fracture of the Party, so that the Right wing formed the 
“Partito Socialista Unitario.” The latter could count 70 members of the 
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Chamber who were ready to support a new Government with the 
Democrats and the Popular Party.673 During those days Mussolini also had 
meetings with Giolitti and Nitti. The general conviction was that a broadly 
based Government would be formed. Many democrats and liberals 
believed that Fascism could be regimented in a constitutionalizing process. 
According to those political circles, the crisis could be solved by the 
formation of a new Government which would be led by a liberal leader and 
would include members of the fascist party. Indeed, the fascist leader 
demanded six Ministries and new elections.674  
The Ambassador also thought that if a new Cabinet was formed, he 
would be appointed as Foreign Affairs Minister.675 In his opinion, Albertini 
was the only other prominent person who could hold that office.676 In the 
meantime, the Ottoman Question was still the priority of Sforza’s office. 
Indeed, the Allies signed on October 11th the Armistice of Mudanya, which 
ended the war between Turkey and Greece. The Entente’s Powers were 
preparing for the Conference which needed to discuss the revision of the 
Treaty of Sèvres. Sforza was ready to go to the Conference as the first Italian 
delegate, but the diplomat also asked for Albertini’s willingness to go.677 
The request could depend on the fact that he believed himself to be 
appointed as future Minister.  
Sforza would lose his expectations in few days. According to the 
diplomat’s memoirs, in the days which came before the well-known 
“Marcia su Roma,” he received a visit from Gustavo Nesti, director of the 
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Italian press agency Stefani. Nesti told the Ambassador about Mussolini’s 
regret for the impossibility to appoint the diplomat as Foreign Minister in 
the Cabinet which the fascist leader “was sure to lead.”678 Nesti offered the 
diplomat the opportunity to lead the Italian delegation at the Conference of 
Lousanne and negotiate as a “real plenipotentiary,” the peace Treaty with 
Turkey and the Allies. Sforza could also keep the Embassy in Paris.679  
Sforza observed the events of October 28th and of the following days from 
his office in Paris, and on October 31st, he resigned as soon as he received 
the telegram announcing the appointment of Mussolini as President of the 
new Government. Referring to a speech the fascist leader had delivered at 
the Theatre San Carlo di Napoli on October 24th, Sforza argued that in order 
to adopt “a foreign policy which is a policy, and not just a sum of feelings 
and resentments, it is necessary to assign the most delicate places to men 
who agree with the new Government’s view.”680 The diplomat did not leave 
any chance of negotiation as his staff suggested: to be sure that the King 
would not insist on him to retire his resignation, the Ambassador sent his 
letter of resignation en clair. The news immediately spread out.681 Mussolini 
tried to persuade Sforza not to leave his office; in fact, the new Government 
had not explained their foreign policy guidelines yet.682 
Contarini and the Embassy’s staff were “surprised” by the ex-Minister’s 
decision.683 In particular, the Foreign General Secretary tried to change the 
Ambassador’s position. Contarini suggested waiting for the explanation of 
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the new Government’ foreign policy. The moment, indeed, would require 
responsibility to overcome the “severe crisis” which the Country was 
experiencing.684 For this reason, all the responsible men should “facilitate 
the formation of the Government with a realistic program in order to protect 
the national interest.” To conclude, the abandonment of the Cabinet was “a 
mistake” because other forces were ready to push Mussolini in an opposite 
direction.”685 
Contarini’s attempt was fated to fail. Sforza explained the reasons of his 
decision in a private letter addressed to Giolitti.686 In the first place, the 
Ambassador did not want to create a “question of self-esteem.” In the 
second place, he did not want to damage the Country’s international 
relations. Finally, he sent the letter en clair to demonstrate that he was 
determined in leaving his office.687  
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Conclusions 
 
Sforza, as a Foreign Minister of Giolitti, belonged to the Italian Liberal 
Party, according to the Foreign Office.688 He was not just a diplomat but also 
a politician.689 In October 1922, Sforza was among those who had supported 
the idea of a Government including different parties, and he also believed 
in the “honest fascists.”690 In his memoirs, the ex-Minister writes that his 
relationship with Mussolini was positive.691 The disappointment came from 
the presence of personalities such as Federzoni, who was appointed 
Minister of the Colonies. The latter belonged to the Nationalist Party and 
had strongly criticized Giolitti-Sforza’s policy, in particular the Treaty of 
Rapallo.692 When Sforza went to Rome and had an hour of conversation 
with Mussolini on November 6th, Federzoni also arrived at the Consulta.693 
In the diplomat’s opinion, the new Minister did not want him to go back to 
Paris. Instead, the Ambassador would be in the French capital city until 
November 20th.694 Before leaving, he said to his chargé d’affairs, Carlo Galli, 
that the new Government would last only three months. As a consequence, 
the Ambassador thought he would be recalled as Prime Minister.695 
Sforza’s resignation was functional to his return as Chief of the 
Executive. So that, the diplomat could complete his foreign policy’s design. 
On June 13, 1922, in a report addressed to Rome, Sforza wrote that he had 
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strongly opposed the theory which considered the epilogue of the First 
World War as major Italian defeat.696 Italy had come out of the War as a 
“Mediterranean Power,” but it was just a formal result which needed to be 
preserved. Obviously, France and Great Britain had been able to realize the 
aspirations they had before the conflict flared up. They obtained new 
territories which also meant a growth in financial responsibilities.697 Taking 
care for the mandates in the Near East was an expense Italy could not afford 
because of the economic crisis which struck the country. Plus, Sforza was 
not sure that such an effort would have been enough to maintain the control 
on the Arab countries, which were on the way of a complete 
independence.698 
Considering the Italian situation, Rome could not be able to impose its 
authority in a region such Anatolia. The only wise decision to make was an 
action aimed towards being accepted as an external influence over the 
Angora Government. This strategy would have allowed the commercial 
and industrial penetration in the Near East. It would also be an important 
political tool to use in the Arab world.699 Of course, the Allies would oppose 
their reasons against this policy, but in Sforza’s view, those disputes always 
ended in nothing but words. So that, there was no reason to worry about 
protests and threats. Sforza believed that the strength of a country did not 
lie in the extension of territorial possessions, above all with regard to Italy. 
As a realist, he thought that Rome could only follow a policy of influence, 
because it did not own enough resources.700 
                                                
696 Sforza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 13, 1922, in ACS, CS, b. 3, f. 6. 
697 Ibid., 1. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Ibid., 2.  
700 Ibid., 3. 
	 	 	
188 
 Sforza belonged to a post-Crispi diplomatic generation. He entered the 
career in 1896 when Italy had been shocked by the defeat of Adua. As a 
young official, Sforza worked many years in Paris with Tornielli in the years 
of the Italo-French reconciliation. He understood that a positive relation 
with France was as crucial for the Italian security as the cooperation with 
Great Britain. His conversation of Hyde Park with San Giuliano should 
have left a sign in the young diplomat, who made of the commercial 
penetration of the East his main goal.  
Nevertheless, he did not oppose the Triple Alliance as long as it was a 
tool to maintain the European peace. Considering this context, the 
experience of Algeciras with Visconti Venosta held a tremendous 
importance to the young diplomat, who could see the premises of the war 
in those days. The old statesman, who had worked with Mazzini and 
Cavour, taught him how to maintain an equidistant behavior from the 
extreme Franco-German rivalries. Sforza looked at him as a mentor. It was 
not a coincidence that in 1922 Barrère stated that Sforza had been the only 
postwar Minister committed in the mediation between the British and 
French interests. From Visconti Venosta – and Giorgini’s accounts, Sforza 
also inherited Mazzini’s idea of the inevitability of the dissolution of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman Empire and Cavour’s tradition of European 
equilibrium.701 According to this tradition, Italy’s major interest lied in the 
opposition to the creation of any major force in the Balkans and in the 
Mediterranean and, after the First World War, the reconstruction of such 
balance of power was a major issue for the “new Europe.” 702  As a 
consequence, the creation of the Little Entente was a sort of wall against a 
new Russian or German expansion; for this reason, Italy had to support this 
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alliance.703 Part of this tradition was also the awareness of the Italian limits: 
Italy was a “young” country with huge social, financial and military 
problems which made the Mediterranean cohabitation with Great Britain 
and France extremely difficult, but essential because anchored in the liberal 
values. However, none of the heirs of the Risorgimento would have endorsed 
a complete renunciation of the Italian role as a Great Power.704 
In foreign politics, Cavour’s tradition represented a special authority for 
the prestige that came from a success of exceptional dimensions, 
comparatively obtained with minimal costs. Cavour’s legacy remained in 
the Italian diplomacy and turned into a special skill of focusing on the right 
combination of forces in which the Italian interests could be framed.705 That 
meant to choose the diplomatic method rather than war. In 1914 Sforza had 
recommended San Giuliano to maintain the neutrality. Sforza, as Giolitti 
and many other Italian prominent figures, thought the terre irredente could 
be obtained by negotiations. The diplomat could not imagine the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But, it is true that he was shocked by 
the news of the German attack on Belgium, which was his wife’s country. 
Moreover, Sforza’s family had a close relation with the Belgian Monarchy, 
which he also remained in touch with during the exile’s years.706  
That was not enough to keep the British trust in the post-war period. The 
Allies saw those as Giolitti who had supported the neutrality as antagonists. 
As a High Commissioner in Turkey, Sforza endorsed the nationalist 
movement. When in 1943 the diplomat demanded clearance to go back to 
Italy, the Foreign Office would remember everything. According to the 
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British officials, Sforza’s personality could be defined in the following 
terms: 
 
A clever man, whose astonishing vanity entirely warped his judgement. On 
three separate occasions Sforza behaved more foolishly than even a dull man 
may. 
1. When he gave to Sir George Buchanan the text of the Italo-Turkish 
agreement which he arranged in London, with an essential clause 
omitted. 
2. When he lied to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee 
regarding the cession of Porto Baros to Yugoslavia, and committed the 
additional blunder of saying to a group of angry critics: “What is Porto 
Baros? Four syllables.” 
3. When he telegraphed en clair from Paris offering his resignation to 
Signor Mussolini and saying why. 
Sforza has a reputation for gallantry, and for susceptibility.707 
 
On these premises, even if Mussolini’s Government had closed his 
experience in few months, as Sforza had originally thought, his return 
would have been difficult because Italy needed to reach a Mediterranean 
Entente. Indeed, Mussolini did not insist in having him as Ambassador or 
Italian delegate at the Conference of Lusanne for the revision of the Turkish 
Treaty.708 Sforza had acted according to his experience, but the world after 
the war was something completely different, where there was no space for 
the “zones of influence.” Sforza should have understood it, and, probably, 
somehow he did. In April 1928, in the introduction of his Diplomatic Europe 
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since the Treaty of Versailles, Carlo Sforza quotes Napoléon’s last message to 
his son:  
 
The aim of all my son’s efforts should be, to rule by peace. For the future 
there is only one way to convince Europe, and that is, through reason. My 
son should be a man of new ideas… the new idea is, to reunite Europe in the 
bonds of an indissoluble federation. It is in this direction that Europe is 
advancing. To endeavor to retard progress would be a waste of strength. It 
is useless to struggle against the inevitable. I cut the Gordian Knot of the 
nations; now it must be united.709 
 
In 1928 Sforza had already started working at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and had already published several papers on 
Versailles and its aftermath. He wrote that the First World War should have 
been “the culminating proof that [they] had come to the end of a Europe 
thinking of being able to live outside some more or less loose federal 
bonds.”710 In 1920 Sforza was not thinking about a European Federation, 
according to the documents, but for sure Sforza believed in the necessity of 
avoiding another war. His action focused on resolving every dispute by 
negotiations. For instance, the Treaty of Rapallo was a compromise which 
aimed for solving the Adriatic Question in the broader political scenario of 
the European stability. The agreement determined the Eastern border but, 
also, established the basis for an economic cooperation that went beyond 
that border. It represented an attempt to protect a national interest, which 
consisted in: the obtainment of the national boundaries, the maintenance of 
peace, and economic development. But, Italy also committed in the 
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prevention of a Habsburg’s restoration. Sforza believed that an Italian 
interest should be treated as an international – or European, interest in 
order to having it recognized by the international community. 711  To 
conclude, until 1922 Sforza was a committed Europeanist in method – the 
diplomatic method, but, in the following years, his action would acquire 
new meanings becoming political commitment.  
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